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THE POETICS OF EXPERIENCE: A FIRST-PERSON CREATIVE AND CRITICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF SELF-EXPERIENCE AND THE WRITING OF POETRY 
SUMMARY 
 
There is increasing interest in the personal benefits of writing poetry and a growing field 
of practical application within healthcare.  However, there is little direct research and a 
need for practice-based theoretical integration to improve understanding of the specific 
changes, creative processes and challenges involved.  
 
This study investigates the way that writing poetry can affect self-experience.  It also 
contributes to the development of combined modes of creative and critical inquiry.  A 
first-person account of the experiential and creative outcomes of writing poetry over an 
extended period is presented.  The results of this are subjected to reflexive analysis and 
a critical theoretical explication.  
 
Four factors relating self-experience to the experience of writing poetry are identified:  a 
failure of conscious intention; an inhibiting objectification of experience; an implicit 
assumption of a separate self, and a changed experience of self that felt more embodied 
and fluid.  These findings are the basis of a theoretical examination that utilizes the 
work of Ignacio Matte Blanco and Michael Polanyi, in conjunction with insights 
derived from contemporary psychoanalysis, embodied cognition, neuroscience and 
attention training. 
 
An original theoretical integration is developed.  It is proposed that poetry has a 
characteristic bi-logical form that condenses and integrates difference and identity in a 
simultaneous and concentrated manner.  The process of composition requires a 
reciprocal interplay of conscious and unconscious processes, which can be enhanced by 
an increase in embodied awareness, a decrease in the exercise of deliberate volition, and 
the facilitative use of images.  This involves a flexible oscillation of awareness that, 
modulated by the breadth of attention and the degree of identification or separation from 
experience, directly alters the boundaries and quality of self-experience.  This 
framework avoids the limitations of reductive or eliminative views of the self and 
allows for the creative operation of what is dubbed the 'nondual imagination'. 
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1   Introduction 
1.1 Background 
I came to this study from a career in clinical psychology and as a group analyst and 
psychotherapist.  In my professional work I had observed how many people turned 
intuitively to the writing of poetry at times of personal difficulty.  They almost 
invariably found the experience of writing in this form helpful.  I had also written poetry 
at many points in my own life, and recognized that this was often during periods of 
transition or uncertainty.  Although I had paid little attention to this at the time, writing 
poetry appeared to contribute in a valuable way to my negotiation of these challenges.   
The benefits that I have witnessed go beyond the mere expression of feelings; they seem 
to include subtle but significant alterations to the experience of self and the perception 
of the world.  Furthermore, the mechanisms and challenges involved are difficult to 
explain adequately within traditional psychotherapeutic models that emphasise 
relational, learning and developmental processes within an interpersonal context.  
Among the factors that require greater understanding are the effects of writing in 
contrast to verbal interaction and, with regard to poetry, the specific significance of 
writing in a poetic form. 
In exploring these questions and extending my professional practice into the use of 
writing and literature within a therapeutic context, I found I was entering a challenging 
and rapidly developing area.  This field of work inhabits the contested ground between 
art and science, creativity and critical understanding, and the claims of both personal 
and objective forms of knowledge.  It draws on the perspectives of normally separate 
academic disciplines and focuses them on a highly complex and varied form of creative 
activity, which is informed by a strong critical tradition of its own.  My ambition in 
undertaking a personal research investigation was to remain true to the diversity and 
complexity of the first-person  experience of creative activity.   However, I also wished 
to articulate that experience in a way that would further wider theoretical integration, 
and that might be useful in terms of practical work with others. 
The thesis presented is situated within the inter-disciplinary field of creative writing and 
personal development, and is informed by the growing professional and academic 
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interest in the therapeutic uses of poetry.  It sets out to explore how, in practice and 
theory, the writing of poetry can be related to changes in self-experience.  The research 
on which it is based was undertaken through a prospective first-person investigation into 
the writing of poetry, followed by a critical explication of the outcomes of that inquiry.  
The thesis is thus centred on a practical case study of my own creative writing 
experience, and draws on contemporary psychological and psychoanalytic theory to 
formulate an original understanding of what I encountered. 
1.2 Rationale and aims of the investigation 
1.2.1 Rationale 
The rationale for the investigation emerges from my own observations and the review of 
current work in the field of creative writing and personal development that is presented 
in Chapter 2.  This suggests that there is a growing need to examine more closely the 
experience of those who write poetry, including people who are not established poets, 
and to bring together and develop theory grounded directly in that experience.  There is 
also a need to explore ways of undertaking this research that adequately reflects the 
complex and indeterminate nature of engaging in creative activity, and the 
fundamentally first-person nature of self-experience.  These needs give rise to the 
primary and secondary aims of the study.   
1.2.2 Primary aim of study 
The primary aim is to investigate the way that writing poetry can impact on the self-
experience of the writer. This aim is approached from the perspective of seeking greater 
understanding of the possible therapeutic or developmental benefits of writing poetry.  
Although inherently interdisciplinary, the study is thus centred on the psychological 
aspects of this form of creative writing, rather than on wider literary, cultural or 
philosophical questions.  
1.2.3 Secondary aim of study 
The secondary aim is to contribute to the development of modes of inquiry that combine 
a creative or artistic activity with a critical examination of the experience of undertaking 
that activity.  This aim is underpinned by the need for theory that is grounded in the 
characteristics and challenges of specific creative practices. 
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1.3 The structure and form of the thesis 
The thesis has been structured into four parts.  Part I situates the study in the context of 
relevant work in the field and outlines the nature of the integrated research approach 
that was adopted.  Part II focuses on a presentation and analysis of the first-person 
investigation that was conducted.  Part III considers the outcomes of this investigation 
from a theoretical point of view, and proposes an integrated conceptual framework that 
can help to elucidate it.  Part IV provides a discussion and evaluation of the study as a 
whole, including its implications for future research and practice.  Parts II and III are 
introduced by a short note to clarify the organisation and sequence of writing within 
these sections. 
The presentation and explication of this study necessitates the use of a range of writing 
styles and a movement between contrasting authorial voices.  The styles adopted reflect 
their ‘rhetorical appropriateness’ (Willis, Smith, & Collins, 2000, p. 2)  to the purposes 
of different sections of the thesis.  Part I consists of two chapters that employ a 
conventional third-person perspective suited to the review of related work and the 
location and development of the research design employed.  Part II contains a more 
diverse range of approaches.  Chapter 4 is written as an autobiographical narrative, in an 
attempt to convey and bring alive the most significant aspects of my experience during 
the investigation.   A selection of poems written during and as part of the study is 
presented in Chapter 5, followed by a personal commentary.  Chapter 6 takes an 
analytic and interpretive approach to the experience and creative outcomes of the 
investigation to identify the key ‘findings’.  The writing in Part II thus moves across 
narrative, poetic, reflexive and analytic modes, with an emphasis on the use of a first-
person perspective throughout. 
In Part III there is a return to a more critical form of writing which adopts a third-person 
perspective, grounded and interspersed with reference to my own experience.   This 
reflects a change in epistemological aims from the presentational and interpretive 
concerns of Part II, to the propositional and explanatory objectives of this section of the 
thesis.  The focus on reflective evaluation in Part IV requires the continued adoption of 
a critical perspective, supplemented by further reflections designed to help integrate the 
personal, creative and scholarly strands that run throughout the study. 
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Part I 
Context and Research Approach 
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2   Poetry and Self-Experience 
In this chapter, some of the key strands of the emerging area of inquiry and practice 
relating poetry and other forms of creative writing to personal development will be 
outlined.  The intention is to highlight those elements of this interdisciplinary field that 
inform, and suggest the need for, the creative and critical investigation that follows.  
2.1 Creative writing and personal development 
2.1.1 Writing and the ‘talking therapies’ 
During the last century the proliferation of psychological approaches to personal change 
and self-development have been dominated by what are loosely described as the 'talking 
therapies'.  Many of these have been influenced by psychoanalysis, the approach 
originally designated a ‘talking cure’ by Freud following remarks made by Anna O. 
(Breuer, 1955). Talking therapies are now differentiated into a diverse spectrum of 
approaches that share a standard paradigm of person-to-person spoken interaction in 
either individual or group sessions.  The reliance on talking has been supplemented in 
some therapies by writing, most commonly self-focused diary/record keeping, and 
sometimes reading, often of psychoeducational material.  However, the use of more 
creative forms of writing as a planned form of intervention is relatively unusual. 
The significance of written communication by therapists to patients has recently been 
given greater prominence.  This is partly through the influence of narrative approaches 
which seek to 're-story' or ‘re-author’ experience (White, 1995), the use of shared 
written formulations in cognitive-analytic therapy (Ryle, 1983, 1990), and new NHS 
policies that require letters and reports to be sent to patients.  The clinical value and 'art' 
of writing to patients has been explored by Steinberg (2000) who argues that the 
discipline of finding the “right words” is essential to therapy and that writing provides 
an opportunity to achieve and extend this.   
In some psychotherapeutic approaches use may be made of creative writing or 
published literature to facilitate emotional expression or assist interpretation and 
understanding.  In psychodynamic therapies such material is usually introduced by the 
patient and becomes part of the interpretative work of therapy.  However, creative work 
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is directly encouraged in some forms of Jungian therapy.  This draws on Jung’s concept 
of ‘active imagination’ and most often involves the elaboration of dreams (e.g. Kast, 
1993).  Such activity is usually seen as part of a self-initiated transformative encounter 
with the unconscious and involves working with symbols and images.  The form or 
medium in which this imaginative activity is undertaken is usually viewed as secondary. 
2.1.2 Creative writing and the arts therapies 
In the UK, the use of creative writing and literature as a specific modality of personal 
development and therapy is growing but is still relatively unstructured.  A membership 
organisation called Lapidus1 was set up in 1996 to promote the use of the literary arts in 
personal development.  This now has a professional membership category but the 
organisation has yet to accredit a formal qualification in the area, or have an agreed 
framework of either theory or practice.  This is in contrast to a number of other arts-
based therapies that have well-established systems for training and accreditation, for 
example: art therapy, music therapy, dramatherapy, and dance and movement therapy.  
These therapies draw on psychological models of emotional development and disorder, 
but use a specific art form as the primary vehicle for increasing emotional awareness 
and communication.  Alongside these modality specific traditions, there is an increasing 
interest in more integrative forms of arts therapy and more generically  ‘expressive’ or 
'creative' forms of therapy (Levine & Levine, 1999; Rogers, 1993; Simon, 2005; 
Warren, 2008).  These approaches include the use of creative writing, particularly 
poetry, and tend to emphasise the ‘creative process’ as a developmental or curative 
factor, as opposed to psychological or interpretative theory developed in other contexts.  
Current interest in creative writing as a developmental activity has followed the 
significant expansion of creative writing programmes within higher and adult education, 
and the success of earlier initiatives, such as the Arvon Foundation2, in promoting the 
teaching and facilitation of creative writing.  In the UK, therapeutic writing initiatives 
have drawn heavily on this creative writing background.   For example, through the use 
of activities evolved from creative writing exercise and workshop models but with an 
explicit focus on personal as well as writing outcomes (e.g. Bolton, Field, & Thompson, 
2006; Hunt & Sampson, 1998).  The boundary between developing creative writing 
                                                 
1
 See http://www.lapidus.org.uk/.   
2
 See http://www.arvonfoundation.org/p1.html.  
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skills and promoting personal development varies according to context but is often 
blurred, as many participants and facilitators have an interest in both dimensions and see 
them as mutually enhancing (Hunt, 2000).  
2.1.3 Bibliotherapy and poetry therapy 
In the USA, the most prominent organisation applying writing and literature to personal 
therapy and development is the National Association of Poetry Therapy3 (NAPT).  This 
was established in 1980 and accredits professional training and certification in poetry 
therapy.  Despite this title, poetry is not the only literary form employed by poetry 
therapists.  The field developed from earlier and more general applications of 
bibliotherapy, the adjunctive use of literature in support of psychiatric care, and 
continues to draw on diverse forms of literature and sometimes film. Nevertheless, 
poetry is central to the approach.  As stated on the NAPT (n.d.) website: "Poetry 
Therapy is a specific and powerful form of bibliotherapy, unique in its use of metaphor, 
imagery, rhythm, and other poetic devices."   
Poetry therapy makes a structured use of literature to evoke personal and shared 
responses, which can then be expressed and developed both verbally and in creative 
literary forms (Leedy, 1973; Lerner, 1994; Mazza, 1999).  The work is often undertaken 
in groups and the critical task of the poetry therapist is to select suitable material to 
introduce to the group, and then to facilitate discussion and response to this material 
(Chavis & Weisberger, 2003). Writing, or other activities, may be utilized to take 
forward the expression and examination of individual and group responses.  Poetry 
therapy thus makes specific use of the power of literature to resonate with the emotional 
experience of individuals, and for creative forms of writing to further a process of 
formulation and communication of that experience. 
Leedy (1969), one of the pioneers of poetry therapy, proposed the 'isoprinciple', a 
concept borrowed from music therapy, to guide the selection of suitable literary 
material.  This simply suggests that it is best to select work that is close to the current 
mood or feeling of the group or individual being worked with.  It implies that the 
therapist must have a wide knowledge of suitable literature to respond to the emerging 
needs of participants.  Hynes & Hynes-Berry (1994, pp. 44-54) describe four steps that 
                                                 
3
 See http://www.poetrytherapy.org/.  
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typically follow in working with this material.  First there is recognition: a personal 
engagement with the selected writing that stimulates some connection with feelings or 
“strikes a chord”.  This is followed by examination: a reflection on the form and nature 
of the initial and evolving reactions to the selection. Then comes juxtaposition: 
connecting different personal or group reactions and perspectives to arrive at an 
enriched and elaborated pattern of response. Finally there is application to self, to 
evaluate and integrate the personal significance of the material and individual responses 
to it.  More recently Mazza (2003, pp. 17-31) has proposed a model of poetry therapy 
which highlights the creative and symbolic components of the work.  He suggests that 
there is a receptive/prescriptive component, related to bringing a selected piece of 
literature into the therapeutic situation, followed by an expressive/creative component 
that involves the active use of creative writing by participants.  Both of these may also 
utilize symbolic/ceremonial processes that arise from the imaginative employment of 
metaphor, narrative and rituals. 
Poetry therapy has clearly developed a systematic methodology for employing literature 
therapeutically and recognises the particular effectiveness of poetry to deepen emotional 
awareness and personal expression.  Its theory and techniques are rooted in the use of 
literature as a catalyst for this personal exploration and communication. However, in 
practice it is relatively unconcerned by issues of literary quality, or craft, in participant 
writing.  Informed by psychoanalytic and humanistic therapies, it relies heavily on the 
therapeutic relationship, or group context, to support and facilitate the personal 
exploration that it promotes. 
2.1.4 Journaling and expressive writing 
The keeping of diaries or journals has a long tradition, and in the hands of some people 
has been raised to the level of a literary form.  The explicit use of journaling as a 
therapeutic and developmental activity has been supported and promoted by numerous 
publications (e.g. Progoff, 1992; Rainer, 1980), and more recently by resources such as 
journaling software.  Although journaling is recognised by the NAPT as a potential 
element of poetry therapy, it has a diversity of uses and forms, from acting as a tool in 
qualitative research and reflective learning to the recent phenomenon of Internet ‘blogs’.  
In contrast to facilitated forms of writing, exploratory journaling can be practiced 
independently of a therapist and may be seen as a form of self-help.   
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Judging by the number of publications offering guidance on how to undertake 
journaling for ‘self-healing’ and ‘discovery’ it appears to be a widely used method of 
writing for self-development.  The extent to which this involves creative forms of 
writing is unclear, but many handbooks do encourage imaginative writing exercises, 
including dialogue techniques, character portraits and poetry.  However, the essence of 
journaling consists of recording and reflecting on personal experience, sometimes with 
an emphasis on ‘free’ or stream-of-consciousness writing (Cameron, 2000; Goldberg, 
1986). 
The value of writing expressively about difficult emotional events or experiences has 
been the subject of extensive empirical research, most notably by Pennebaker (1990; 
1997).  The standard format of this 'expressive writing' or 'written disclosure' research 
paradigm is to encourage participants, often university students, to write about upsetting 
feelings and experiences for a short period each day, over a number of days or weeks.  
The writing is not shared and participants are warned that they may, initially, find the 
process distressing.  The results of numerous studies indicate that such expressive 
writing is associated with physical and psychological health benefits and reduced need 
for professional help (Easterling, L'Abate, Murray, & Pennebaker, 1999).  A feature of 
this research is that self-focused writing is employed in relative isolation.  There is no 
discussion or sharing of the writing with another person, so the role of any form of 
therapeutic relationship is reduced to the impact of the researcher recruiting participants 
and providing instructions.  Face-to-face contact between the researchers and 
participants is minimised or avoided altogether.  The benefits thus appear to be 
attributable to the act of writing and have been demonstrated to occur quite rapidly.  
Although these controls place limits on expressive writing as a developmental approach 
(e.g. Nicholls, in press) they are the basis of its value as an experimental paradigm. 
Pennebaker (2004) has concluded that the processes behind the benefits of expressive 
writing remain to be properly understood, largely because of the many levels at which 
they operate.  This is a view endorsed by other reviews of the literature (Sloan & Marx, 
2004; Smyth & Pennebaker, 2008).  One suggestion is that the benefits gained from the 
act of writing about difficult or traumatic experiences may be associated with the 
translation of felt experience into a structure than can further understanding; for 
example, by connecting emotional reactions and events into a more coherent or 
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explanatory narrative.  Another proposal is that the self-directed attention involved in 
writing has an effect not dissimilar to the alterations in awareness facilitated by 
mindfulness practices.  Brody and Park (2004) note how expressive writing may operate 
in this way to integrate unconscious levels of experience and thus impact on the sense of 
identity.  They also point out that there may be a relational dimension in writing 
connected to the existence of an implicit audience.  This connects with the idea of the 
“implicit reader” which Hunt sees as a presence in the act of writing that can influence 
how individuals may write and represent themselves (Hunt, 2004a, p. 36) .  A number 
of more fundamental processes may also be salient, including the simple act of 
confronting rather than avoiding upsetting experience.  
2.1.5 Writing within the context of the ‘arts in health’  
The role of the arts in health care has recently been the subject of a Department of 
Health review (DoH, 2007), which concluded that arts initiatives delivered worthwhile 
health benefits and should be considered integral to health service provision.  The use of 
writing and literature within this area has extended from medical education to service-
user initiatives.  Among the projects that have emerged are facilitated creative writing 
programmes and the establishment of writers-in-residence schemes.  Poets and poetry 
have been at the forefront of this movement.  One of the best-known initiatives is 
Survivors Poetry4, which supports those who have survived mental distress or trauma to 
both write and publish poetry.  Sampson sees such activity as distinctively forefronting 
the role of poetry as an arts activity that can complement other service provisions, rather 
than as a medical or therapeutic intervention (Sampson, 1999, p. 8).  This emphasis may 
be one reason why the equivalent of poetry therapy has yet to become formally 
established in the UK.   
The relationship between writing as a craft or arts activity and for therapeutic ends is 
potentially complex.  Many doubt whether writing for therapeutic purposes is likely to 
have any wider value given the possible disjunction between what is rewarding to write 
and what is worthy of the attention of others.  As Andrew Motion argues: 
Yes to access, no to dumbing down, otherwise you end up with a mush in which 
emoting or just stringing words together is its own reward, well it might be for the 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.survivorspoetry.com/.  
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person doing it but there is no earthly reason why it should be for anyone else.  
(Motion, 2002) 
It is reasonable to observe that creative writing may bring benefits without achieving 
high standards of accomplishment, but it is also plausible that developing knowledge 
and craft could enhance the capacity of writing to be used for personal benefit (Hunt, 
2000). Greater facility with writing may enhance the precision and depth of expression, 
facilitate more effective communication, and provide a stronger sense of individual 
voice.  On the other hand excessive concern with quality or achieving publication could 
contribute to inhibition, disappointment, and a potential sense of failure in those who 
may already feel vulnerable to criticism. 
One way of reconciling this is to avoid a rigid dichotomy between writing 
therapeutically and writing as an arts practice or craft.  An alternative conceptualisation 
is to view both according to how much they are emphasised in the context and purpose 
of different writing activities.  A schematic view of this is presented in Table 2.1 as an 
‘arts-therapy continuum’.  The key point of this is to highlight how the standards of 
evaluation of writing depend on where it is located along the continuum.  Problems may 
arise when standards or expectations appropriate to one area are misapplied to writing 
that has quite different imperatives. 
In addition to writing there has been increasing interest in the potential value of reading 
imaginative literature in health care.  Poetry and fiction have always been mined as a 
source of insight and understanding within psychoanalysis, and have been identified as 
a valuable source of personal learning for psychotherapists (Knights, 1995).  Hedges 
(2005), for example, seeks to demonstrate the common concerns of poets and major 
models of psychotherapy.  Literature has also been seen as a valuable humanising 
influence in the increasingly technical context of medical training (B. H. Smith, 1998).  
Although many testify to the personal rewards of reading literature, little empirical 
research has been conducted on its health benefits.  A recent grounded theory study has 
indicated that reading fiction can promote and maintain psychological well-being, and 
suggested a number of possible mechanisms for this (Sullivan, 2007).  Reading 
appeared to facilitate a vicarious form of learning about emotional, relational and life 
issues that participants could transfer to their own lives.  Processes such as 
identification, catharsis, and the integration of experience, led some people to feel less 
isolated and more able to work through their difficulties. 
  
 
 
Table 2.1   The arts-therapy continuum and creative writing. 
 
 
Arts practice/quality emphasis  
Therapeutic practice/change emphasis 
 
Art as art-form 
 
Focus on the art world 
and critical or cultural 
value. 
 
Art as art-making 
 
Focus on art and the 
process of making art. 
 
Arts in health 
 
Focus on improving well-
being via the arts. 
 
Art as therapy 
 
Focus on art as a 
therapeutic activity. 
 
Art in therapy 
 
Focus on personal 
therapy. 
 
The aesthetic quality, 
critical appreciation and 
cultural value of the 
literary product is 
paramount rather than the 
personal experience of the 
writer. 
 
Creative activity is seen to 
be affected by personal 
and social factors and 
may have transformative 
effects.  The literary 
product is important but 
the process of writing is 
also significant. 
 
The arts are recognised to 
contribute to human 
welfare and creative 
activity is seen as 
promoting well-being.  
Active participation in 
writing and literary 
activity is encouraged. 
 
The arts as creative 
therapies with writing 
used for personal 
expression, exploration 
and reflection. Can 
employ professional 
facilitation but also be a 
means of self-help. 
 
 
Art as a vehicle for 
exploration and change in 
psychotherapy.  Creative 
writing as a potential tool 
of therapeutic work. The 
content and process of 
writing utilized as an 
aspect of therapy. 
 
Professional creative 
writing. 
 
Professional or personal 
creative writing. 
 
Creative writing as an 
activity and discipline 
with life-enhancing 
benefits. 
 
 
Creative writing as a form 
of therapy. 
 
Creative writing in the 
context of a broader 
psychotherapeutic 
approach. 
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2.1.6 Conclusions 
Although applications of creative writing and literature to personal development are 
advancing there remains a significant lack of practice-based research and theoretical 
integration within the field.  This is complicated by the diversity of the work being 
undertaken and the inherently interdisciplinary nature of its associated theory base.  
Empirical support is often based on the work of Pennebaker et al (e.g. Wright, 2003) but 
this represents only one paradigm of writing and is not underpinned by an agreed 
theoretical model.  The personal benefits of creative writing have been related to a 
variety of concepts from psychoanalysis and other psychological therapies, but with an 
emphasis on the content and power of existing literature and its therapeutic applications. 
The actual practice of creative writing is in need of more detailed and specific research. 
2.2 The writing of poetry 
2.2.1 Differentiating the field 
The therapeutic applications of creative writing include a variety of activities, contexts 
and genres.  Although there may be important common factors in how these operate, 
there are also likely to be crucial differences between them.  There is a need to identify 
and investigating these differences through appropriately focused research in order to 
delineate the key processes involved.  An obvious way to structure investigation within 
the field is to distinguish between receptive and expressive uses of the 'written word', in 
other words between the activities of reading5 and writing.  These activities can then be 
differentiated according to the form or genre of the writing involved, as shown in Table 
2.2. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the personal benefits of either writing or reading will 
have at least some relation to the specific form of writing engaged with.  For example, 
the categorisation from non-fiction to poetry could be seen to reflect increasing degrees 
of emphasis on imagination over fact, and towards more 'creative' and figurative uses 
language.  This might be expected to be associated with increasingly complex aspects of 
lived experience. 
                                                 
5
 Receptive activity could also include viewing films and plays or listening to audio books and poetry 
readings.   
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Table 2.2   Therapeutic uses of different forms of writing 
  
Non-fiction 
 
Personal Writing 
 
Fiction 
 
Poetry 
 
 
 
Reading 
 
  
 
Educational 
Self-help 
Biography 
 
Autobiography 
Letters/diaries 
 
Novels 
Short stories 
Drama 
 
Published poetry 
 
 
Writing 
 
 
 
Diary keeping 
Structured 
recording 
 
Journaling 
Life story 
Expressive writing 
 
 
Fictional 
narratives 
 
Writing poetry 
 
Given the central role of relationship factors in most forms of psychological therapy it is 
important to identify the potential interaction of these with the categories identified in 
Table 2.2.  Unlike the talking therapies, writing or reading can be employed either 
within or completely outside the context of a facilitative personal relationship.  The 
presence of any such relationship, whether individual or group, is clearly an important 
parameter to consider when designing research to examine the processes and outcomes 
associated with different reading and writing activities. 
2.2.2 The salience of writing poetry 
While reading is an important dimension of the therapeutic applications of literature, 
one of the striking things about the recent growth in the field has been the expansion of 
interest in the practice of creative writing.  This is underpinned by the growth of 
creative writing programmes and the increase in formal and informal self-publishing via 
the Internet.  Professional interest has correspondingly extended from reading-based 
bibliotherapy to the facilitation of personal and creative writing across a range of genres 
(Bolton, 1999; DeSalvo, 1999; Harris, 2003).  This shift in emphasis raises practical and 
theoretical questions about the processes involved in creative writing as a therapeutic 
activity, not least how different types of writing might relate to personal change and 
what the nature of these changes might be.  
Of all genres of creative writing, poetry is probably most strongly associated with the 
idea of healing or personal transformation.  This is reflected in the poetry therapy 
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movement in the USA and the centrality of poetry within the arts in health movement in 
the UK.  Poetry is probably the form of creative writing most frequently turned to in 
times of personal difficulty by individuals who otherwise do not see themselves as 
writers.  In my own practice, as a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist, I have 
worked with a number of people who have spontaneously started to write poetry, some 
of whom have gone on to self-publish collections of the poems that they wrote during 
this period.  This writing has been an important component of these peoples recovery 
from states of severe emotional distress to either more stable or much improved levels 
of functioning.  On the whole the quality of their poetry has mattered far less to them 
than the act of producing it and, in some cases, the subsequent wish to share it with 
others.  Other therapists have made similar observations, for example, Gilbert writes: 
With what seems to me amazing frequency, suddenly here is a poem!  Perhaps I find it 
so astonishing because I have never written one myself, and assume some special 
talent is necessary.  Here are 'ordinary' people with no particular literary background, 
and without any particular suggestion from me, who write, quite spontaneously, very 
powerful and varied poems about their own psychological distress and change.  
(Gilbert, 1995, p. 3) 
Another report, by Morrice (1983), describes a “therapeutic liaison” in which the 
author's own publication of poetry led, largely by chance, to an exchange of verse with a 
patient that had parallels with the processes of psychotherapy.  During the exchange the 
patient had a psychotic episode, which was reflected in fragmented writing, and a 
subsequent recovery that led to better-crafted work.  Morrice believes that poetry 
provided a mode of communication that combined access to and expression of deep 
emotion, with the maintenance of necessary space and distance.  He also suggests that: 
"…good poetry, like successful psychotherapy, arises from disturbed emotions only 
when they are given resolution and form."  (Morrice, 1983, p. 367) 
The existence of a close but equivocal relationship between writing poetry and 
psychological difficulties is reinforced by the notoriety of poets with emotionally 
troubled lives, such as Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton.  There is statistical evidence of a 
high level of mental disorder in those pursuing careers as creative writers, with poets 
consistently suffering the highest rates of many mental health problems (Jamison, 1993; 
Ludwig, 1995).  It has been argued that connection between creativity and mental 
illness may reflect a genetic predisposition that is common to both and which may be 
maintained because, on balance, it conveys an evolutionary advantage (Nettle, 2000).  
However, this does not explain the particularly high association of mental health 
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difficulties with poetry, particularly among female poets; a phenomenon that Kaufman 
(2001) has labelled the “Sylvia Plath effect”.  Ludwig (1998) suggests that a strong 
relationship exists between the form of creative expression and mental health.  He 
argues that creative work requiring objective and logical processes is associated with 
greater emotional stability than forms reliant on more subjective, intuitive, or directly 
emotional processes.  In a similar vein, Post has suggested that the variation of mental 
illness between different kinds of creative writers may be linked to the “nature and 
intensity of their emotional imagination” (Post, 1996, p. 545).   
Poetry could be seen as a constructive attempt to come to terms with existing emotional 
difficulties or challenges.  For example, my first serious attempts to write poetry 
occurred during a period of loneliness after my family moved to a new and more remote 
part of the country in my teens.  Indeed, Harrower sees poetry as part of a process of 
normal growth and development: “…much of my poetry springs from the inner need to 
get thoughts and feelings in order and to emerge triumphant from difficulties.” 
(Harrower, 1972, p. 56)  This is also the view of some individuals with serious mental 
health problems, for example a sufferer from a severe mental illness reports: "I actively 
use them [poems], as a tool to give vent to any subject matter which may be causing me 
to become anxious, and as a first line of defence if any delusive thoughts or 
misconceived ideas come into my mind." (Anonymous, 2003, p. 271)  On the other 
hand, writing poetry could potentially add to disturbed feelings by circumventing 
defences or fostering self-absorption.  For example, a textual analysis of the writing of 
poets who committed suicide showed more first-person singular references throughout 
their careers compared to a demographically matched group of poets who were 
nonsuicidal (Sterman, 2001). In Don Paterson's view this danger is inherent to the 
“dark art'” of writing poetry, but only for some people: 
There is a reason why poets enjoy the highest statistical incidence of mental illness 
among all the professions. Your unconscious is your unconscious for an awfully good 
reason. If you want to help yourself, read a poem, but don't write one. Then again I 
think maybe 5% of folk who write poetry really want to write poetry; the other 95 are 
quite safe, and just want to be a poet. If they knew what their dreams were like, they 
wouldn't.  (Paterson, 2004, para. 6) 
Interpreting the available evidence on poets and mental health is problematic; the 
research is largely retrospective, vulnerable to selection bias, and poorly controlled.  It 
is also based on professional poets and thus confounds the writing of poetry with 
professional achievement and the cultural expectations this entails.  Kaufman (2006) 
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tries to explain why the benefits found from expressive writing don’t help poets by 
proposing that they may have more problems to start with, or suffer from unhelpful 
expectations.  However, he also suggests that the absence of narrative in many forms of 
poetry might be an explanation, and advises those seeking health benefits to use a 
narrative form.  Given the limited evidence available this recommendation seems 
premature.  However, it does demonstrate the need for more detailed research on the 
process and effects of writing poetry.  
Inevitably those who are drawn to write poetry will be influenced by their conceptions 
of what poetry is, and what kind of people poets are.  The popular image of the poet is 
associated for many not only with mental illness, but also with ideas of personal 
sensitivity, self-expression and emotional revelation.  This view of poets and poetry has 
been influenced by romanticism, particularly the seminal commitment to emotion in 
Wordsworth's (1802, p. 598) argument that "all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow 
of powerful feelings".  Interestingly, Wordsworth's additional remarks that this requires: 
“…more than usual organic sensibility”, in someone who has  “…also thought long and 
deeply”, point to how writing poetry could help process and transform emotional 
experiences, not simply express them.  It is also important to recognise that this view of 
poetry is only one aspect of a very diverse poetic tradition, which encompasses a variety 
of forms and agendas for poetry.  Nevertheless, the romantic emphasis on emotion and 
the self continues to exert a powerful influence on how poetry is conceived and utilized 
as an instrument of change. 
2.3      Personal change and self-experience 
2.3.1 Therapy and self-experience 
Personal development can occur in many ways but a common psychotherapeutic aim is 
to achieve some change in the quality of self-experience.  This may be at a purely 
affective level, such as reducing feelings of anxiety or depression, but can also include 
the promotion of enduring changes in self-image, self-presentation or self-efficacy.   
While the fundamental nature of 'the self' has come increasingly into question, self-
experience, or the “varying ways in which the self is perceived, expressed and enacted” 
(Crastnopol, 2002, p. 262), has become an important means of conceptualising both the 
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process and outcome of many forms of therapeutic work (e.g. Bollas, 1993; Josephs, 
1995).   
Models of therapeutic change can be related to how self-experience is altered.  For 
example, Leiper & Maltby (2004) have described six interrelated processes of change 
within psychodynamic therapy. These operate through expression, understanding, and 
the therapeutic relationship; and can lead to regression, differentiation, and the 
emergence of more spontaneous and creative forms of action.  Self-experience can be 
affected in different ways and to different degrees by each of these processes, with 
effects as varied as short-term emotional relief, new forms of self-understanding, the 
breakdown of established modes of functioning, and the discovery of new ways of being 
and acting.  Other therapeutic approaches place emphasis on different processes of 
change, with corresponding variations in the way self-experience is most likely to be 
influenced by these interventions.  The variety of forms and ways in which self-
experience can be affected may be one reason why such a multiplicity of 
psychotherapeutic models have emerged, each attracting strong allegiances and claims 
for effectiveness, but without a commonly agreed basis for comparison.  
2.3.2 Writing and self-experience 
Specific forms of writing may effect change in self-experience in different ways or, as 
Esgalhado (2003) has suggested about genres of creative writing, may formulate 
different aspects of subjectivity.  The four forms of writing differentiated in Table 2.2 
are considered briefly from this perspective below, with tentative parallels drawn to 
established conceptions of change in psychological therapy.  
Non-fiction 
Non-fiction and factual writing can offer information and instruction when read, as in 
much self-help literature, and objective feedback on behaviour and experience if used 
actively in the form of a diary or other record.  This is likely to promote action and 
direct attention in specific ways, often through logical persuasion. As such it has 
similarities with more directive and behavioural forms of therapy or guidance.  These 
tend to see self-experience as something that is secondary to, and can be altered by, 
immediate behavioural and cognitive changes.   
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Personal writing 
Personal forms of writing can lead to insights into the experience of others, and may, 
through the action of writing, facilitate self-reflection, acceptance and a more complete 
integration of experience.  This has similarities to person or client-centred forms of 
therapy and counselling, which privilege a largely nondirective and very reflective 
approach by the therapist.  This emphasis places a greater focus on self-experience and 
can promote increased personal sensitivity, together with greater awareness of the 
subjectivity of others.     
Fiction 
The reading and writing of fiction, particularly the recognition of alternative narratives, 
may promote new conceptualisations of experience and identity, and lead to the 
emergence of new kinds of self-understanding, meaning and choice.  This is broadly 
congruent with approaches such as narrative therapy, constructivist forms of cognitive 
therapy, existential therapy, and narrative perspectives within psychoanalysis.  These 
tend to highlight either the intersubjective or social construction of self-experience or a 
personal creative search for meaning.  
Poetry 
The reading and writing of poetry appears to have a particularly strong resonance with 
emotional and unconscious levels of experience and with experience that is difficult to 
convey adequately in logical prose.  It may have its roots in aspects of self-experience 
that are normally outside of awareness and that prefigure socially determined forms of 
meaning. This connects it closely with the exploratory and interpretative tradition of 
psychoanalysis. 
2.3.3 Poetry and psychoanalysis 
Poetry has figured in the writings of many psychoanalysts, not least Freud who is 
reputed to have credited poets, together with philosophers, as discoverers of the 
unconscious (Trilling, 1950).  Although Freud set out to establish a scientific basis for 
analytic work, many subsequent writers have compared the necessary sensibility of the 
psychoanalyst with the nature and craft of poetry.  For example, Hutter examined a 
report of a session by Winnicott in which a number of poems were central and 
concluded: "These poems also demonstrate the subtle and complex relationship between 
poetry and psychoanalysis, between the psychological explication of poetry and the 
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need for an extraordinary sensitivity to language in therapy – to poetry in 
psychoanalysis." (Hutter, 1982, p. 315)  The language of poetry has frequently been 
compared to the language of dreams, Freud’s ‘royal road’ to the unconscious. This has 
been theorised by Kristeva (1984) to arise from a ‘semiotic’ area of presymbolic bodily 
experience closely connected to rhythm and sensation. These and other connections 
between poetry and psychoanalysis have been discussed by a number of recent writers 
(Canham & Satyamurti, 2003; T. H. Ogden, 2001; Philips, 2000) with calls being made 
for a greater recognition of the poetic as opposed to the scientific nature of the 
psychoanalytic task (Wallach, 2003).   
These connections suggest that the writing of poetry could, potentially, serve as a 
vehicle for self-analytic exploration.  Griffin (2004) has proposed that fictional 
autobiographic writing could give rise to a self-analytic experience, an idea also 
proposed by Hunt (2000) who draws on the thinking of Horney, and Bollas’s concept of 
the ‘self-analytic function’.  Wallach contends that a poetic perspective can build on the 
narrative dimension by adding greater depth as opposed to breadth to the analytic 
experience.  By this she means that it is less about the content and reconstruction of 
experience, and more about defining moments in which "past and present come alive 
simultaneously for the patient" (Wallach, 2003, p. 403).  Although Wallach sees this 
arising in therapy through transference enactment, the possibility exists that writing 
poetry might provide direct access to therapeutic and developmental experiences of this 
kind.  Indeed, as Harrower (1972) has suggested from a psychologically informed 
analysis of her own poetry, it could support a process of self-development throughout 
the lifespan. 
2.4 The need for and challenge of practice-based research 
The current state of theory and practice in the use of creative writing for personal 
development suggests an important need for research that more clearly differentiates 
salient aspects of the field and that considers the impact of writing on self-experience.  
There is a need for work that develops and connects theories of change to specific forms 
and genres of writing.  Poetry is of particular interest given its widespread formal and 
informal use in therapy and recovery from mental health problems, as well as the high 
incidence of mental illness among poets. 
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Until recently most of what could be suggested empirically about the way writing 
poetry can impact on self-experience is derived from the accounts or biographies of 
established poets, or from reports of poetry being used in psychotherapeutic contexts.  
The former are usually based on retrospective descriptions that are some distance from 
the actual process of writing, while the latter are complicated by the therapeutic 
situation within which the writing occurs.  A need therefore exists to develop a 
theoretical understanding that is more directly grounded in the lived experience of 
writing poetry, and that is applicable to those who may write for personal benefit 
without having a formal identity as a poet.   
However, to combine the investigation of self-experience with a creative process such 
as writing poetry presents a number of difficulties. Although writing poetry may have 
developmental potentials, these are likely to depend on a level of creative engagement 
that is difficult to ensure. It is not possible to determine in advance the course of 
genuinely creative work, or foresee its impact on self-experience, which makes 
prospective studies problematically open-ended.  There are also issues connected with 
the complex and fundamentally first-person nature of self-experience; not least the wide 
range of disciplines and theoretical perspectives that are potentially relevant, and ethical 
problems associated with the risk of problematic as well as helpful outcomes.  Finally, 
there are important methodological questions about how self-experience can best be 
examined and researched alongside, or through, an arts-based activity such as creative 
writing. 
The next chapter will examine in more detail the nature of the research approach 
adopted for this study, the practical methodology employed, and the precise questions 
the investigation set out to answer. 
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3   Combining Creative and Critical Modes of Inquiry 
The field of creative writing and personal development has yet to establish a 
characteristic tradition of research and inquiry.  Indeed, as described in Chapter 2, it is 
still in the early stages of development as a field of practice.  The area can clearly utilize 
established methods of academic research, but it also provides opportunities to explore 
new forms of inquiry that arise from its position at the interface of the contrasting 
disciplines of ‘creative writing’ and ‘psychological therapy’.  An innovative approach of 
this kind has been adopted for this investigation.  In particular, the study attempts to 
combine creative and critical-theoretic forms of inquiry. 
It seems important to locate the project in relation to developments in the culture and 
methodology of research in associated areas.  This is partly to provide a conceptual 
framework for its conduct and evaluation, but also to identify the potential benefits and 
limitations of pursuing a less well-established approach.   This chapter sets out to 
achieve this by first examining some of the developments in contemporary research 
practices that help situate the study, and then by examining the nature of the action and 
arts-informed research paradigms from which it has drawn.  Key issues related to the 
conduct and epistemological basis of a first-person creative and critical inquiry are 
highlighted. 
While this chapter is presented prior to the account of the investigation, it would be 
misleading to read it as being uninfluenced by the conduct of the study.  My 
understanding of the method of inquiry has been refined and informed by experience 
arising during the investigation.  This is discussed further in Chapter 106. 
3.1    The diversification of research approaches 
3.1.1  Trends in academic research 
Over recent years there has been a considerable expansion in research methods within 
the humanities and social sciences.  At the same time, distinctive practice-based forms 
of inquiry have developed in professional areas such as education, nursing, management 
                                                 
6
 Section 10.3. 
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and the creative arts.  This has given rise to a diverse and pluralistic context, with claims 
to knowledge and relevance often depending on very different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, as well as different practical aims and political priorities.    
One of the main drivers of change has been the sustained critique of positivist 
conceptions of objectivity in ‘scientific’ research.  This has been part of a wider cultural 
critique of modernism, and the emergence of postmodern accounts of how knowledge 
and understanding of the world are constructed, mediated by language, and shaped by 
the role of power within social relationships.  Constructionist and deconstructionist 
views have themselves been subject to criticism for, among other things, “semiological 
reductionism” (Dillon, 1995) and extreme relativism; nevertheless, the context of 
academic inquiry now appears irrevocably changed.  In particular, subjective and 
qualitative aspects of experience have become more legitimate foci of social science 
research. 
Paradoxically, the reinstatement of a place for the subjective has been accompanied by 
the widespread deconstruction of the concept of the individual subject prevailing in 
western humanism and has thus rendered problematic concepts of personal identity, 
agency and intentionality.  Subjectivity has been extended to encompass notions of 
inter-subjectivity, with the boundaries between self and other becoming correspondingly 
less distinct.  As some commentators have pointed out ‘objectivity’, even in the natural 
sciences, depends on inter-subjective agreement, and at the quantum level it is now a 
cliché that the act of observing is inseparable from what is observed.  The result, in the 
humanities and in qualitative social science research, is a decreased attempt to simply 
eliminate the influence of the individual researcher and an increased attempt to 
incorporate active forms of reflexivity (Etherington, 2004). 
3.1.2 Practice-based research 
Alongside these trends in mainstream academic research there have been significant 
developments in what may be characterised as practice-based research, or practitioner 
inquiry.  This has arisen from misgivings not only about the nature of traditional forms 
of research but also about the applicability of the knowledge this provides to specific 
contexts of professional practice and real-world activity.  The assumption that such 
knowledge is adequate to these contexts has been called “technical rationality” (e.g. 
Schön, 1992 p51).  It is argued that in order to make sense of the highly complex, 
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situated and personally mediated nature of practice, alternative forms of understanding 
and inquiry are required.  Among these are Schön’s model of reflective-practice, and a 
family of approaches that have been collectively described as action-research (J. 
McNiff, 2002b; Reason & Torbet, 2001). 
New approaches to higher education have evolved in the humanities with the emergence 
of practice-based doctorates in many creative and performing arts (UKGCE, 1997).  
These developments have fuelled important questions about the relationship between 
creative practice and critical understanding, including the extent to which the creative 
arts can be seen or used as a form of research inquiry (Cole, Neilson, Knowles, & 
Luciani, 2004; S. McNiff, 1998a; Watrin, 1999).  The use of the term art can be 
confusing as it is applied both to contemporary notions of the ‘fine’ or ‘creative arts’ as 
well as contexts where the wider sense of a practical skill or craft is implied.  For 
example Schön speaks generically about “professional artistry” (1992, p. 51) and an 
influential paper by Carper (1978) proposes a distinctive place for the “art of nursing”.  
However, both uses of the term raise epistemological questions about how practice is 
related to understanding. 
In the natural sciences it is common to distinguish pure from applied research and to 
link the latter to practical domains, such as engineering.  However, this suggests a top-
down relationship between research and practice, which is exactly what critics of 
technical rationality object to.  The domains of research and practice relevant to the 
present study are overlapping but are represented schematically in Table 3.1.  This 
illustrates how research and practice can have a mutual or bidirectional influence 
through the notion of practice-as-inquiry, which helps to link critical understanding to 
creative or vocational activities. 
Practice-based forms of inquiry into the use of creative writing for personal 
development can draw on, and contribute to, models of both action research and arts-
based inquiry as the field spans the arts /social science boundary.  Some prominent 
action and arts-based research approaches will be examined in Section 3.2 to develop a 
framework for how such an integrated inquiry might be conducted, and how its creative 
and critical elements can be combined. 
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Table 3.1   Relevant domains of research and practice 
 
  
Established 
methods of 
academic research 
and scholarship 
 
 
Practice-based 
forms of inquiry 
 
 
Practice disciplines 
 
Creative arts & 
humanities 
 
 
Methods of critical 
and interpretative 
research 
 
 
Arts-based forms 
of inquiry 
 
Creative and 
performing arts 
disciplines 
 
Social sciences & 
related vocational 
disciplines 
 
 
Quantitative and 
qualitative research 
methods 
 
Action research 
Reflective practice 
& inquiry 
 
Disciplines such as 
teaching, nursing, 
& psychotherapy 
  
        Critical                        Practice-as-inquiry              Creative/practice 
 
3.2  Action research, emergence and reflexivity 
3.2.1 Action research 
The label ‘action research’ has been applied to a number of strands of practice-based 
inquiry.  As such it constitutes a general approach rather than a specific set of methods.  
Its origins are often traced to the work of Kurt Lewin (1946), who developed the notion 
of an action-reflection cycle to capture the processes involved in attempting to 
implement improvements or changes in working contexts.  The key processes are 
usually identified as: planning, acting, observing and reflecting.  These can be 
elaborated into a sequence, or spiral, of action-reflection cycles.  The approach reflects 
the influence of American pragmatism and its concern with applicable outcomes as 
opposed to abstract theoretical understanding.  Nevertheless, it does embody a form of 
evolving knowledge-in-practice and can lead to explicit theoretical developments.  The 
action-reflection cycle has similarities to models of experiential learning (e.g. Kolb, 
1984).  These emphasise the experiential basis of all learning, with reflection on 
experience and active experimentation being central to how practice develops and 
conceptual understanding grows.  There is no definite end point to an action research 
process, while action continues it remains possible to learn from it and to change or 
improve its effectiveness.  This links the approach to the model of the reflective 
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practitioner developed by Schön (1983; 1987).  However, in most research contexts 
projects are delimited in some way and lead to recognizable scholarly outcomes. 
The development of action research in the UK has been influenced by a humanistic 
philosophy of personal and collective development that eschews distinctions between 
researchers and participants, in favour of models of participative or collaborative 
inquiry (Heron & Reason, 1997).  It also contains, but is not dependent upon, an interest 
in transpersonal or spiritual dimensions of reality (Reason, 1993).  It thus has a 
distinctly emancipatory flavour and is critical of externally imposed or purely rational 
models of understanding. The epistemological basis of action research is grounded in 
privileging the area of praxis, or practical knowledge, over the theoretical knowledge 
usually favoured by the academy.  However, the epistemological framework of action 
research is inclusive of a range of ways of knowing, the relevance of which will be 
considered later in this chapter.  What is of note here is that knowledge is rooted in the 
specifics of lived experience and ultimately realised in practical action. 
Although no particular methods or tools are essential to the action research process, it is 
possible to use many traditional quantitative or qualitative techniques depending on the 
context of the inquiry.  What is de rigueur is some means of ensuring and facilitating a 
process of reflection on experience.  Both individual forms of reflection and collective 
methods, involving groups of co-researchers and stakeholders, can be employed.   
Action research has become popular in education and management, and has been used 
widely in other professional fields.  However, the paradigm is not without its critics.  
Brown & Jones (2001) interrogate action research from a poststructuralist perspective 
and argue that it is often grounded in assumptions about controlling and implementing 
change that are more problematic than they appear.  In assuming an ideal of betterment, 
it can fail to tackle the complexities involved in the way this comes to be defined, 
particularly when there are conflicts of interests.  This leads them to advocate an 
approach less concerned with improving situations than with developing different ways 
of viewing them.  They illustrate this with examples of practitioner research in 
education that is based on reflective writing.  Through this writing the researcher is 
involved in a: “construction of self in relation to the professional/social context being 
faced.” (Brown & Jones, 2001, p. 8) In other words, it is the action researcher who 
stands to be changed as much as the situation they are in. 
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McNiff (2002b) also argues for a strongly reflexive and personally engaged form of 
action research.  In her view what is at issue in the field is not any particular definition 
of action research per se: 
What is at issue is the form of theory used to describe and explain action research 
processes, the whole business of whether we regard human inquiry as an objective 
phenomenon which we observe from a distance or a living process of which we are a 
part. (J. McNiff, 2002b, pp. 5-6). 
Although committed to an improvement-centred form of inquiry McNiff conceives this 
as a “generative transformational evolutionary process” (2002b, p. 57).  Thus, rather 
than being prescriptive, it may develop in unexpected ways and lead to unintended 
outcomes.  In her guidance on the conduct of action research she illustrates this with the 
familiar metaphor, drawn from the complexity sciences, of the ‘butterfly effect’ (J. 
McNiff, 2002a, para. 23). 
3.2.2 Emergent exploration of experience 
A distinctive form of action research has recently been developed in management 
education that makes direct use of theories of complex responsive processes, and also 
methods from the field of group analysis (Stacey, 2001a, 2003).  This model involves 
the ‘emergent exploration of experience’ and has been applied successfully to doctoral 
and other studies.  Although the approach has much in common with other models of 
action research, it has a number of conceptual differences which are highlighted by 
Stacey & Griffin (2004).  The methodology of emergent exploration seeks to be 
consistent with the perspective of complex responsive processes by taking a temporal 
view of how human interaction leads to the emergence of both continuity and 
discontinuity.  It eschews any global assumptions about improvement or emancipation, 
and does not conceptualise change as involving systems containing separate individuals 
who ‘co-operate’.  Rather, after Mead (1934) and Elias (1991), it sees the individual and 
the social as two aspects of the same phenomenon: complex processes of human 
interaction.  It is at the level of everyday action, interaction and experience that 
investigation takes place, through a process that is characterised as “taking experience 
seriously”.  Thus investigation proceeds through a process of recording, narrating, and 
reflecting on the practitioners lived experience of their work, and critically interpreting 
this in a manner that is reflexively cognisant of the wider theory, or tradition, being 
employed. 
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The model of emergent exploration seeks to avoid a split between theory and practice 
by seeing both critical understanding and practice as continuously emerging from 
patterns of social and personal interaction.  These emergent forms may become stuck or 
be subject to rapid transformation, but there is never any guarantee of improvement or 
possibility of a completely objective or final understanding of social phenomena.  While 
this model has been developed to explore organizational life, it could equally be applied 
to creative practices that are normally seen as the activity of individuals.  No 
fundamental distinction is drawn between the individual and social level of analysis, so 
both can be approached in terms of the fundamental dimensions of action and 
experience.  Individual action could be conceptualised dialogically as interaction with 
others, with specific media or language, and with oneself – all of which lead to 
emergent patterns of experience and self-experience. 
3.2.3 Heuristic research 
Among the major themes to emerge from the areas discussed above are the emergent 
nature of experience and the need for intensive personal involvement in the research 
process.  This implies a form of inquiry that is highly uncertain and emotionally 
demanding for the researcher-practitioner.  There have been previous attempts to 
develop and characterise qualitative research approaches that emphasise these features.  
Perhaps most notable among these is the model of heuristic research developed by 
Moustakas (1990b).  This is worthy of examination for the insight it can offer into the 
conduct and challenges of first-person forms of inquiry. 
Heuristic is derived from the Greek heuretikos, meaning inventive or to find.  It usually 
refers to methods of discovery but its connotation of creativity is also noteworthy.  
Within the social sciences a number of approaches have been labelled ‘heuristic’ (e.g. 
Kleining & Witt, 2000; Tyson, 1995); however, the work of Moustakas is most seminal.  
Moustakas was among the first to break from an objectivist philosophy and embrace 
personal experience as a datum in psychological research. 
Essentially, in the heuristic process, I am creating a story that portrays the qualities, 
meanings, and essences of universally unique experiences.  Through an unwavering 
and steady inward gaze and inner freedom to explore and accept what is, I am 
reaching into deeper and deeper regions of a human problem or experience and 
coming to know and understand its underlying dynamics and constituents more and 
more fully.  The initial “data” is within me; the challenge is to discover and explicate 
its nature.  In the process, I am not only lifting out the essential meanings of an 
experience, but I am actively awakening and transforming my own self.  Self-
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understanding and self-growth occur simultaneously in heuristic discovery.  
(Moustakas, 1990b, p. 13) 
Moustakas’ approach is grounded in humanistic conceptions of self-actualisation and 
development but like Stacey (2001b) he sees the ‘inner’ worlds of personal experience 
and the ‘outer’ worlds of social reality as continuous rather than separated.  Coming to 
know the world and coming to know the self are not seen in opposition but as 
interdependent processes.  For Moustakas the selection of a suitable focus of inquiry 
requires an intense personal identification.  Its subsequent examination involves 
processes such as self-dialogue, intuition and indwelling, alongside more technical 
research methods.  
The phases of heuristic research outlined by Moustakas are strikingly similar to models 
that attempt to depict the process of creativity (e.g. Pürto, 2004, p. 41).  He lists and 
amplifies phases of: initial engagement, immersion, incubation, illumination, 
explication and creative synthesis.  He characterizes the process in terms of its 
uncertainty, “swimming into an unknown current” (1990a, p. 174), its periods of 
necessary activity and rest, and finally by “the researcher as scientist-artist” developing 
“an aesthetic-rendition of the themes and essential meanings of the phenomenon” 
(1990a, p. 187).  Thus Moustakas provides a bridge to recent explorations of 
representation in arts-informed research. 
While acknowledging the prescience of Moustakas’ formulation of Heuristic research, 
Sela-Smith (2002) has criticised the failure of many studies to adequately implement it.  
She conducted a review of 28 studies claiming to follow the approach and found that 
only 3 met criteria that she thought defined it.  In particular, most studies failed to report 
on the subjective experience of the researcher and, instead of letting the process 
determine the method, followed procedural rules.  There was little evidence of what she 
described as “surrender” to unknown dimensions of personal experience, but rather a 
reliance on the experiences of others.  This is closer to more formal and distanced 
phenomenological and grounded theory methods than the first-person approach 
advocated by Moustakas.  Sela-Smith suggests that what she calls a personal “self-
search within an experience” has been replaced here by what she interprets as a 
“phenomenological explication of the definition of an experience” (2002, p. 71).  
Examining Moustakas’ original work on loneliness (Moustakas, 1961), she argues that 
it is inherently ambiguous and ambivalent about this point.  In effect she deems that he 
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moved too rapidly away from the experience into the idea of the experience and then, 
paradoxically, created a methodological structure for a process that, he had argued, 
needed to be free of such structure. 
A number of explanations for these observations are possible, including the historically 
determined need to undertake and present scholarly work in a recognised manner and 
the degree of self-revelation deemed personally acceptable.  However, Sela-Smith 
argues that this failure could also reflect the unacknowledged resistance of Moustakas, 
and other researchers, to the experience of genuine confusion and intense emotion.  
There is some support for this contention in recent accounts of narrative research that 
illustrate how immersion in personal experience can evoke distress and the recall of 
previously dissociated trauma (Etherington, 2005; West, 2001). 
3.2.4 First-person inquiry and personal reflexivity 
Central to all the approaches identified here, as action, emergent, or heuristic research, 
is a profound shift of emphasis from traditional third-person forms of inquiry to the 
incorporation and development of first-person perspectives.  Within some areas this has 
been characterised as ‘self-study’ (Mitchell, Weber, & O'Reilly-Scanlon, 2005; Tidwell, 
Fitzgerald, & Heston, 2004).  The benefit for this type of research is not restricted to 
practice-based disciplines, it is also advocated in areas such as consciousness studies 
(Varela & Shear, 1999) where vital aspects of the phenomena under investigation are 
only available to introspective awareness.   
The focus of first-person inquiry into practice is experience as it arises in the pursuit of 
that practice.  However, making the practitioner-researcher the primary datum of 
investigation has consequences that third-person research methods normally seek to 
avoid.  For example, it is almost axiomatic that the intention to inquire into one’s own 
experience is going to alter it.  Thus the act of inquiry and the emergence of new or 
changed experience are inextricably conflated.  This means that the inquiry becomes an 
intrinsic part of any process of personal change, whether this is conceived in terms as 
self-development, or more neutrally as self-experience.  Indeed, there is no a priori 
reason to assume such changes will necessarily be welcome or in a direction preferred 
by the researcher. 
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To undertake research from a first-person perspective clearly demands a very high level 
of personal reflexivity, not merely to acknowledge the influence of the researcher but to 
sustain the process of inquiry.  A significant danger is that the difficulty of maintaining 
this could lead to reliance on conventional perspectives that are, in effect, second-hand.  
This may contribute to understanding but obscure genuine first-person exploration.  
From a psychodynamic point of view this reflexivity is also profoundly compromised 
because the experience of the researcher is never completely available to conscious 
awareness (Meek, 2003).  There is also the difficulty of adequately representing lived 
experience, particularly that of an emotional nature.  One approach to exploring and 
representing lived experience, which could also give better access to conscious and 
unconscious levels of first-person experience, is through ‘arts-based’ or ‘arts-informed’ 
methods of research.   
3.3    Arts-based research and writing as inquiry 
The way in which the creative arts contribute to knowledge is a major theme in the 
philosophy of art (e.g. Graham, 1997) but has been relatively ignored in social science 
disciplines that have constructed their research frameworks around more rational and 
‘scientific’ modes of knowing.  Indeed, within the arts and humanities a divide often 
arises between creative practice and critical academic understanding, which has tended 
to make ‘art’ the object of study rather than a vehicle for research.  However, the 
potential for the creative arts to contribute more directly to research is now being 
systematically explored across a range of subjects.  This challenges many traditional 
expectations about what constitute appropriate methods, data and outcomes of research 
activity. 
Three strands of arts-based or arts-informed research will be delineated here. These 
distinguish art as a process of inquiry, art as a means of representation, and art as a 
form of research outcome or discourse.    
3.3.1 Artistic inquiry: art-making as a process of inquiry 
The use of the process of art-making as a distinctive method of research has been 
championed by a number of writers, perhaps most notably by those developing their 
ideas from an arts therapy background (Hervey, 2000; Levine, 2000; S. McNiff, 1998a).  
The arts therapies have traditionally been concerned as much with the process of art-
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making as with the product and its interpretation, although the balance between these is 
seen as a point of tension for many in the field (e.g. Thompson, 1989).  Personal 
engagement in a process of creation is, however, accepted as a prerequisite of 
subsequent learning or change. 
Within the arts therapies psychoanalytic ideas have had a major influence, both in the 
way they inform the interpretation of finished work and the understanding they provide 
of the influence of unconscious processes on creativity.  However, recent expressive and 
integrative trends in the creative therapies have eschewed relying on psychological 
models in favour of a commitment to the creative process itself as the essential means of 
inquiry.  The slogan of this approach is neatly captured by McNiff’s injunction to “trust 
the process” (1998b).  The contention is that the creative arts have their own unique 
demands and characteristics; these necessitate the temporary suspension of more 
conceptual and instrumental methods of inquiry in favour of a commitment to the 
process of art-making itself. 
Artistic inquiry has been characterised by Levine as a type of research that rests, 
following Nietzsche’s distinction, on a more Dionysian than Apollonian quality of 
engagement with experience.  He sees this as complimentary to scientific modes of 
investigation and a means of ultimately combining both logical and imaginative ways of 
knowing. 
To base our research in the arts means to engage the imagination in the forming of our 
concepts and in the carrying-out of the project itself. Not only may the initial 
inspiration come in the encounter with an image, but the conduct of research should 
itself be imaginative. We must have faith that the imagination can inform us, that art is 
not non-cognitive but that it binds together both feeling and form in a way that can 
reveal truth.  (Levine, 2004, para. 16) 
In practical terms, this means actively engaging in art-making, and surrendering to what 
is compelling or emergent in the creative process rather than pursuing preconceived 
ends.  Although practising an art in this way may constitute a method of inquiry, its 
essential nature is non-methodological in that it cannot be stipulated procedurally: what 
is advocated is a full immersion in the creative activity (e.g. Allen, 1995).  What is 
lacking from this process perspective is any clear means of distinguishing research from 
artistic outcomes.  This issue is discussed further in Section 3.3.3. 
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3.3.2 Artistic representation: art as a means of capturing experience 
The use of artistic forms for the representation of experience has developed as part of 
the growth of qualitative research in the social sciences.  One of the problems faced by 
qualitative methods has been described by Denzin and Lincoln as the “crisis of 
representation” (2000, p. 16): how to describe or convey social reality or lived 
experience if the means of doing this is understood to be part of its construction.   From 
this perspective, descriptive language loses its assumed neutrality and alternative forms 
of representation may have enhanced value and applicability, including forms that are 
explicitly creative. 
One area of qualitative research that lends itself to artistic representation is hermeneutic 
and phenomenological inquiry.  As Van Manen sees it: 
Phenomenology asks: “What is this or that kind of experience like?”  It differs from 
almost every other science in that it attempts to gain insightful descriptions of the way 
we experience the world pre-reflectively, without taxonomizing, classifying or 
abstracting it.  (Van Manen, 1997, p. 9) 
To achieve this Van Manen emphasises the art of writing and rewriting in 
phenomenological inquiry as a means of reflection and explication but with the ultimate 
aim  “to effect a more direct contact with the experience as lived” (Van Manen, 1997, p. 
78).  This has inspired others to experiment with a range of creative art forms in 
addition to prose description.  One example of this is the ‘arts based expressive 
research’ projects reported on by Willis and colleagues (Willis et al., 2000).  These 
illustrate the use of a range of genres, from poetry and painting to cartoons and theatre, 
to help portray and communicate what certain phenomena are like for the individuals 
experiencing them.  Most contributors emphasise the expressive and presentational 
nature of this work and see it as complimentary to more analytic forms of inquiry.  The 
criteria for the evaluation and utility of these methods are still evolving but contain 
some distinguishing features.  In general, judgements appears to depend more on the 
verisimilitude and aesthetic qualities of the finished work than traditional criteria of 
methodological rigour.  Evaluating such research thus makes additional demands on the 
sensibility of the ‘reader’ or ‘viewer’.   
3.3.3 Art forms: art as an outcome of research  
The requirement on readers/viewers to engage with an artistic representation of 
experience on its own terms leads to a third strand of arts-based research, where the 
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artistic product becomes, in effect, an outcome of the research. There is no absolute 
dividing line, but the claim for artistic representation or products of inquiry to be ‘read’ 
and taken seriously as forms of art implies a fundamental shift in assumptions.  The arts 
practice is then not merely a method or means of presentation leading towards 
conventional forms of discursive research knowledge.  It becomes, instead, a distinctive 
form of discourse and knowledge representation in its own right.  Although it may be 
combined with other forms of critical inquiry, the claim would be that it cannot be 
reduced to them. 
This strand of thinking is implicit in the ways some, but not all, arts-based research 
projects are presented and discussed.  Some relevant examples can be found in a book 
edited by Neilson, Cole and Knowles (2001) on the art of writing inquiry.  Some 
contributors present poems and other forms of creative writing without additional 
commentary, while others include substantial amounts of amplification and discussion.  
Another text from the same group (Cole et al., 2004), which examines the theoretical 
underpinnings of their work, makes similar ‘stand-alone’ use of creative genres. 
One of the issues raised by this level of integration of arts based work is the extent to 
which the work presented is considered ‘art’ in the cultural sense of the word, or its 
creator an artist.  Some researchers are explicit that their use of art is not necessarily the 
same as that required by the accepted standards and traditions of the artistic discipline 
employed.  For example, Willis (2002) is clear about his own ‘poetic representations’ in 
phenomenological research.  He does not consider these fully crafted poems, 
nevertheless, he also notes that crafting them is dependent on the same processes as 
writing poetry, and is exceedingly demanding.  For others however the distinction is 
less clear-cut, particularly where researchers either have or aspire to an artistic identity.  
For example, in a discussion on this issue, Finley and Knowles conclude that: “Through 
the process of reflection we each discovered that our personal (artistic) and researcher 
selves were one and the same self.” (1995, p. 133)  In trying to find a balance Pürto 
(2002) argues that both the artistic discipline and the research purpose need to be 
respected.  A potential way to integrate these dimensions is to see artwork presented in 
the context of research inquiry as a distinct subgenre, which is related both to 
established dimensions of aesthetic evaluation, and additional factors stemming from its 
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role in a research project.  This has parallels with many commissioned forms of artwork 
that have a situated purpose or given rhetorical agenda. 
3.3.4 Writing as inquiry 
Unlike other mediums, writing is the vehicle for conventional scholarship as well as 
creative art.  As a result, an arts-informed approach to research in creative writing and 
personal development can usefully recognise that all forms of writing make use of 
characteristic rhetorical features and stylistic conventions.  In a sense all writing is 
‘creative’, with particular genres of creative writing such as fictional-narrative, poetry 
and drama constituting an artistic or imaginative end of the spectrum, while 
conventional research and academic writing occupies a more rational or ‘scientific’ end.  
For example, where the former makes use of allusion, imagery and connotation, the 
latter favours explicitness, conceptualisation and clarity of denotation.   
Sparkes (2002b) has drawn attention to the range of rhetorical forms of writing now 
available to academic researchers.  It is now commonplace for good research writing to 
involve the construction of a storyline, but Sparkes illustrates the many forms such 
“tales” can take, and the way that these intrinsically sustain the claims to knowledge of 
the writing in question.  These range from what he characterises as ‘scientific’ and 
‘realist’ tales, through to ‘autoethnography’ and forms of ‘poetic’ and ‘fictional’ 
representation (Bochner & Ellis, 2002).  The epistemological significance of these 
rhetorical forms for the present study will be examined further in the next section.  What 
is important to note here is that it is possible to utilize and craft research writing in 
different ways to achieve different purposes, and that the forms of writing chosen are 
intrinsic to the outcomes achieved.   
Creative forms of writing have also been advocated as part of the research process.  
Qualitative methods have always made extensive use of field notes, memos and diaries, 
but increasing concern about reflexivity has led to more self-reflective and imaginative 
forms of writing.  These provide a means of exploring and examining both the research 
question and the unfolding experience of the researcher.  For example, Richardson 
(2000) encourages those interested in writing as inquiry to attend creative writing 
classes and to make use of narrative and poetic forms to help develop and extend their 
investigations.  From a similar perspective, Cahmann (2003) discusses the way writing 
and crafting poems can inform educational research.  This use of reflective writing in 
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research is closely connected to its application in the context of professional education 
and practice (Bolton, 2001; Winter, Buck, & Sobiechowska, 1999) and as a tool for  
personal development (Bolton, 1999; Hunt, 2004b).   
The overlap in the use of different forms of creative writing for inquiry, to develop 
practice and for personal development indicates how it can contribute to the emergence 
and presentation of different forms of knowledge, all based on learning directly from 
experience. Writing offers a range of potential forms of inquiry and knowledge 
representation, from those that are artistically informed and imaginatively based to those 
that are more discursive and rational.  To combine these coherently within a single 
project requires the adoption of a broad but integrated epistemological position.  
3.4   Epistemological perspectives 
3.4.1 Art and first-person experience 
Eisner (1993; 1998) is clear that one of the fundamental justifications for  arts-informed 
qualitative research is epistemological.  One of the core assumptions of his position is 
that: “There are multiple ways in which the world can be known: Artists/writers, and 
dancers, as well as scientists, have important things to tell about the world.” (Eisner, 
1998, p. 7)  In order to help embrace this he has made use of the dual concepts of 
connoisseurship and criticism.  He sees connoisseurship as a form of knowing that 
requires the ability to ‘see’ as opposed merely to ‘look’.  It requires an aesthetic 
sensibility that enables the salient qualities of an experience to be grasped and possibly 
artistically rendered, whereas criticism requires a process of explication that draws 
attention to or is ‘about’ those qualities. 
It is interesting that today aesthetics is widely equated with beauty and the study of art.  
As Gross has pointed out this is a long way from the conception of Baumgarten who 
introduced the term to western philosophy in the 18th century.  
Baumagarten did not primarily develop his aesthetics as a philosophy of art.  The 
making and understanding of artworks had served in his original programme only as 
an example for the application of his philosophy.  What he really attempts to present is 
an alternative philosophy of knowledge that goes beyond the purely rationalist, 
empiricist, and sensualist approaches.  (Gross, 2002, p. 403) 
The concern with the aesthetic dimensions of experience and understanding has been 
taken up by Gadamer who argues that: “Aesthetic experience is not just one experience 
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among others, but represents the essence of experience per se.” (Gadamer, 1993, p. 70)  
In Gadamer’s hermeneutics it is the shaping of aesthetic experience, both in everyday 
and artistic forms, which leads to personal knowledge and understanding.  This is not an 
objective or neutral form of knowledge but is vital to the development of deeper 
understanding of oneself and others.  This form of aesthetic knowing can be viewed as 
complimentary to scientific modes of gaining knowledge about the world. 
The argument that one of the fundamental purposes of art is to represent and shape 
aesthetic experience is also found in Dewey and has been explored by Gerwen (1996), 
who argues that its achievement is dependent on first-person acquaintance; a third-
person account of art is always incomplete and cannot substitute for a direct experience 
of it.  Thus, the kind of knowledge generated by art is of a kind that can only be 
adequately conveyed through first-person experience.  Art mediates between the first-
person of the artist and the second-person of the ‘viewer’ through the latter’s own first-
person experience.  The nature of the understanding involved is thus distinctively rooted 
in direct experience, and cannot be completely reduced (or raised) to a detached third-
person formulation. 
This quality of artistic forms of knowing has been described as ‘presentational’ by 
Langer (1957), in contrast to the ‘propositional’ forms of knowledge that characterise 
detached and rational modes of understanding.  While the latter involves making 
explicit statements about the world that may be established as true or false, the 
presentational form makes use of implicit and symbolic means of representing 
experience, particularly of an emotional kind.  The truth of these forms cannot be 
established logically, but for many a quality of truth is discernable in art that may 
sometimes have vital significance.  In fact the relationship between poetry and truth has 
been a particularly important theme for many writers (e.g. Martin, 1975).  However, the 
difficulty of reconciling conceptual and aesthetic forms of truth can be traced at least as 
far as Plato’s banishment of poets from his rationally conceived republic (Dorter, 1990). 
3.4.2 An epistemological framework 
The distinction between ‘presentational’ and ‘propositional’ forms of knowing provides 
a basis for encompassing both creative and critical forms of inquiry into a common 
research enterprise.   However, this is more applicable to the outcomes of such an 
inquiry than the process of inquiry itself.  Research leading to presentational or creative 
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forms is inherently one that draws on a first-person perspective and, if an artistic 
discipline is involved, is also a form of creative practice.  An approach that can 
encompass these dimensions needs to include the way understanding develops from a 
first-person perspective, and the way it is reflected in the practice of the discipline 
involved.  The epistemological framework proposed by Heron and Reason (1997) 
effectively incorporates these dimensions by including both personal and practical 
forms of knowing, as well as the presentational and propositional dimensions.  While 
they prioritise practical knowing or praxis, all four forms of knowing can be seen as 
legitimate and necessary elements of a critical inquiry based on a creative activity.  This 
is summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2   Four forms of knowing7 
 
  
Source: 
 
 
Quality: 
 
Shorthand: 
 
Subject position: 
 
Experiential 
 
Personal lived 
experience 
 
 
Tacit 
 
Know not what 
you know 
 
First-person 
Presentational Aesthetic 
shaping & 
representation 
 
Implicit Know that First to second 
person 
Propositional Conceptual 
formulation 
 
Explicit Know about Third-person 
Practical Action in the 
world 
 
Practical skill Know how Embodied in 
action 
 
The idea of a personal or tacit form of knowing was articulated by Polanyi (1958) in 
opposition to the common assumption that the conduct of science is purely rational and 
methodological.  He argued that the tacit dimension of experience represented a form of 
knowing that couldn’t easily be put into words and that developed out of the lived 
experience of each individual.  It is reflected in the fact that people cannot always give 
an account of what they know, but that a direct experience of knowing nevertheless 
informs and emerges from their interaction with the world.  Thus presentational and 
                                                 
7
 Developed from Heron and Reason (1997). 
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propositional forms of knowing, and by extension art and science, arise from and are 
underpinned by what is largely an unconscious form of first-person knowing.  Practical 
knowing is also dependent on this, but may incorporate or use more conscious or 
explicit forms of knowing in the development of sophisticated skills.  The learning of a 
complex skill can involve presentational and propositional steps that later become 
superfluous to the ultimate mastery and execution of the skill as an embodied action. 
The framework presented in Table 3.2 locates and integrates knowledge arising from 
lived experience, aesthetic forms of knowing, and knowledge connected to practice, 
with the critical forms of knowledge usually associated with academic research.  A key 
distinction is that personal and practical knowledge are embodied in individuals, 
whereas presentational and propositional forms of knowing can be embodied in 
language or other symbolic forms.  However, whereas creative presentational forms 
may be used to capture some of the complexity and richness of first-person experience, 
propositional forms require greater abstraction from that experience to elucidate aspects 
of it in more impersonal and theoretical terms.  The framework also provides a means of 
mapping the overlap of subjective and objective epistemologies.  Experiential personal 
knowledge could be characterised as the most subjective, while propositional forms are, 
at least potentially, the most objective and impersonal.  Presentational and practical 
forms of knowing are intermediate in different ways.  The presentational form 
effectively moves towards an objectification of the subjective, that is, to a form of 
objective-subjectivity.  On the other hand, the practical form, while existing objectively 
in performative action, is embodied in individual subjects, and could thus be 
characterised as a form of subjective-objectivity.  Although this does not necessarily 
resolve competing claims to knowledge, it does provide a means of differentiating them 
while also recognising their fundamental interrelationship.  Forms of knowing may thus 
be more easily judged on their own terms and linked together in a mutually enriching 
way. 
3.5    An Integrated Model of Inquiry 
3.5.1 Research method and questions 
The present investigation has been informed by the practice-based and arts-informed 
approaches to research reviewed earlier in this chapter as well as the epistemological 
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framework outlined above.  To fulfil its aim of investigating the way that writing poetry 
can impact on the self-experience of the writer it has adopted an approach that combines 
a first-person practice-based investigation or self-study, with a theoretical explication 
that is reflexively grounded in the process and outcome of that study.  The main 
components of the method employed are outlined below: 
1. Writing poetry – a sustained personal attempt to engage with the writing of poetry 
and the development of that writing over an extended period. 
2. Reflection on experience – a concurrent reflection on the experience of writing with 
a reflexive focus on its relation to my self-experience. 
3. Theoretical formulation – an attempt to explicate key aspects of my experience in 
terms of the integration and development of relevant theoretical perspectives.  
The investigation is rooted in a creative arts practice, the writing of poetry, and my 
attempt to undertake that practice.  I took as my starting point a wish to both write and 
improve my writing of poetry, and to use that writing as a basis of investigation into its 
influence on my self-experience.  Thus, the intention is to treat seriously both a creative 
aim and a critical or investigatory one.   The process and experience of writing are 
simultaneously part of a personal creative practice and the objects of a critically 
reflective and theoretically informed study.   
To help focus the conduct of the investigation and achievement of the study aims four 
guiding research questions were formulated.  These are presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3   Research questions 
 
Question 1: 
 
 
What is my experience of undertaking an extended personal experiment 
with writing poetry? 
 
Question 2: 
 
 
Is there anything significant or relevant to self-experience reflected in 
the poetry written? 
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Question 3: 
 
 
What are the key relationships found between self-experience and the 
writing of poetry? 
 
Question 4: 
 
 
How can any relationships found between self-experience and writing 
of poetry be formulated theoretically? 
 
 
Adopting any research approach inevitably brings certain benefits but also associated 
problems and limitations (McGrath, 1982).  Some of the advantages of the chosen 
approach are highlighted below, followed by discussion of some of the pitfalls that 
could be anticipated and how these were approached in the design and conduct of the 
study. 
3.5.2 Advantages of the method of inquiry 
The potential benefits of a combined creative and critical form of first-person inquiry 
include the following: 
• The construction of a specific, rich and authoritative account of a personal creative 
process and its relation to self-experience, including creative representations of that 
experience. 
• The capacity to follow an individual inquiry in detail over an extended period 
enables continuities and discontinuities in patterns of experience to emerge more 
clearly. 
• Following a creative practice allows for the emergence of the unanticipated and 
provides a practical means of interrogating assumptions and preconceptions. 
• The combination of creative and critical approaches provides for an original and 
experientially grounded basis for the development of theory.  It also enables this to 
be tested and refined through further experience and the experience of others. 
Against these a number of difficulties were anticipated which required careful 
consideration. 
42 
 
 
 
3.5.3 The danger of falling between stools 
Put bluntly, this refers to the possibility that the inquiry could lead to neither good 
poetry nor good research/scholarship.   The quality of the ‘art’ in arts-informed research 
has already been discussed and the complexity of evaluating the contribution to 
knowledge of a study that explicitly attempts to encompass different forms of knowing 
is self-evident.  However, many authors have proposed standards of evaluation for arts-
informed research (e.g. Eisner, 2003; Hervey, 2000) and research involving self-study 
or autoethnography (e.g. Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Richardson, 2000).  These include 
aesthetic considerations, rhetorical persuasiveness, coherence, trustworthiness, 
generativity and the demonstration of critical reflexivity. Others, such as Garratt & 
Hodgkinson (1998) have argued that it is pointless to specify any definitive set of 
criteria for qualitative research.  To some extent any study that combines approaches 
will need to be judged on the effectiveness of this integration and its success in 
achieving its stated aims.  However, maximizing standards in all areas seems a prudent 
way to support this.  
In the present study the writing of poetry has been actively supported by regular writing 
workshops, tutorials, attendance at poetry readings, and independent study.  The aim has 
been to develop a greater poetic sensibility and some degree of poetic craft, informed by 
the prevailing standards of contemporary poetry.  However, the poetry written during 
the study was not primarily intended to make a contribution to the genre, as in 
doctorates taken by creative writing, but to underpin the investigation into the personal 
experience of writing.  Reflection on the process and experience of writing poetry 
involved the use of other methods of writing as inquiry, for example maintaining a 
personal journal and making extensive research notes.  Reflection was also facilitated 
through regular supervision.  The copious material generated provided a source of 
reference for the critical analysis and was the basis for identifying and interrogating 
relevant theoretical material.   
3.5.4 The danger of confounding processes 
Although there was a clear intention to combine creative and critical modes of 
investigation, it became immediately clear in practice that this was not straightforward 
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and that critical reflection could conflict with creative activity.8  This is a commonplace 
observation in primers on creativity and the advice is usually to suspend or postpone 
critical judgement.  On the other hand, it is possible for critical scrutiny to be avoided in 
favour of maintaining a satisfying creative activity, or through fear of diminishing the 
perceived value of a creative product in which much has been invested. This is a 
product-investigation or creative-critical tension which many arts-based researchers 
comment on (Wilson, 2002).   
The approach adopted in this study is to try and maintain an integrated and flexible 
perspective by framing the whole of the study in terms of the guiding research 
questions.  In other words both the creative and reflective writing, as well as the critical 
analysis, are held together by a constant returning to the research questions as common 
points of origin and towards which an integrated creative outcome is sought.  This is 
consistent with the model for creative arts doctorates proposed by Milech and Schilo 
(2004) who observed how those completing such doctorates can struggle to write an 
effective exegesis to their creative work.  This can prove critically inadequate if it is 
merely a post hoc commentary on the creative product.  
3.5.5 The danger of self-indulgence and lack of relevance 
One of the dilemmas of those engaging in first-person inquiries is how to avoid the 
research either becoming, or sounding, excessively self-referencing and self-indulgent 
(Sparkes, 2002a; 2002b, pp. 88-94).  There is also the related problem of achieving 
outcomes that are not just personally meaningful but have wider relevance to the 
development of understanding.  Taken together these constitute what have been 
described as ‘solipsistic risks’ (Piantanida, Garman, & McMahon, 2000, pp. 101-108).  
Although these issues can be tainted by prejudices stemming from more traditional 
conceptions of research, they present potential problems that must be addressed. 
Cole and Knowles (1996) advocate a focus on specific research questions in self-study 
projects to help focus personal and autobiographical writing effectively.  This supports 
the plan of the present study.  In addition the discipline of making personal inquiries 
public can be an important means of shaping the creative and reflective elements into an 
effective and research conscious form.  This was built into both the creative and critical 
                                                 
8
 See account in Chapter 4. 
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element of the study through open workshops and supervision. Although relevance 
cannot be guaranteed, it can be sought by systematic efforts to link the personal to a 
wider theoretical level.  The epistemological framework and design of the present study 
explicitly sets out to do this.  This cannot ensure the generalisability of findings but this 
is not necessarily an appropriate aim for qualitative research methods (e.g. Marecek, 
2003).  However, as Eisner (2003) argues, important forms of generalisation can and do 
stem from qualitative study of the individual case.  With such research the general may 
be found in the particular leading to a more “naturalistic” as opposed to statistical form 
of generalisation.  For example, the research may lead to insights or theoretical 
connections that have wider applicability, or highlight specific points that, as a result, 
become more widely recognizable. 
3.5.6 The danger of encountering or avoiding personal difficulties 
Although there are potential benefits from relying on creative and emergent process of 
investigation, this introduces a level of uncertainty that can be difficult to manage given 
the need for demonstrable outcomes. Quite significant personal challenges might ensue 
for the researcher as previously discussed with regard to heuristic research (see also 
Ellis & Bochner, 2000). This raises ethical issues that parallel the normal requirement 
for research participants to give informed consent about participation and withdrawal 
from research studies, and about the use of their material.  There is also a possibility that 
such difficulties will be avoided, which might compromise the conduct of the study. 
My own position is that I entered the study with a well-established professional 
background in clinical psychology and psychotherapy and thus felt familiar with the 
challenges of both self-reflection and the boundaries of self-disclosure.  I was hoping to 
learn and benefit from the investigation at a personal as well as academic level and was 
therefore prepared to enter challenging territory if required.  In addition to supervision, I 
had both formal and informal support available and was willing, in principle, to present 
and reflect on my experience openly.  However, I was not interested in self-revelation 
for revelation’s sake and was clear that I would only report what was relevant to the 
emerging themes of the study.  
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Part II 
First-Person Investigation 
 
Note on structure and chronology 
The autobiographical narrative of experience presented in Chapter 4 was written at the 
end of 2005 following a review of my personal journal and other notes made during the 
first four years of the study.9  The poems presented in Chapter 5 were all written during 
this period and consist of work selected for public reading in 2005.  Following this it 
was necessary for me to take an intermission of one year from the study because of 
increased work commitments.  The narrative account and poems are presented in the 
form that they were written or read in 2005 as unmodified ‘outcomes’ of this initial 
phase of the investigation.   
The analysis of the narrative account presented in Chapter 6 was completed at the 
beginning of 2007 together with the commentary at the end of Chapter 5.  These 
sections have been edited for length and clarity, but without change to the substantive 
content of the original analysis that structured the theoretical examination presented in 
Part III. 
                                                 
9
 The study commenced in October 2001. 
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4   Mouthing Words: A Narrative 
A November mist shrouded the Lyn Peninsula.  The view inland towards Snowdonia 
was obscured and to sea the vista was a uniform grey.  My feet had become wet and 
cold as I picked my way awkwardly around the rocky promontory at Criceth.  I took my 
time.  I was in no hurry to get back and a fall could easily cost me a twisted ankle or 
grazed arm.  I remembered those times I had returned home as a child with yet another 
flap torn open across the knee of my school trousers.  That look of anguish in my 
mothers face – more running repairs.  Couldn’t I be more careful in the playground?  
And here I was skiving lessons again – well, actually for the first time in a long time.  
The writing week at Ty Newydd10 was almost at an end and while the others had 
gathered for a final workshop, I had made my excuses and fled.  Unfortunately, I had 
taken my mood with me.  Six days worth of accumulated frustration. 
Poetry, so it seemed, was not about to bend to my will.  My research plan had not 
allowed for this.  I had attended poetry workshops before but the goalposts had been 
mysteriously moved.  Maybe it was the high level of the participants or the focus on 
close reading and revision that was the problem.  Gillian Clarke and Michael Longley 
were both poets I admired, and facilitators of great sensitivity, but the focus was on 
accomplishment and I felt grimly alienated from it.  The poems that I had brought with 
me seemed dry as dust.  Like archaeological remains to be picked over: 
It stills my heart to find you here again 
within the soil and fossil faeces spread, 
a broken record built from your remains 
to reconstruct our life beyond the dead.11 
I read them to the group with my eyes cast down.  I noted the suggestions for revisions 
but felt no desire to return to the lines, not now, not ever again.  As for writing anything 
new, well my hand, heart and head seemed equally petrified.  I was sure blood would 
come from this stone far more easily than poetry. 
                                                 
10
 The national writers centre for Wales. 
11
 From Neanderthal Man, see Appendix I. 
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And so it proved.  Maybe it had never been easy but the difficulty was just less obvious.  
The earliest adolescent poem that I still have a hand-written copy of certainly seemed to 
be howling: 
Thought in conflict with emotion 
Leads me to confusion. 
Is it poetry or words? 
Love or desire? 
Am I thinking when 
My feelings take control?12 
The difference was that then, and on and off over the years, I had written without much 
personal expectation or deliberation.  The occasional poems I produced arose in 
response to an intense or heightened state of my own feelings or more recently, in 
immediate response to an imaginative exercise set as part of work in a writing group.  
Now, a couple of months into my DPhil programme, I had clearly entered new terrain.  I 
had a mission.  I even had some research questions.  But I was stuck. 
It hadn’t occurred to me that reflexively exploring the way that writing poetry related to 
my self-experience could lead me so abruptly to a problem with writing my own poetry.  
It was as if I had set out on a carefully planned adventure and immediately walked into 
an ambush.  The consequences were not pleasant: a circulating brew of confusion, self-
flagellation, and a simple but shameful sense of inadequacy.  I was committed to 
exploring my lived experience of writing poetry and unfortunately this was it.  Not all 
the time of course.  There was plenty of room for distraction; what with a full-time job 
split across clinical psychology education and therapeutic practice, the throes of two 
children readying to leave the nest, and the unending demands of everyday life – I could 
certainly still keep myself occupied.  Underneath, however, the doubts were simmering.  
What is it that I am struggling with?  What’s making this so difficult?  Even – trust a 
psychotherapist to think it – what’s wrong with me? 
The pattern for the ensuing year rapidly unfolded.  Repeated forays into the struggle of 
composition, drafts, half-drafts and fragments formed and then usually abandoned; each 
attempt running into an impasse.  The feeling was that what I wrote went ‘dead’ on the 
page almost before the ink was dry.  Just enough produced to take along to the 
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 From: Am I Thinking, see Appendix II. 
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workshop at the university and the local poetry society group that I attended.  Not 
enough to bring any satisfaction or sense of progress; only too aware that my lines 
tended towards prose, lacked surprise, didn’t quite find a cadence.  The groups patiently 
focussed on the poems and I realised I was learning something about poetry – or at least 
what it was not – but what was I learning about myself?   
I was writing regularly and copiously in a reflective journal about my experience.  
Indeed this writing came refreshingly easily after my hesitant attempts with verse.  The 
journal became a private place to moan, to question, to theorize, to dissect.  It had a 
certain energy that my approach to poetry clearly lacked.  It represented the private 
world of my own experience as against the attempt to shape a public form in poetry.  
Indeed the attempt to write poetry seemed to be ‘on show’ to myself in a debilitating 
way.  It was as if by paying deliberate attention to my walking I kept falling over.  The 
more self-conscious I became about my writing the less satisfactory it seemed. 
I found I was responding to this difficulty in a number of ways.  On the one hand I was 
intensifying my study of poetry.  It was as if I reasoned that the lack was at least in part 
technical, or perhaps reflected a lack of a proper immersion in the traditions and forms 
of poetry.  After all I had dropped any formal study of English many years ago, after O’ 
levels, in favour of mathematics and science subjects.   Psychology, apart from those 
areas of psychoanalysis concerned with the arts, had not really brought me back any 
closer to the world of literature.  Perhaps what I needed was a deeper appreciation of 
poetry, its history and traditions, its forms and principles.  I began to read more poetry 
and more about poetry.  A small library of books spread on my shelves in response to 
this impulse.   At the same time I started questioning my motives and realised that in 
some way I had been attracted to this whole study by a desire to develop an identity as a 
poet.  Although I had been content to write occasional poetry largely for my own 
consumption one of the opportunities I saw in the doctorate was to apprentice myself 
more seriously as a poet.  It was a profound disappointment to find that this was not 
working out as I had hoped. 
* * * * * 
In support of my research I had agreed to undertake a couple of significant writing 
projects.  One of these involved co-authoring a book on the processes underpinning 
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change in psychodynamic therapy.  The other, arising as an integral part of the study, 
was a chapter for a book on psychoanalysis and poetry.  As I moved into these projects I 
found that the space for writing poetry contracted even further.  It wasn’t just time that 
was squeezed – although I was getting up very early each day in a routine necessary to 
meet the publishers deadlines – but somehow my thinking became increasingly set in an 
expository prose format.  My mind seemed set in pursuit of achieving maximum clarity 
as I wrestled with the complexities and subtleties of my themes.  When I turned back to 
poetry it was as if more of the same wanted to emerge:  a logical progression of ideas, 
systematic connections and selective illustrations, a general commitment to be 
informative and to try and make sense.  An approach that seemed firmly rooted at a 
conceptual level.  Even when I was writing directly about poetry I found my own 
attempts to actually write poems was stymied by this ‘mental set’.  I was trapped in 
‘telling’, the cardinal sin of creative writing, but knowing this was not enough to shift 
out of it.  My trickle of poetry writing turned into a series of spasmodic drips. 
I found it interesting at this time to talk with others who were undertaking doctorates by 
creative writing.  Almost without exception they postponed the discursive elements of 
their writing until after the creative components had been completed.  Many described 
to me a similar difficulty in combining creative forms of writing, particularly poetry, 
with the demands of writing more expository prose.  People talked of ‘interference’ or 
the need for a different kind of mood.  Apparently the capacity to move between 
different genres of writing was not a straightforward matter.  At least I was not alone in 
experiencing this. 
I became familiar with an uncomfortable feeling of emptiness.  I was disciplined enough 
to keep forcing myself to attempt to write poetry and thus found myself repeatedly 
sitting, sometimes for quite long periods, in front of a blank sheet of paper or an open 
‘Word’ document.  Unfortunately nothing seemed to be there, and of course there was 
nothing there – on paper or the screen.  What I couldn’t quite understand was why 
nothing seemed to be over here either, in ‘me’ so to speak.  Hadn’t I had a rich enough 
life experience?  Surely something had happened to me that I could write about?  Surely 
there were significant experiences or feelings that I could shape into words?  Why had I 
suddenly turned into this blank slate?  I tried numerous treatments for this ailment: free-
writing; writing exercises culled from books on creative writing, practice in the use of 
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different forms and imitations of poems I liked.  From these, sometimes, a little would 
gradually emerge.  However, the free-writing usually took me away into a reflective 
bout of journal writing, while the other exercises felt true to their name, they felt 
primarily like exercises.  What emerged might look a bit like a poem but didn’t feel it 
had any significance or resonance for me.  I soon lost interest in these efforts and 
frequently binned them despondently as simply ‘practice’. 
I couldn’t really understand why I didn’t have more to express.  Somehow my feelings 
and experiences felt superficial when it came to shaping them into words.  I could write 
about them endlessly, chewing over my frustration about not writing poetry became an 
almost compulsive habit.  Then this too became boringly repetitive.  I was tired of 
naval-gazing, sick of my self-obsession but couldn’t find a way out. 
In fact it wasn’t that I made a deliberate decision to ease up on this effort.  It felt rather 
that another impulse entered in.  Faced with a blank sheet I felt the urge to pick up a soft 
pencil or coloured pen and draw something instead; nothing spectacular, more a simple 
process of building up a doodle on the page.  It was an immediate relief.  I let myself 
indulge as if I had been let out of school at the end of a long exam term into a huge field 
of wonderful wild flowers.  I could do what I wanted.  Make a mark here; draw a big 
sweeping curve there.  It rapidly got a grip of me.  I bought a variety of pads of paper; 
some water-paints; pastels, eventually even a desk easel.  I still haven’t used the easel 
but I couldn’t resist it – it just screamed BUY ME!  I couldn’t relax until I had 
purchased it.  But in fact it ended up on the top of the wardrobe while I kneeled on the 
floor with my biggest sheets of paper.  Somehow I needed to satisfy the desire to have 
it, even though I didn’t actually use it – at least not yet.  There seemed no need to get 
that serious too soon. 
My drawing remained unstructured and although I dipped into a few books on art I soon 
put them down and continued with my own spontaneous productions.  Then this 
impulsive condition started to mutate and spread.  It felt like a mild physical contagion.  
I felt a restless energy to ‘muck around’ in other expressive art forms.  Two areas in 
particular captured my imagination, sound and movement. 
* * * * * 
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I resigned from the school choir when I was eleven.  On the surface I gave in my notice 
voluntarily, although in hindsight it is clear that I was given the push.  After all I was 
caught red-handed.   Our music teacher and conductor was a serious, bespectacled man 
who never wasted words.  One day he stalked around the room in his crumpled dark suit 
and homed in on two of us, first me and then another boy.  I can still feel my anxiety 
rising as he stopped in front of me and then, with great deliberation, bent his head to one 
side and stooped forward lowering his ear inches in front of my mouth.  I hadn’t even 
been aware of it but as soon as he did so the awful truth hit me – I was mouthing the 
words but no sound was coming out.  He said nothing.  I said nothing.  At the end of the 
lesson I approached him and said I thought I should drop out of the choir.  He nodded 
and I never returned.  I never returned to any choir.  I never got on with any musical 
instrument beyond air guitar.  I was a musical non-starter. 
The need to make some sort of music suddenly now became urgent.  A few years 
previously I had experimented with a course on overtone chanting – it seemed ideal for 
me, you make a fundamental groaning noise and shape your mouth to produce bell-like 
overtone sounds.  You don’t need to hit a single note, in fact you can’t pitch the 
overtones, they rather magically appear all by themselves.  Doing it in a group sounds a 
bit like travelling by underground with a choir of angels – there is a modulating peel of 
high-pitched ethereal sounds coming and going against a heavy baseline rumble.  I had 
only experimented with it occasionally before but now I found myself beginning to let 
rip.  The family raised their eyebrows but soon learnt to ignore the sounds coming from 
my study.  What they couldn’t ignore quite so easily was my decision to buy a piano.  I 
didn’t play the piano but my son played the keyboard and guitar and was doing music at 
A’ level, so I had the perfect excuse.  I taught myself some of the basic principles, but 
what I really wanted to do was just enjoy creating my own improvised patterns and 
rhythms of sound, without concern for playing any recognizable melodies.  I 
experienced this as totally absorbing and very physical.  There was no time for pre-
meditation, the fingers just had to move from key to key in response to what seemed 
called for, what simply wanted to occur next or perhaps happened to occur by chance.  
It was a matter of luck whether what emerged sounded at all musical, but it almost 
always felt as if it embodied something for me and in the process of this free-playing I 
could usually feel my body relax, and my concentration alter, moving away from any 
thought about what I was doing towards an immersion in the sound that was emerging.   
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The bodily experience of making sound was also reflected in a desire to experiment 
with spontaneous physical movement.  I have always pursued activities such as running 
and swimming and had also spent some time learning some basic forms in Tai Chi. The 
repetitive discipline of all these activities gave way to a desire to feel movement more 
fully, to try and move in response to inner feeling in a manner that was nearer to some 
form of improvised dance than any sport or martial art.  I had previously read a little 
about the Alexander technique and found myself seeking ways to tune into my body 
more, to become aware of what I was doing at a physical level from moment to 
moment.  All this was pursued rather unsystematically, there was just a desire to try 
things out, to play an evocative piece of music and move to it, to take note of how my 
body felt when I was sitting in a meeting at work, or walking from A to B.  To get in 
touch with something that represented a more vital and cellular level of my own being, 
that took shape in the form of my movements, postures and gestures. 
This whole pattern of activity – drawing, sounding and moving in more spontaneous 
and improvised ways – seemed both connected and disconnected from the central aims 
of my research.  In some respects it took me away from my efforts to write poetry, but 
at another level I had the sense that it was a continuous part of the process that had 
begun with my efforts to write.  I continued with my reflective journal and tried to link 
up the activities that I had been drawn to with my research aims, but while I was 
actually engaged in these almost compulsive activities I gave little or no thought to what 
they meant.  I simply allowed myself to follow the impulses that arose.  I did not 
question where they might be leading to or establish any regimen to follow. 
* * * * * 
This pattern continued into the second year of the research programme during which 
time the work on both the book and chapter I was writing proceeded well.  The study 
that I did for these helped me to formulate and clarify in my own mind some of the 
complexities of the way poetry might be understood to relate to conscious and 
unconscious psychological processes, particularly in relation to psychological change.  
Interestingly where I had most difficulty was in writing a chapter on creativity.  Here I 
found myself struggling to integrate ideas about personal and artistic creativity.   It was 
as if this touched on a question that for me was still not resolved – did art require a 
special kind of creativity and was my continued difficulty with poetry an indication of 
53 
 
 
 
an absence of the necessary ability, or was it reflective of some other kind of more 
personal obstacle?  Put more bluntly was my difficulty reflective of a lack of 
competency or some form of pathological block? 
It struck me that my whole approach to writing poetry over the first eighteen months of 
my research had rested on some implicit and unquestioned assumptions about what such 
writing should involve, if it were related to personal development.  I came to see this as 
the ‘inner world into words’ or ‘symbolic expression’ model.  However naive it might 
appear when I thought about it, I sensed that the way I approached writing was to search 
for some area of experience or feeling ‘inside’ me that I might be able to describe or 
articulate in poetry.  It was as if I imagined an inner location where I had a store of 
accumulated personal experience that I could then try and externalise or express in 
poetic form.  The problem was the more I looked the less I seemed to be able to locate 
any such fixed form of inner experience.  Rather everything was more or less in flux.  
Influenced by psychodynamic ideas I had also imagined that once I had successfully 
articulated my inner world in a poetic form this would be open to symbolic 
interpretation.  I would then be able to learn about myself by interpreting my poems in a 
manner not dissimilar to the analytic interpretation of dreams.  Of course, the problem 
might be that this inner world was unconscious but somehow this way of thinking about 
it didn’t seem to help the process of writing poetry.  I continued to get stuck or produce 
work that I felt had little or no personal meaning. 
I was aware of a continued feeling of shame and inadequacy at my lack of poetic 
productivity.  I attended poetry readings that provoked my envy, not so much of the 
quality of the poetry, but of the simple fact that the poems had been written at all.  
When my prose writing projects were finally complete I sat back and realised that I 
would have no more excuses for not producing some more poetry of my own, and that if 
I could not do this then a radical re-think of my whole program of research might be 
required.  I was coming to a point of make-or-break.  An early summer holiday 
provided the opportunity to relax and take stock with the aid of a small collection of 
books that I took with me.  Among these were some of the writings of William Stafford.  
His description of the process of writing poetry seemed so natural and compelling, so 
free of the mystification or technically based accounts of some other poets I had read.  I 
sat back in the mild early season Aegean sunshine and warmed to his account of rising 
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daily at dawn to write poetry as a ritual and pleasure, not as a chore or with excessive 
concern about any form of achievement.  In fact when Stafford was interviewed about 
how he felt others might achieve his productivity and apparent ease in writing he 
famously replied that this would require their willingness to “lower their standards” 
(Stafford, 1978, p. 118).   I read and reread this as if I was gradually unpicking a tightly 
sewn straightjacket that I had been wearing without even being aware of it.  What 
standards was I trying to live up to?  The standards of an accomplished poet?   My 
imagined standards for writing something with psychological significance?  I felt ready 
to resign from the choir all over again but this time I felt I wanted to join another one.  I 
wanted to find a way of writing my own poetry free of unnecessary assumptions and 
burdens. 
Soon after my return home I was away again, this time on a week’s course in poetry 
therapy, the first of its kind in the UK, run by Cheri Chavis an experienced poetry 
therapist from America.  The week was great fun and included a lot of practical 
exercises.  Here the concern was essentially with personal change and development 
through the stimulus of poetry and literature, including creative writing.  What was 
absent was any real concern with the quality of the writing itself.  It was a long way 
from the writing groups that I attended and this helped me see more clearly that the 
context of each type of group created a particular culture of expectation and evaluation.  
In the writing workshops the focus was on the poem, and specifically on how it might 
be improved; on the course the focus was on the personal meanings and responses to 
what was written irrespective of craft.  There was hardly any overlap or integration of 
these concerns in either context and yet it was just this meeting point, between the 
attempt to write poetry and personal experience, which was my chosen focus of interest.   
I sensed that I had not been clear enough about my own agenda but had been trying to 
swing between some unquestioned assumptions about what counted as poetry and 
personal development all along, a problem no doubt reinforced by the distinct concerns 
of the different groups from whom I most frequently sought support and recognition. 
The temperature crept up as the summer progressed and I resolved to continue to rise 
early but now, like Stafford, I would try to enjoy the cool early hours of the day not 
writing book chapters but spinning out whatever poetry I could.  Up to this point my 
journal writing had been extensive but for the first time it began to diminish in favour of 
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trying to find a poetic form for whatever was arising for me.  At first the process was 
fragmentary then I hit on the idea of  ‘free-lining’ – free-writing in the way proposed by 
many creative writers but with the added requirement that I lay it out in lines.  No effort 
to stop and think or to look inside for some experience to express.  Just words on the 
page, one line after another, without too much concern with punctuation or sense: in 
other words, in some form of verse.  I was faintly embarrassed with what immediately 
began to emerge.  The creation of line-endings immediately provoked a reaching out for 
clanging rhymes and simple rhythms to take the momentum forward.  For example: 
my body aches 
my eyes are shut 
I feel discomfort 
in my gut 
I want to lie 
my body down 
until its lying 
on the ground 
then let sweet peace 
sliding creep 
as I drift back 
off to sleep 
I ignored the fact that even casual readers of the Poetry Review would spurn this as 
doggerel and just let the writing find its own way.  To start with I would often write but 
not bother to save this unless I felt something meaningful had emerged.  Then I fell into 
the pattern of accepting it all; letting it stand as it first emerged in the hope that I might 
discover in it the seeds of something nearer to poetry. 
Gradually this writing built up its own momentum.  For a short period, on almost a daily 
basis, I would produce another free-lined ‘poem’ as part of my journal writing routine.  
On the whole I did not return to what I had written and make any serious attempts at 
revision, I just moved forward trying to put down whatever arose in the moment.  In this 
I noticed a difference from how I had been approaching my writing when I had felt 
stuck.  Then I had tended to look for something to express, to search for an experience 
or a feeling to somehow externalise and explore in poetry.  Now I was simply and 
directly attentive to my body – noting how my body felt rather than trying to formulate 
how I felt – following the sensations that were arising, such as heaviness behind the 
eyes or subtle fluttering in my chest.  Then, at some point, I would find myself 
following the words that came to mind.  Initially I would simply write whatever arose 
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but as time went on I seemed to be tuning in to both the words and what they stirred in 
me.  A phrase would bring a slight sense of excitement and I would go with it, another 
might feel mechanical and elicit no response, so I would hesitate and seek something 
else.  This did not feel like a process of editorial or critical censorship; any response to 
the words, whether experienced positively or negatively, was taken as a cue to continue.  
It was only the absence of response that might lead me to wait a little longer before 
writing the next line down. 
All that I wrote felt raw and uncrafted but I had the sense that something was happening 
in at least some of this writing that had not happened before.  I did not try to analyse or 
reflect too much on what this was, although I was aware that themes of stifled 
communication, anxiety and sorrow were tentatively emerging and I certainly felt that 
the writing was in some way quite personal.  As such it also seemed to be potentially 
revealing – both of my undeveloped poetic sensibility and of a more emotionally 
vulnerable aspect of myself.  
So in the morning I grieve 
line after line in the simplest of fashions 
lowering the drawbridge 
and penetrating  the thickened walls 
through an open wound 
gashed beneath the watchtower. 
 
I look up and see no one there, 
they are lying down 
exhausted by years of vigilance, 
responding to my call 
and finally 
handing over keys 
 
that turn slowly 
crack after crack within the lock 
to steal into the palace 
kept safe from penetration 
protected from view 
and the presence of witnesses. 
 
Each step is a word 
written to take me a fraction further 
toward the residue 
the accumulated remains 
that form 
the riches of sorrow. 
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My main concern throughout this period was with writing, not what this writing might 
mean or reveal.  So on the whole I did not re-read what I had previously written, even if 
it had engaged me emotionally, but pressed on to something new each day. 
* * * * * 
The start of the third year of my programme commenced with a scheduled meeting with 
my supervisor, Celia Hunt, to review progress over the summer and to plan the year 
ahead.  When the day for our meeting came I found myself anxiously wondering what I 
had achieved over the summer.  Unlike the first eighteen months when I had made 
tangible progress with chapters for publication, I had nothing even in a draft stage to 
show.  I had been reading widely but in a variety of different directions, it would be 
difficult to identify exactly what I had been focussed on and exactly where I was going.  
Uncomfortable at the thought of arriving empty-handed for supervision it occurred to 
me that I could print out my latest ‘free-lining’ and seek Celia’s feedback on this.   This 
seemed to be at the heart of what I had doing but it suddenly felt like I was about to take 
an unanticipated and risky step.  This writing had always felt private and without any 
audience in mind.  It felt closer to my personal reflective journal than drafts of poetry 
and I didn’t even really know what the writing contained.  I hadn’t returned to it or 
edited it.  The thought of Celia reading it filled me with a mild sense of dread, perhaps 
this would finally confirm that I had no poetic ability; perhaps it could reveal the worst 
or least acceptable aspects of myself.  It felt as if I was at a boundary, it was a ‘now or 
never’ moment and the lack of time to deliberate may have helped to swing the 
decision.  I pressed the print key and quickly gathered up the sheet of papers that 
spewed out into the printer tray.  I was already running late so there was nothing for it 
but to leave for the meeting.  I set off with a sense of resolve and the collection of 
printed sheets still unread in my hand.13 
I took pains to explain the nature and context of this writing when I handed it to Celia, 
and felt pleased that she seemed genuinely interested in reading it and hearing about the 
experience of writing that I described.  However, after I left the meeting I felt a sense of 
increasing detachment and remoteness that is difficult to adequately describe.  Over the 
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weekend that immediately followed I went with some friends for a sailing trip on the 
Solent and my mood throughout the weekend felt strangely isolated, despite my being 
enclosed in a small yacht with five other people.  We sailed into the night watching the 
pinpricks of light scattered along the coastline and the diffuse outline of other vessels 
making their way through the carefully marked channels.  The experienced sailors in the 
group poured over charts and chatted as they monitored the radio but I felt most at home 
not moving at all, just sitting alone on the prow sensing everything flowing around me, 
earth, air and water intermingling in the night.  There seemed a deep unfathomable 
sadness but not something I could articulate or that anyone else apparently noticed. 
On my return my sense of detachment deepened further.  I found myself going through 
the motions at work adequately but when external demands ceased I quite literally 
rolled to a gradual halt.  It was as if there was no internal drive operating, only a system 
that could still respond to what impinged from outside but when that ceased would lose 
all momentum.  I was unable to muster the energy or motivation to engage in any self-
directed activity and would just sit in my study chair staring into space and often falling 
asleep.  My mind was not filled with negative thoughts but it did feel, at the risk of 
sounding over-dramatic, that some part of me had either died or been anaesthetised.   
My feelings were a complex mixture of a peculiarly detached sense of calm and a 
profound but subtle sense of suffering, nearest in quality to an impersonal kind of grief 
or sense of dread.  However, I did not feel entirely identified with these distressing 
feelings, they were just quietly present and remained unattached to any particular 
thought or event.  What was most bewildering was my lack of any capacity to initiate 
anything and my overwhelming physical sense of being brought to a complete halt. 
This state persisted over a number of weeks and I began to become a little concerned 
about whether or not it would lift or move on.   I began to wonder whether I would need 
to consult someone about it.  However, my instinct was to simply stay with it.  I seemed 
quite able to respond normally to others and could complete tasks when the situation 
demanded it.  I was still able to go to work and function OK.  It was just that there 
seemed nothing beyond that.  Nothing in me running the show anymore, just an 
awareness of this state of being.  Eventually having sat motionless in my chair for some 
hours one evening it occurred to me that although I couldn’t seem to do anything else I 
might be able to actually embrace this state more fully, really just accept it rather than 
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hope it would pass or seek a way back to normal.  Without thinking I got up, lay on the 
floor and allowed myself to simply imagine and accept that this was it, that I was in 
some sense dead and so be it.  Nothing miraculous happened but I got up and went to 
bed and when I awoke the next morning I immediately sensed that something had 
shifted.  I felt a little more alive and engaged, my mood began slowly to lighten.   As 
time went on I gradually made a return to my old self but with a sense that maybe 
something had in fact changed – although I was uncertain exactly what.  After nearly a 
month of not approaching any sort of writing a poem emerged which I initially titled 
‘Paper Wings’14, but which I later adapted into a poem called Invisible man15.  The 
latter half of the original draft was as follows: 
I am not what I think, I think 
staring out from blindness 
mind no longer refuelling 
rooted in a body 
but raised from the ground 
both feet in the air 
quite still 
like someone with paper wings 
and remarkable vision 
I brought this poem and reflected on the experience of the last month at my next 
supervision meeting – still very unsure about whether the episode would return or had 
run its course.  I felt that somehow the whole experience had been closely connected 
with the fact that I had given Celia something to read that had a much more personal, 
private and raw quality about it than I had done previously.  Her response to my writing 
was encouraging and above all accepting, although there was no pretence that it was 
anything more than spontaneous and quite uncrafted writing. Celia was able to pick out 
some passages and sections that she felt had potential for re-drafting and revision and 
this led me to return to this writing myself to consider whether I wanted to take any of it 
forward. 
After this meeting I found I began to tentatively re-engage with drafting further poetry 
and for the first time I began to go through what I had previously written to see what 
might be worth working on a little more.  Celia’s suggestions were particularly helpful 
here and I eventually revised and took to workshops two poems from the material I had 
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originally given her to read: Missing Pieces and One Million Conversations.16  I seemed 
able to look at my own initial efforts in a more forgiving light and to rework things that 
seemed to have at least some potential for development.  At the same time I noticed that 
my approach to writing poetry had altered.  For one thing I did not feel so anxious about 
producing poetry that needed to achieve a certain recognised standard or quality.  I was 
still interested in writing as well as I could, but attempting to be a poet no longer 
seemed so salient. 
It became very apparent that previously my locus of judgement had been almost 
completely external.  I had found it hard to trust my own more direct sense of what felt 
good or indifferent in my writing, and indeed even in that of other poems that I read.  
Now, the process of writing felt more immediately rewarding, as I searched for patterns 
of words that appealed to me, with less concern for achieving an imagined standard that 
I could not quite grasp or define.  I also found that my pleasure in reading a variety of 
forms of poetry noticeably increased, while at the same time I was happier to admit that 
some widely acclaimed poets and poetry, for whatever reason, did not engage me at all. 
I moved forward a little cautiously at first.  It wasn’t clear to me exactly what the 
overwhelming feeling of inertia and ‘going dead’ had really been about, but I did have a 
strong sense that it was a critical experience, and that it was intimately connected with 
the process not only of my having written more freely but also the act of sharing this 
with Celia.  As I re-engaged with writing again, I found it became more possible to 
observe my own process without interfering with it so much.  It was as if I had 
developed a greater degree of detachment but not of an inhibiting or critical kind.  It had 
simply become a little easier to rest in an awareness of what I was doing or experiencing 
and to note how this ongoing experience, if left to its own devices, would simply 
develop and change without any need for deliberate control or determined effort on my 
part.   When this relaxed awareness was present I felt an increased sense of ease and 
enjoyment in what I was doing, even if the writing itself didn’t lead very far or ran into 
difficulties.   
It was soon apparent that this pleasurable quality was profoundly rooted in an increased 
consciousness of my body, both of the sensations arising in different areas of my body 
                                                 
16
 See Section 5.1. 
61 
 
 
 
and an overall sense of bodily presence and what can perhaps be best described as a 
sense of ‘rootedness’.  Previously my attempts to write were marked by a feeling of 
going into my head, sensations in my body were largely ignored.  I would sometimes 
rise from my desk oblivious to the fact that one of my legs had ‘gone to sleep’ or that 
there was a deep mark on my wrist from where it had been pressing on the edge of the 
table.  Now, particularly as I started writing, I found I wanted to tune into my body, get 
it comfortable, feel out what was going on, what specific or global sensations were 
arising.  I would also be more interested in how this might subtly change as I wrote, 
how words seemed to alter the feelings slightly.  How certain words could somehow 
feel ‘right’, while others were somehow unconnected to this level of somatic 
experience. 
For a while I experimented quite deliberately with just writing from my body.  I would 
simply sit, allow myself to relax and then tune into my body sensations.  I would then 
wait for a while and see if any words arose and if they did I would write them down 
until something resonated or stood out for me.  Then I would try and develop this a 
little, all the time trying to let my bodily reactions be a guide to where to go next, as 
opposed to relying on a process of explicit thought.  This did not always prove 
straightforward and did not lead in any reliable way to better writing.  Sometimes I 
would not find that any words came, or if they did none seemed to move me.  At other 
times I would drift back up into my head and only later realise that I had lost awareness 
of this bodily level.  However, on the whole I felt considerably less blocked than I had 
in the past.  There also appeared to be less of a divide between private forms of writing, 
which had no relation to craft, and attempts to shape something more explicitly into a 
poetic form.  These two aspects of writing seemed far more interchangeable when I kept 
contact with my bodily reactions, as opposed to when I might think about what I had 
written.  Sometimes a line could be written quickly and spontaneously, perhaps with a 
loose feeling in my arm and hand, at another point I might find myself weighing a word 
or group of words together by rolling them over and over in my mouth. 
This experience of writing was reflected in a more differentiated experience of self.  
Rather crudely, it seemed that at one level there was a bodily level or self-experience 
composed of myriad sensations together with a more integrated feeling of the body as a 
whole, and on another, completely different plane, there was a level of being as a state 
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of awareness which had no particular characteristics of its own at all.  Between these 
distinctly different levels was all that arose in terms of mental content – in particular the 
flow of thoughts.  It was as if I had inhabited this intermediate zone somewhat to the 
exclusion of the other two, particularly when approaching activities like writing.  This 
seemed to be adequate for writing expository prose but not for writing poetry.  Now, 
stepping back into a greater awareness brought with it a heightened sense of what was 
going on bodily, and the way this connected with the flow of thoughts and in particular 
the play of language.  I became more aware of how an idea, formulated in language, 
influenced my physical state, and conversely how a physical state could be elaborated 
into language and was changed by this process.   
I kept exploring this newly established sense of connection although it didn’t 
necessarily lead immediately to more successful poetry – it just made the process feel 
less burdensome and more playful.  I no longer felt pulled between the attempt to write 
‘good’ poetry on the one hand and to ‘express myself’ on the other.  It seemed more like 
a process of moving dynamically between language and my sensed state without any 
prior expectation of what might emerge.   
* * * * * 
It was at this point, mid-way through my third year of investigation that I attended a 
one-day writing workshop facilitated by Mathew Sweeney.  This focussed on 
imaginative writing exercises rather than editorial work.  One of the exercises that were 
given was to write something based on the idea of time running in reverse.  We had no 
more than about half an hour to come up with a draft of something stimulated by this 
notion.  As usual in such situations, I watched as others rapidly scribbled down their 
lines and felt a mild sense of panic.  What can I write about this I thought?  I tried to 
relax and feel my way into my already tensing body and then searched hopefully for 
some words that would get me going.  Nothing seemed to come.  Then suddenly there 
was a leap of excitement like a mild shock running through me.  There were still no 
words but I realised that I had formed an image – it was of a man with food being 
expelled from his mouth and dropping onto the plate in front of him where it was 
reconstituted into egg on toast.  Immediately on its heels came a series of other images – 
people moving backwards as if on a film run in reverse, stubble growing back into the 
skin on a man’s face, words re-entering a speakers mouth and sounding garbled in the 
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process.  I heard this sound, saw these pictures and instantly felt I could begin on my 
poem – this time basing my writing on the images that I had formed.  The poem was 
later revised and titled Toc tic17.  Its opening lines retain some of the initial images that I 
formed: 
We woke today to the day before 
the calendar frame tripping backwards 
as stubble shadowed its way into skin: 
 
outside, figures passed in rapid retreat 
dancing blindly across the street 
dangerously close to passing cars. 
This experience now seems so obvious as to be hardly worthy of comment, but it came 
as a revelation to me at the time.  For the first time it dawned on me how significant 
images were, in all their many forms, to the way my ‘thinking’ operated.  Images were 
arising all the time, they provided a background panorama to all my thinking in words 
and indeed often simply came and went without any verbal elaboration.  Somehow these 
images were much more closely tied to my bodily state than words.  I found I could say 
the word ‘gun’, for example, and the way I felt about it depended not on the word per 
se, but the image that accompanied it.   An image of a gun pointed at a child’s head 
brought a feeling of tension and anger or at my own head a feeling of fear; however, if I 
imagined an old gun in a display case in a museum there was just a sense of curiosity 
and attentiveness.  The significance of images suddenly came alive for me in totally 
new ways.  It wasn’t that the images operated any differently, just that I became much 
more aware of their ubiquitous presence.  Like my previous observations about verbal 
thought, images would come and go but I also noticed that when I was caught up in a 
particularly intense mood I would often be dominated by a recurrent image, one that I 
re-ran in my mind over and over.  On the other hand when I felt relaxed and creative the 
images that came would feel more spontaneous and fluid.   
As I became more attentive to this image-making activity I also noticed how the way I 
felt about myself was often closely tied to the presence or absence of images of myself, 
most significantly images of myself in relation to other people.  Underneath a confident 
mood I could locate an image of myself acting in a successful or appreciated way.  
                                                 
17
 See Section 5.1. 
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Similarly under an anxious mood I could usually find an image of some kind of 
inadequacy or failure, either a re-play of a past scenario or an imagined future situation.  
One of the things that struck me about these images and the image-making activity was 
the way it seemed at times to be quite conscious, but at other times quite difficult to 
bring into focus and yet unmistakably present.  A bit like peripheral vision there was 
something there but it couldn’t quite be brought into focus – nevertheless, even if it was 
indistinct it could throw its shadow across my mind and have a definite impact.  This 
seemed quite unlike verbal thought.  Words and language in the form of an inner or 
outer conversation or process of thought were either conscious or they did not seem, as 
far as I could tell, to exist at all.  A thought had literally never crossed my mind until I 
actually thought it, whereas an image coming into conscious awareness could feel as if 
it had been present to some degree, or in some form, for a period of time.  Unlike verbal 
thought, images seemed to cross the boundary of consciousness and form a bridge to 
what was taking place unconsciously. 
These personal observations about the presence and influence of images added to the 
increasingly complex and more differentiated sense of myself that had been developing 
over the whole of the previous year.  Although images arose outside of my control, 
attention could be brought to them and they could be imaginatively elaborated, 
combined or attenuated.  However, apart from images that I rehearsed, most images 
were ephemeral.  Like dreams they faded away in much the same indistinct way as they 
had come.  It was here that language came into its own.  Language, if well chosen, 
could sometimes capture an image and re-present it.  Moreover it could elaborate and 
play with images in a way that created new possibilities and held in place what was 
otherwise a fleeting experience.  I began to approach writing poetry with the same 
attention to my bodily state, but with a concern for the images that arose rather than 
immediately searching after words.  It dawned on me that I was perhaps at last entering 
the realm of the imagination so deeply revered by the romantic poets.  As I moved 
forward in this direction, I found that images did not only arise in a purely imagined 
way but were constantly being given, through direct sensory perception, if these 
perceptions were received or connected to imaginatively. 
One example of this arose during the first term of my fourth year of study.  My son had 
started at University but had a difficult time with illness and suffered a quite traumatic 
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personal loss during the first few weeks he was away from home.  This had necessitated 
him returning home for a period.  After driving him back to University I found myself 
sitting alone in my car watching the rain sheet down on the windscreen.  The image 
connected with my deep feelings in the moment and found its way into a subsequent 
poem18 which began: 
That night, before leaving 
I watched rain 
streak oblique 
across your screen, 
it spread out 
 
in wind-swept arcs, 
casting flickers 
of shattered light 
to reveal your face 
veiled 
in chequered shadows. 
I found I could now write either from or using images to connect to both real and 
imagined experience.  The requirements of the poem and its personal significance were 
much more blurred.  Images seemed to have much more to show than merely what they 
represented at the level of personal experience, although they were deeply implicated in 
this as well.  Working with and from images seemed to provide the bridge that I needed 
to move between my awareness of bodily sensations and feelings, to embodiment in 
language.  The process was far more playful than my previously dour struggles to move 
words about on the page.  A poem that captures this new almost exuberant spirit that I 
began to find in writing is Laburnum19.  Interestingly the imagery that led to this was 
initially largely auditory, it was the rhythm and cadence of hearing an old recording of 
Yeats reading Innisfree that stimulated not only the first line but the whole melody of 
the poem: 
Lets go away then, past the yellow tree 
and gather black seed from the ground, 
lets go now beyond the grip of town. 
For the first time since I had started the project, writing poetry no longer felt like an 
obligation but something I could both enjoy and yet also put to one side without any 
                                                 
18
 Head Lights, see Section 5.1. 
19
 See Section 5.1. 
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sense of guilt or failure.  While the process of playing with images could be fun, 
crafting this into a satisfying poem was not simply automatic but demanded a 
willingness to let go of a lot of material that I might easily become quite attached to.  A 
finished poem felt like a real achievement that demanded the integration of a number of 
processes, usually over a sustained period of time.  I finally became more comfortable 
with what I was able to produce and took more pleasure in sharing this, warts and all, 
with other people.   
The culmination of this in terms of my period of creative investigation came mid-way 
through the fourth year when I gave my first formal public reading at the Kent & Sussex 
Poetry Society.20  Although I still doubted whether I had enough material to sustain an 
effective reading, the evening passed without disgrace and feedback suggested that 
many had found it engaging and rewarding.  Later in the year I read the first 
‘occasional’ poem that I had written at a function to mark the departure of a senior 
colleague from a role he had occupied for many years and that I was now taking on.  
The poem was contrived from images gathered from those who knew him and on the 
night it appeared to powerfully hit the mark.  
I knew, at this point, that I had come a long way since the start of the study.  My poems 
felt both more personal and less, more crafted and yet quite simple.  I did not feel that 
having given a reading qualified me as a poet but I did feel that at last I had regained my 
place in the choir.  I was no longer just mouthing the words but was contributing my 
own voice.  I could look back at my early experience at Ty Newydd from a new and 
hard won perspective.  Although the view was not entirely clear, a good deal of the fog 
had lifted.  I wasn’t entirely sure what had changed but I did feel something quite 
fundamental was different and that I was now able to experience the process of writing 
poetry and, through that, myself in a freer and more flexible way. 
                                                 
20
 This followed previous readings of individual poems ‘from the floor’. 
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Black and white photograph 
At six, in a summer smock 
with scalloped sleeves 
you stood, 
bright white socks 
standing out from the shadows. 
 
It was a lesson in discretion 
an image of sweetness 
pure and preserved 
 
but already your knew 
how to hide your horns, 
under your hat 
and behind your back 
in a brown paper bag. 
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Heart bypass  
Stepping to an irregular beat 
you climb four flights 
before entering 
a descent into silence. 
Suffering the grip 
of respiratory crisis, 
arrested by a cabbage heart. 
 
Watching patiently 
accustomed to witness 
your non-arrival, 
I sit dissolving, 
a therapeutic trick, 
inviting you to see through 
my presence. 
 
Emerging from the barricades 
the hole in the ground 
the rock-locked cupboard, 
mere fragments of memory. 
Meaning fractured 
by a father’s fist 
against the floor. 
 
Raged impotent 
you poured out  
the dregs of past experience, 
smashing crockery 
and rending 
your wife's face 
to a tear-streaked bruise. 
 
In this devastated landscape 
we seek out 
a delicate verbal touch. 
Your unfolding hand 
cradling a single leaf, 
the torn veins seeping, 
bypassing words 
onto the easy chair. 
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Indian summer 
No need to note 
what is known 
only that  
which escapes words, 
a sense less clear,  
an intimation  
of deeper things. 
 
The house on stilts 
opens to gardens 
and banana trees, 
a sweet scent  
of incense 
evoking memories 
and dreams. 
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Irretrievable? 
A smile fell in the grass 
Irretrievable!   
 
From The Night Dances by Sylvia Plath 
 
 
A smile fell in the grass 
and disappeared, irretrievable 
among decaying leaves 
and spreading moss, 
 
lost in dark shadows 
under clumps of fern, 
blanched by the rising smell 
of evaporating dew. 
 
Disembodied, 
lips no longer hold its shape 
but fingers scratch the ground 
for what is undefined: 
 
the texture of a rounded stone,  
an acorn shell, 
a weathered plastic soldier 
severed at the waist. 
 
Strange what you find, 
a smile –  
recaptured in my face. 
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Invisible man 
I am not what I think 
he thinks 
 
walking through  
the November night 
armbands glowing 
caught full beam 
staring out from blindness 
mind no longer recycling 
rooted in a body 
but raised from the ground 
both feet in the air 
quite still 
 
like someone with paper wings 
and remarkable vision 
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Morning 
No time for pillow-talk, 
she dresses  
through the blur 
of half-opened eyes, 
swiftly painting 
puckered lips 
and feeling on the floor 
for missing studs. 
 
No time for breakfast, 
just a sip of coffee 
remainder swilled away, 
to face the battle 
in the handbag 
and the smoked coat 
airing out 
by the door. 
 
No time for meditation 
on the early train, 
shoulder pressed  
by heavy breathers, 
as other readers  
droop their heads 
over lifestyle 
magazines. 
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Cellar steps 
Edge worn slabs 
each descending 
foot by foot 
to our soles' touch, 
the ritual lowering 
of heads, bent 
beneath a joist 
to meet the must 
of rotting wood 
and the breath 
of coal dust. 
 
This rising up 
from layered earth, 
compressed forest 
and fractured bone, 
excavates 
a wider space, 
still unknown  
to those above 
its intone filled 
from ground 
below. 
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Cradle 
each look 
strokes the surface 
of creamed skin 
 
each touch 
a moving caress 
a shared impetus 
 
slipping-pressing-holding 
charged with the delight 
of bodily contact 
 
embraced in endless 
possibilities 
restored from absence 
  
uplifted 
in attentive arms 
the whole universe 
 
in motion 
rising and falling 
with the breath 
 
centred on 
the breast 
the rite of communion 
 
this greedy celebration 
of conjoint need 
this moist flow 
 
of satisfaction 
feeding back 
through lover’s eyes 
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Petals 
Six petals 
lay lightly scattered 
on the pine dresser, 
almost identical 
but each turned 
to a singular curve, 
folding over 
with a final sigh, 
a faint gasp 
of astonishment, 
the pink fragrance 
fading like summer 
in the windowless 
air. 
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Readme  
Two hundred pages of acid free paper 
registration card plus troubleshooting guide, 
incorporating specs with greyscale illustration, 
erratum note to addendum slip inside. 
 
Twelve straight folds in A2 format 
concertinaed down to pocket size, 
a topography of language in word for word 
translation – variable syntax supplied. 
 
Twenty kilobytes of release information, 
confessing to known problems that arise, 
new patches and frequently asked questions 
– origin unspecified. 
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Freshman 
We drive down, laden with years 
spent moving towards independence, 
each moment the last moment. 
 
Arriving at halls 
your eyes shut with indifference 
as we join the column of vehicles 
 
unloading on yellowed lines,  
a free-flowing stream of plastic crates 
filled with mugs, books, posters, c.ds.  
 
We stand back awkwardly 
as you sign in, 
adding as an afterthought 
 
washing powder and vitamins, 
while you find your room 
and collect flyers 
 
from a second-year helper - 
to you he sounded cool, 
to us the room feels empty. 
 
Your mother makes up the bed, 
I check the security of the window, 
you set up your music 
 
and suggest we leave. 
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Playground        
I arrived at school enthroned 
on the back wheel of my mother's  
bicycle. I was left turning 
at the classroom door, deposited, 
unable to double back 
unsure what it meant  
for them to say: 
he'll be all right. 
 
Walked across the room 
papered with drawings 
of stick-shaped people, 
I stood, held at the threshold 
of a narrow way that led out 
to the playground, 
rooted by the sight of a cycle 
wheeling discreetly away. 
 
I could not take the steps down 
towards the din of children 
but watched as one boy grabbed 
another's satchel 
and leaning back, 
like a hammer thrower, 
began to spin 
inside my stomach. 
 
His mouth opened 
with a cry that choked my throat, 
before he spiralled sideways 
mowing down the ducking faces, 
as I edged backwards –  
to kneel before the refuge 
of a world map  
and a shallow tray of sand. 
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Missing pieces 
We're going back in search 
of something, 
slipping down dirt roads 
past waving cotton fields 
to a roadside stopping, 
where passing traffic presses us  
like cornered convicts 
tight against a wattle fence. 
 
An unmarked bus pulls in, 
a woman riding shotgun 
descends to guide us 
through a tumbled mansion, 
where rooms change shape 
moved by pulleys and sheet slings 
suspending space 
and fabricating shadows. 
 
She's climbing ropes 
to a higher level  
while we try to locate 
the missing pieces, 
hesitating, among a cascade 
of exotic ornaments 
and perfumed clothes, 
draped in a time 
when we knew nothing –  
 
just two to a bed 
behind closed doors. 
 
Our pockets full and unperturbed 
by signs of rising water, 
she is gone and we emerge –  
creased  by candlelight; 
  you offer me some oars 
    and I gather myself 
    for the long row back home. 
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One million conversations 
conducted over meal tables, 
slipped through open doorways, 
bellowed across wide streets, 
whispered in tall buildings, 
emerging through windows, 
passing in and out of cars –  
 
words, lip-shaped in air 
shaken up from throats 
and stirred by tongues 
to stream into the void. 
 
Again and again the same patterns 
disabled by fixed meanings, 
the static interference 
of chattering minds 
 
but now, 
when you are so noisily silent, 
I hear everything. 
I feel it echo in my chest 
and my bone marrow dries, 
splintering with the crack 
of a million missed moments 
for saying something.
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Navel gazing 
* 
 
It's a constant fascination 
but there's more to it than fluff. 
 
* 
 
Umbilicus –  
an organic connection 
waiting to be cut, 
leaving an impression 
in the shape of a scar. 
 
* 
 
Omphalos, 
sounds good 
looks neat 
in its thousand 
irregularities. 
 
* 
 
A giggle, a scream, 
a belly eyed beam 
button up your shirt 
stop tickling, it hurts. 
 
* 
 
Sun drenched, perspiring, 
stretched out on a long afternoon,  
tracing the graceful tributary 
that trickles between her breasts, 
surrendering to a basin valley 
of bronze dimpled skin 
and bleached roots of hair,  
collecting in the hollow of her belly 
a small clear pool. 
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Toc tic 
We woke today to the day before, 
the calendar frame tripping backwards 
as stubble shadowed its way into skin;  
 
outside, figures passed in rapid retreat 
dancing blindly across the road 
dangerously close to reversing cars. 
 
We were distracted by the rising rain 
the food that spilled from our mouths 
and those echoes we heard before the sounds 
 
but it was the words that undermined us 
the incomprehensible... 
'ingenhapp si twha' – you screamed, 
 
I looked bewildered. 
We walked away from each other 
our wounds healing abruptly. 
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Black 
You find it in the fullness of night 
merged with trees, 
 
I find it in those awful jokes you tell 
about men. 
 
You find it in the faces of the surging crowd 
when they see a God, 
 
I find it in the toe you trapped last week 
under the sofa. 
 
You find it in the dance of angels who 
salsa to communion, 
 
I find it in traces of make-up smudged  
on tissue paper. 
 
You find it in the rifle butts of soldiers 
pictured unawares, 
 
I find it in the middle of your eyes 
slowly widening. 
 
You find it in the depths of stars 
when light implodes, 
 
I find it in your drawer - 
with and without straps. 
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Tree fall 
The day was marked 
for chain-saw and ropes 
but no single felling, 
no timber crack 
or graceful sweep to earth, 
this proved 
a slow killing, 
an amputation of branches, 
a systematic surgery  
of growth 
executed in suspended cuts, 
from top down 
and outside in, 
until the final stump 
was buried 
– under shaved 
spillage 
from its core. 
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Enlightenment 
Just sitting 
at the edge –  
 
sitting still, 
waiting to find 
what isn't lost. 
 
Sitting, hearing 
the answer 
in the question. 
 
Sitting with 
eyes closed  
but "I" open. 
 
Sitting, 
 – ah so! 
 
That simple. 
 
In silence 
no place to go. 
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Head Lights 
That night, before leaving, 
I watched rain 
streak oblique 
across your screen. 
It spread out 
 
in wind-swept arcs, 
casting flickers 
of shattered light 
to reveal your face 
veiled 
in chequered shadows. 
 
Unblinking, you stared 
ahead, at nothing 
in particular,   
I mouthed some words 
and slipped away, 
 
for at that moment 
only our tears 
appeared 
unambiguous. 
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Laburnum 
Let’s go away then, past the yellow tree 
and gather black seed from the ground, 
let’s go now beyond the grip of town. 
 
Let’s creep past the signal mast 
and grimly duelling carriageways, far out  
to the furthest mark of the retail park  
 
and down then off the beaten track 
towards the ash periphery, through elder 
sycamore and birch, let’s steal our way 
 
to the clearing they once made and find  
our ring of stones.  Let’s strip our clothes 
and dance awhile before an unlit fire, 
 
let’s feel the heat that we can raise 
and scour each other’s skin,  let’s chant 
a chorus of don't knows and then –  
 
then we may rest on bracken bed  
and hold our breath to the point of death 
then, before our dreams expire, 
 
we can swallow our laburnum seeds 
or scatter them around – to root this place 
and carry us to ground. 
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Visitation 
Behold, I stand at the door, and knock:  
 if any man hear my voice and open the door, 
 I will come in to him....  Revelation 3.20 
 
 
I heard someone 
knocking 
and rising from my chair 
thought of Holman Hunt's 
revelation of the light 
of the world –  
 
a sandaled figure, standing 
beside a handle-less door, 
staring out towards us 
while tapping gently 
against the timber grain. 
 
Pausing in the hall 
I recalled how 
the embroidered cloak 
glistened in the darkness 
and joined beneath beard 
 
in a clasp of precious stones; 
the whole scene 
illuminated 
by a bird-cage lantern, 
with crowning stars 
 
mirrored in a branching sky. 
Only then was I aware 
of the overgrowth 
of bramble and ivy  
impeding my own entrance, 
 
the litter of leaves and refuse 
strewn outside the door. 
It was a voice 
not the knock  
that finally bid me open –  
 
to reveal 
an unfamiliar face, 
just for a moment 
haloed 
in full circle 
by the moon. 
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Line Endings 
Today, I embarked  
on a terminal career 
a last reprieve 
from vocational failure. 
 
I turned the page 
to greet a blank  
world, its surface 
ruled in narrow feint 
 
with each line 
disappearing to space, 
before circling back 
from nowhere. 
 
Between parallel bars 
there is no margin for error 
– on the flat of my lap 
lies a sheer edge 
 
one slip and I'm gone, 
 
leaving only the trace 
of one hand moving 
towards its final 
cursive utterance. 
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Muse 
I have been waiting so long 
unaware of your continuous presence 
anticipating, instead, an arrival 
so always on the look-out. 
It must have felt rude 
staring through you like that, 
poking around your face 
biting down the skin 
around your nails 
till the corners tore and bled. 
No way to treat a guest. 
 
Maybe it was your idle chatter, 
or the awkward pronunciation 
– foreign names in particular –  
that deceived me into assuming 
you were simply me 
and that she would be  
something more. 
It wasn't the version of myself 
I expected but an ideal model 
complete with Lyre, like Erato, 
someone I took to be fluent 
and blindingly pretty. 
 
But now I am listening again 
instead of fretting, 
and you've begun to play, 
leaving me regretful 
for ever doubting 
or making assumptions 
over gender. 
Still, it seems reasonable 
to assume a certain facility with language, 
not your struggle with wording, 
always it seems 
biting off too much. 
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Full Circle   (for T.L.) 
You come full circle 
like a football soaring round the world, 
bouncing in your running shoes 
then setting off again –  
without apparent pause. 
Speaking on the move, 
a road runner, haring 
in and out and roundabout 
you leave Gonzales in your wake, 
a fast flying sprite 
no sign of respite 
and now – on your bike 
 –  wh o o o o sh –   
yo yo pogo in perpetual go go, 
its a phenomenal sight! 
 
Your drive's electric, 
a nifty dynamo 
whipping us along 
with charismatic skill, 
some even say – Christ! 
But others wonder and whisper, 
under their breath, 
is this a nutty professor, 
or could it be Harry Potter 
– on speed ? 
 
You leave us breathless 
but somehow not without breath. 
Like a piper with a reservoir of air 
you maintain a continuous solid note,  
a presence, 
an equal treatment of all, 
an ease at every level, 
an open invitation, as comfortable 
as the well worn embrace 
of a soft leather chair. 
 
You come full circle, 
and like a dervish 
your whirling has a still centre, 
a full compassionate heart 
that means to us 
less need to run, 
for we can see 
that so much is done 
for all of us. 
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5.2   Commentary 
The poems presented invite their own reading.  The comments that follow provide some 
additional personal context and highlight what I found most striking about their content 
and themes in the light of the second research question: Is there anything significant or 
relevant to self-experience reflected in the poetry written?  This is followed by some 
additional remarks about the process of composition of some of the poems. 
5.2.1 Form and content 
All the poems are written in free verse.  They are simple in structure and diction and 
have a range of subjects without a deliberate series of poems on one theme.  Their 
general nature is lyrical and evocative with use of rhythmic patterning in relatively short 
lines.  There is an emphasis on specific images and the contrasting of ideas rather than 
on more complex forms.  Most of the poems have a regular patterning on the page with 
frequent use of short stanzas. 
The poems were chosen by virtue of having been read publicly, rather than with regard 
to theme or content.  Nevertheless, it is possible to discern recurring preoccupations.  A 
number of these have personal resonance.  Firstly there is a marked concern with issues 
of loss and separation.   In some poems this is associated with a sense of disconnection 
or loss of meaning, particularly in language.  In contrast to this, there are a number of 
allusions to re-finding or retrieving something that was lost or buried.  In no less than 
three poems this sense of rediscovery is associated, in one-way or another, with death 
and by implication rebirth.  There are also references to finding what was always there 
but had gone unnoticed.  Finally there is a sense in many poems of a link to a physical 
or sensory process of discovery or embodied way of knowing. 
These themes are amplified below following initial consideration of three poems that 
were begun before the commencement of the study, then developed and reworked as 
part of it.   
Seeking connection 
The poems predating the study are Black and white photograph, Heart bypass and 
Indian summer.  The first of these depicts a child who learns to “hide her horns” to 
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present a positive image to the world.  The implication is that the horns are still there 
but cut off and out of view, unsafe to let ‘out of the bag’.  A more disturbing and 
damaging sense of disconnected feeling exists in Heart bypass were trauma and distress 
is linked to a failing heart (‘cabbage’ is an acronym for coronary bypass surgery) and 
eruptions of senseless and apparently motiveless rage.  This is the only poem I have 
written that portrays my clinical work.  Therapy is presented as an attempt to forge a 
verbal connection with another but using the tactile metaphor of touch.  Indian summer 
directly describes the idea of something present that “escapes words” and then offers 
brief visual and olfactory images drawn from my early childhood home in India.  
Words, it seems, must rely on sensory experience and memory to evoke or connect with 
something “deeper”.  These poems prefigure themes that emerge in subsequent work.  
They suggest to me a ‘feeling out’ of areas of experience that I felt somehow separated 
from. 
Loss and separation 
Loss and separation are present in a number of the poems, particularly if this is extended 
to include the idea of loss of connection or effective communication.  Four poems have 
the experience of separation or parting as a point of origin.  In Playground this is from 
my mother on my first day at school.  In Freshman and Head Lights the roles are 
reversed when, on two occasions, I leave my son during his start at University.  Tree fall 
presents a more impersonal loss, the felling of a large tree in my garden.  The poems 
convey in different ways the suppressed painfulness of these events.  The playground 
experience is almost overwhelming, while the others reflect a more containable but 
deeply felt sadness, for example, the perception in Tree fall of “a slow killing”.  There is 
a suggestion in both Playground and Freshman of a personal means of coping by 
'taking refuge' in something practical or tangible: the tray of sand or preparing a room.  
The inadequacy of words is further implied in phrases such as “mouthed some words” 
and “…unsure what it meant / for them to say: / he'll be all right.” 
Failures of language or meaning 
My evident concern with the difficulty of expression or connection in language has 
appeared in a number of the poems mentioned above.  An even more bizarre and 
alienating use of language is found in Readme, which was prompted by instruction 
leaflets included with cheap electrical goods and the guidance files found with computer 
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programs.  Language is presented here as divorced from personal origin and compressed 
down into an unreadable and duplicated form that employs senseless jargon.  One 
million conversations traces the spoken word as it moves continuously in space in 
formulaic or meaningless patterns that fail to connect.  Paradoxically, it is ultimately 
deliberate silence that redeems this in a strikingly visceral way: “I feel it echo in my 
chest / and my bone marrow dries.”   A similar reversal of expectations is found in Toc 
tic where time runs backwards.  Once again, it is meaningless words that end up as a 
source of confusion in this poem.  The disjunction between actual day-to-day reality and 
the gloss of words and illusory images is contrasted further in Morning.  Here the view 
of life promoted by lifestyle magazines is parodied by an account of embodied sensory 
reality, including the fumbling confusion of being half-asleep.  
Search and reunion 
Three poems involve the searching for and retrieval of something that has been 
temporarily lost or hidden.  In Missing pieces this means going back, in direction and 
time, to locate ‘missing pieces’.  This poem stemmed from a vivid dream and suggests 
that what was lost may never have been fully known or understood, such as at an early 
point in childhood.  However, something is recovered and then brought back in full 
pockets against the implied threat of drowning from rising water.  Cellar steps presents 
the image of a descent underground, another journey back and down to something 
unknown.  There is again a ‘rising up’ from this level, this time of highly compressed 
and buried life.  Irretrievable is more consciously concerned with the idea that 
something lost can be found, even if this seems impossible.  Based on a response to 
Sylvia Plath's poem The Night Dances, the poem challenges her sentiment that a smile 
falling to the ground is irretrievable.  Although disembodied, the smile can still be felt 
for.  Its nature although ephemeral may still reappear through what is physically felt or 
re-created.  A smile is found, not on the ground, but on the face.  This was precisely my 
experience when contemplating Plath’s poem – I found I was smiling.  Another poem 
Cradle is not focused on a search but does depict an intense and physically gratifying 
coming together or reconnection.  The cradling is presented as a restoration from 
absence, a reunion that is greedily and lovingly enjoyed.  Without the implication of a 
preceding gap, it is hard to imagine the same intensity of delight and mutual discovery. 
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Allusions to death and rebirth 
The poem Laburnum, describes both a going back to a place of ritual significance and a 
coming away from the grip of something associated with civilisation and society.  This 
return to something fundamental and grounding is explicitly linked to death and a 
symbolic ritual of dying, but also prefigures rebirth through the scattering of seeds.  
This has a liberating or releasing quality, connected to a sense of the pagan and mildly 
ecstatic.  Visitation on the other hand refers to an explicitly Christian image of 
reincarnation and invitation to new life: Holman Hunt’s portrait The Light of the World.  
A print of this picture acts as a bookmark in a Bible that was given to me near the time 
of my confirmation. A third poem, Line Endings, is one of two poems in the collection 
that is actually about writing poetry.  The proposition is that to write is explicitly a 
terminal career.  Facing an empty page is compared to balancing at a “sheer edge” –  
“one slip and I'm gone”.   However what remains is “one hand moving”, as if this might 
reveal a deeper continuity to experience and action, unencumbered by a limited and 
precariously held sense of who I am. 
Recognising what was always present 
The other poem to address the process of writing is Muse.  The poem utilizes the image 
of biting down nails until they bleed to represent the frustration and difficulty I had 
encountered in writing poetry.  The surprise comes in finding the Muse is a “version of 
the self” but not what was being waited for, which was:  "... an ideal model / complete 
with Lyre, like Erato / someone I took to be fluent / and blindingly pretty."  This feels 
like a coming down to earth, a listening again to what is and always has been, not what 
is wanted or assumed to be absent.  The poem Enlightenment rests on the meditative 
practice of sitting and echoes the idea of "waiting to find / what isn't lost."  Here a clear 
revelation is presented, a realisation that there isn't any other place to go to discover 
what is simply present.  Black does not specify the idea of finding what is present 
explicitly, but suggests it to me in the way that abstractions, in this case the colour 
black, are readily available in innumerable concrete forms.   
Embodiment & awareness 
Physical and sensory allusions and images are present across most of the poems with 
many suggesting that it is through the body as opposed to language that the source or 
depth or meaning can be found.  The two remaining poems in the collection hint at the 
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possibility that abstract language and reflective awareness can be combined with, or 
even emerge from, physical embodiment and sensory experience in a more connected 
way.  Navel gazing is something of an exercise following the form of poems such as 
Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird  by Wallace Stevens.  It's title, however, 
reminds me of the self-reflective quality of the whole investigation, while its structure 
suggestively moves between a resonant but abstracted approach to the naval, through 
terms such as ‘omphalos’ and ‘umbilicus’, to a sensual and physically appreciative 
rendering of a loved one’s body.  Petals provides a simple physical description of fallen 
petals but does so with a suggestion of them achieving a simple level of awareness or 
expression, “a final sigh” which seems to convey “a faint gasp of astonishment”, as if 
something new has come into awareness or being through attention to their presence.   
In Invisible man, the title piece I have given to the collection, the subject directly 
questions himself though the power of thought: “I am not what I think / he thinks” and 
is then caught in a blinding flash that stops his mind in its tracks and raises his feet from 
the ground.  Significantly it is from this, while “still rooted in the body” and “quite 
still”, that a heightened capacity of vision or awareness is finally attained. 
5.2.2 Additional remarks on composition 
Chapter 4 contains a description of how the process of composition and my experience 
while writing poetry changed during the investigation.  This is illustrated with examples 
of the development of some of the poems presented above.  Only the first three poems 
were completed in the initial two years of the study and they were based on drafts 
written before it commenced.  The remaining poems were completed in the third and 
fourth years after the point of most marked change in my way of working. 
Regardless of subject matter I have found all the poems, except the last, mirror some 
aspect of my self-experience.  The exception is Full Circle, which was written on the 
occasion of a colleague’s change of role and was explicitly about other people’s feelings 
towards him.  This poem was composed in an unusual way, in that I asked many people 
to give me the first words or images that came to mind when they thought about him.  
The poem is an amalgam of the responses I was given.  It is included because it met the 
criteria of being publicly read and was the last poem written before the break in my 
investigation.  Furthermore, following the collection of material, the composition of this 
poem clearly reflected my changed experience of writing.  
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Finding myself confronted with a diverse set of words, phrases and images, I initially 
struggled to see what I could do with them.  I then relaxed into the material and got 
what I can best describe as a ‘feeling’ for it.  This included a distinct sense of some 
meaning that I couldn’t yet express but that had a quality of physical presence.  
Thoughts and images then began to arise; these came and went until something emerged 
that had a stronger, almost an ‘aha’ quality to it.  This was an image of the world 
spinning on its axis.  Almost immediately I could see and articulate how much of the 
material referred to something about continuous movement, at the surface, whilst it also 
pointed to something at a deeper level that was still and holding.  Moving between this 
image, the material given to me, and my emerging sense of what ‘felt right’ led to the 
gradual formation of the poem.  During this process, my attention first seemed to relax 
and open to include more of my bodily senses, and then oscillated between standing 
back from thoughts and images and moving into them. This took place iteratively as the 
poem took shape over numerous drafts.  I had an appreciative sense that not only the 
content but also the final form of the poem had somehow been ‘given’ to me. 
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6   Analysis and Interpretation 
This chapter presents an analysis of the research experience presented in Chapter 4 to 
identify those aspects of self-experience that were related to the writing of poetry.21  
This is linked to the poetry presented in Chapter 5 and the writing that was shared in 
supervision at the end of the second year of the study.  The chapter first outlines the 
analytic approach that was adopted to interrogate the material and then presents the 
outcome of this in relation to: the form and sequence of the narrative account, the 
uncrafted work shared in supervision, and the key aspects of self-experience to emerge 
in relation to the process of writing.   
6.1 Approach to interpretation 
The analysis of the narrative account, and the reflective writing upon which it was 
based, took place over a year after the first phase of the first-person investigation was 
complete.  This interval created an increased distance from the writing and supported a 
more detached stance to its analysis.  However, given the first-person nature of the 
study, the process of interpretation required a reflexive movement between my 
continuing lived experience of the study and the writing upon which the analysis was 
based. 
Chapter 4 presents an account of my experience structured in a narrative form.  As such 
it represents an initial interpretation of that experience, albeit one referenced against 
writing made throughout the investigation and regular discussion in supervision.  A 
third-person research analysis might subject ‘data’ of this kind to systematic coding to 
arrive at a thematic or interpretative framework that could be validated by subsequent 
feedback from the person who is the subject of the inquiry.  In a first-person inquiry this 
‘respondent validation’ is inextricable from the process of analysis.  Thus, while a 
structured procedure could be employed to code the content of the account, this, and the 
patterning of subsequent categories emerging from the data, can be simultaneously 
tested for appropriateness against the written content and the wider context of 
experience from which the account emerged.   
                                                 
21
 Research Question 3. 
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As the interpretive aim was to identify in a reflexive but systematic way those aspects of 
self-experience central to my experience of writing poetry, the outcome needed to feel 
personally authentic and be well grounded in the writing produced as part of the study.  
To facilitate this integrated approach, the narrative account was reviewed in a detailed 
manner that was informed by two established methods of qualitative analysis.  The 
account was first examined for narrative structure and then for thematic content.  In 
both analyses the emerging categories were continuously checked for congruence and 
consistency with entries in my reflective journal and my recall of the experiences 
involved. 
6.1.1 Narrative structure 
Various approaches can be taken to analyse narrative (Elliott, 2005; Riessman, 1993). 
Whereas a thematic analysis tends to emphasise recurring or key ideas, a narrative-
based approach focuses on the way experience is organised or storied.  This is 
particularly relevant to accounts where experience changes or develops over time.   The 
analysis undertaken was based on a close reading of the account, with a focus on the 
identification and characterisation of its overall story form and constituent chronological 
elements. This was compared with my memory of the experience to achieve the best 
possible 'goodness of fit'.  The evaluation was deepened by examination of the material 
shared in supervision at the end of year two of the study, including comparison with 
supervision notes and an independent account published by Celia Hunt. 
6.1.2 Thematic content 
Thematic analysis focuses on identifying themes that are central or important to the 
description of particular phenomena.  It is usually based on the close reading of textual 
material, an iterative process of coding particular patterns of experience, and the 
organisation of these into a structure of themes and sub-themes (Aronson, 1994; 
Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  Interpretative phenomenological analysis uses 
thematic categorisation within an interpretive orientation that seeks to elucidate how 
individuals make sense of their own lived experience (J. A. Smith, 2004).  An approach 
of this general kind was used to structure closer examination of the connections between 
self-experience and the process of writing poetry in the narrative account.  This 
involved further readings of the account with the identification and extraction of 
relevant statements.  These statements were then organised into descriptive categories 
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that captured common or overlapping features.  These categories were refined into 
factors that most meaningfully captured, for me, the relationships articulated between 
self-experience and the process of writing, and how these changed.  During this process 
key words were selected and used to search the databases containing the reflective 
journal to help continuously ground the analysis in these primary records.  
6.1.3 Presentation and interpretation 
As the narrative structure of the account provides the wider context of analysis, this is 
presented first.  This is followed by evaluation of the material written and discussed 
with Celia Hunt at the end of year two, and finally the interpretive thematic evaluation 
of self-experience relating to the process of writing.  A concluding summary is provided 
of these analyses which links them to the themes already identified in the poetry 
presented in Chapter 5. This also identifies the focus for the theoretical explication of 
the first-person investigation that is undertaken in part III.  
6.2 Narrative structure of experience 
Although there was evidence of some overlap in experience between different stages of 
the inquiry, relatively clear 'phases' emerged in the way the narrative was structured.  
This led to the identification and characterization of eight chronological elements to the 
narrative sequence (see Table 6.1).    
Table 6.1   Chronological elements of the narrative account 
 
1. Setting out on a journey of discovery. 
2. Experiencing a prolonged period of difficulty and challenge. 
3. Allowing a change of direction – following an unpremeditated path. 
4. Finding greater freedom to write. 
5. Opening the products of this to external view. 
6. Experiencing a collapse in the feeling of personal agency. 
7. Emerging with a more differentiated and inclusive sense of self. 
8. Experiencing a greater freedom in writing poetry. 
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6.2.1   Setting out on a journey of discovery 
This element describes the preparatory stage of the study and the sense of anticipation 
associated with it.  The narrative account describes the idea of "a carefully planned 
adventure",22 but otherwise assumes rather than explicitly describes this phase.  
However, early entries in the reflective journal contain frequent references to the idea of 
a personal journey or exploration.  For example: 
Perhaps this is even the model of research that I am specifically interested in.  
Research arising from personal exploration.  Not exploration of the objective but of 
direct experience.   (Journal, 18 November 2001) 
The notion of a journey of discovery is applicable to any research project but is marked 
here by the personal as well as academic focus of the study.  The above mention of a 
‘planned’ adventure (with a formal research proposal and plan) is set in contrast to 
where the study immediately and unexpectedly leads, even though the ensuing impasse 
could be seen as the first significant ‘discovery’ that was made. 
6.2.2   Experiencing a prolonged period of difficulty and challenge 
The narrative account begins with an evocation of a bleak sense of frustration and 
difficulty as I began the creative investigation in earnest.  The experience is linked back 
to a shameful childhood memory, which in turn is related to failing to be careful 
enough.  The narrative continues to chronicle the profound impasse that I encountered 
when trying to write poetry.23  This is variously described as being “stuck”, “petrified”, 
“alienated” or otherwise having my intentions obstructed.  The concept of block 
appears frequently in the journal, as does the deep sense of doubt and inadequacy that 
accompanied it.  The poetry itself is experienced as "dead" or "dry as dust", although 
more formal prose and reflective writing continue to be produced.  Among my 
responses to this difficulty is to try and learn more about both poetry and writer’s block.  
However, this does nothing to remove the feeling of “emptiness” and of having nothing 
to express. 
                                                 
22
 Page 47. 
23
 Pages 46-49. 
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6.2.3 Allowing a change of direction - following an unpremeditated path 
This element marks an unplanned shift towards what could be seen as alternative forms 
of expressive activity:  "…it wasn't that I made a deliberate decision to ease up on this 
effort.  It felt rather that another impulse entered in."24  This was initially towards 
drawing and painting, but was followed with musical/sound improvisation and 
experimenting with movement.  The impulse felt urgent and compelling; it overrode any 
inhibition or questions that arose about its purpose, or the quality of what was produced.  
Accompanying this spontaneous activity was a deeper sense of embodiment; there was a 
sense of physical play, and of shifts in both bodily sensation and quality of awareness:  
"...in the process of free-playing I could usually feel my body relax and my 
concentration alter."25  An association is also made in the narrative account to a 
childhood memory of inhibited singing, and my subsequent departure from the school 
choir  
6.2.4   Finding greater freedom to write 
The freedom found in spontaneous and embodied activities sparked a questioning of my 
assumptions about writing poetry, and a search for an equivalent sense of release: "I 
wanted to find a way of writing my own poetry free of unnecessary assumptions and 
burdens." 26  One assumption that I identified was the idea that I should have something 
pre-existing to express, and that the task was to express it.  Another concerned the 
criteria for success.  Was it to meet the expectations of others regarding poetic craft or 
to achieve some form of personal development?  I seemed out of touch with personal 
impulse or feeling when attempting to write poetry, and was overly concerned to 
produce something that could withstand external scrutiny.  Greater freedom came from 
allowing the writing to follow what was spontaneously arising and to accept everything 
that came, "letting it stand", in the process I found I was:  "…simply and more directly 
attentive to my body.”27  I commenced a practice that I described as ‘free-lining’ and 
experienced a greater sense of ease, as well as increased productivity. 
                                                 
24
 Page 50. 
25
 Page 51. 
26
 Page 54. 
27
 Page 55. 
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6.2.5   Opening the products of this to external view 
Unlike the other elements, this was a single event that marked a critical point in the 
unfolding investigation.  This was the sharing of some of the uncrafted writing that had 
emerged in the previous phase within supervision.  It seems significant that this had not 
been consciously planned but came about because there was nothing else to show for 
the work done over the preceding period.  My recollection and notes are largely about 
Celia's interest and acceptance of my writing, although she also made comments about 
its content that will be examined below. 
6.2.6 Experiencing a collapse in the feeling of personal agency 
This element refers to the period immediately after the meeting in which the work was 
shared.  There was an increasing sense of "detachment and remoteness",28 culminating 
in what I described in both my reflective journal and narrative account as an 
"overwhelming physical sense of being brought to a complete halt".29  Although there is 
evidence of some feelings of sadness in my journal, the strongest impression was of 
feeling a lack of motivational drive or ‘inner’ agency.  I could function in response to 
external events and commitments, but lacked the capacity to act independently with any 
vigour.  My descriptions indicate that it felt as if something was absent or had died.  
This was concerning and confusing but not something I felt I could do anything about. 
The period lasted a number of weeks. 
6.2.7 Emerging with a more fluid sense of self 
My emergence from the sense of loss of agency was associated with an increased 
willingness to accept it.  This involved a conscious gesture, which acknowledged the 
feeling of deadness and sought to embrace it completely.  There was a subsequent 
change in my mood and a restored capacity for initiative and action.  A subtle shift was 
noticeable in my experience of writing and was also detectable in other areas of my life.  
This involved a reduced sense of myself as a controlling ‘agent’, separate from and 
trying to manage my experience, towards a more fluid and inclusive sense of myself as 
part of all experience that arose – and yet capable of detached awareness of that 
experience.  The exploration and articulation of this shift was a theme of my reflective 
                                                 
28
 Page 57. 
29
 Page 58. 
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writing from this point onwards.  This included identification of the way bodily senses, 
imagery, and language operated in a wider field of awareness, without a fixed personal 
centre. 
6.2.8  Experiencing a greater freedom in writing poetry 
This element reflects a greater capacity to engage satisfyingly with writing poetry.  I 
noticed an improved ability to move between drafting and editing without becoming 
stuck.  The freedom of spontaneous production extended to crafting selected pieces with 
readers in mind.  This included shaping some of the work initially generated through 
free-lining, and eventually reached the level of delivering a formal public reading that 
was both confirming and enjoyable.  The freedom found here seemed directly related to 
the more inclusive and differentiated quality of self-experience and awareness described 
previously. 
6.2.9 Overall narrative structure 
The chronological elements outlined above can be reduced to a narrative structure of the 
following general form: 
1. A journey with a purpose. 
2. An obstacle/confrontation with difficulty. 
3. A crisis. 
4. A breakthrough or turning point dependent on relinquishment and acceptance. 
5. An outcome where the sense of self is changed. 
 
This has similarities with the structure of many mythical tales of the hero’s journey or 
vision quest identified by Campbell (2004) as a “monomyth” of personal change or 
development.  Campbell argues that this typically involves a pattern of separation, 
initiation and return, which makes use of frequently recurring motifs.  These include the 
idea of “a call to adventure”, which can be accepted or declined; “a road of trials”, that 
might lead to a period of crisis or conflict; a “ritual death”, or death and rebirth, that 
marks a point of transition; achieving the goal or “ultimate boon”, which often consists 
of important self-knowledge; and some form of “return” involving application of the 
boon, or knowledge, to living life more fully in the world. 
 
The obvious parallels between this and the way the first-person investigation unfolded 
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and was narrated were not recognised until the above analysis was undertaken.  The 
‘setting out on a journey of discovery’ corresponds remarkably closely to the idea of a 
'call to adventure'.  Similarly the 'road of trials' is an apt phrase for the confrontation of 
obstacles and difficulties in the early part of the study.  The motif of death and rebirth, 
present in many mytho-poetic tales (e.g. Leeming, 1998), was a vivid feature of my self-
experience at what turned out to be a turning point in the investigation.  This point can 
also be equated with achieving the goal or 'boon' corresponding to 'important self-
knowledge'.  Finally, the ‘return to the ordinary world’ and ‘application of the boon’, 
could be viewed as the subsequent work of crafting the poetry and theorising the 
experience for formal presentation.   
6.3 Writing towards the turning point 
6.3.1 Sharing work in supervision 
A pivotal feature of the account was the sharing of a collection of spontaneous and 
uncrafted ‘poetic’ writing in supervision.30  This initiated a critical episode around 
which the narrative is hinged.  The implication is that this disclosure, and the way it was 
received, enabled a significant change to occur.  This is equivalent to the 'climax' in an 
Aristotelian plot structure.  It has the characteristic form of depending on the events that 
preceded it, and being the apparent cause or basis of the events that followed. 
As mentioned above, my recollection of the supervision meeting focused largely on 
Celia’s interested and accepting response to the writing that I had produced.  Celia also 
recalls making comments about the writing in terms of its potential for development, 
and the possible links between its themes and my experience.  She later used the 
incident, with my permission, as an example in a paper examining processes in teaching 
and research from a psychodynamic perspective (Hunt & West, 2006).  A substantial 
extract is presented below to provide an external reference on what occurred.31  The 
pseudonym Peter is used, as in the published version. 
The first couple of years of our working together involved discussion of Peter's 
creative writing in progress, work that he was trying to craft into its final form and 
with which he often felt dissatisfied. Then he brought me a batch of spontaneous 
                                                 
30
 See Appendix III. 
31
 See Appendix V for complete passage. 
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personal material in poetic form that he had made no attempt to craft; it was simply in 
its raw state. This felt like a very important stage in the research relationship. 
Sufficient trust must have been built up to enable Peter to allow me to see this deeply 
personal material devoid of the distance that craft provides.  
I read the work several times, noticed some recurring themes that seemed significant 
at a personal level, but wasn't sure whether I should point them out or whether I 
should focus on the potential of the writing for further development. I found it quite 
difficult to know how I should respond and thought long and hard about it. I wrote 
myself some notes and decided to wait and see what the next meeting brought. What I 
remember of our discussion is that we talked primarily about the potential of the 
material for further development into poems. I think I said what I liked, how it made 
me feel, but I also remember clearly saying something about the themes I saw 
emerging, although we didn't discuss these. Subsequently Peter became quite 
depressed. This lasted for about a month during which he seemed unable to proceed 
with the research, but then it lifted. When he started writing crafted poems again, 
something had definitely changed. There was more self-presence, a deep and often 
quite subtle focusing-in on a particular feeling or experience. 
Recently, I asked Peter whether it was my mention of the themes in the material that 
had triggered the depression and, to my surprise, he said he had no recollection of my 
doing so; rather what he remembered was that I had 'received' the material with 
interest, and had discussed it with him from the point of view of its potential for 
poems. Clearly something of a therapeutic nature was taking place here, a kind of 
'cracking-up', to use Bollas's term. Peter was able to let go of his concern with crafting 
his poems and to risk bringing something new into the open, within a research 
relationship that provided a 'safe-enough' container for this to happen.  […]  Whilst 
Peter was largely engaged in a self-reflective exercise, being able to bring some of this 
experience out into the open and to share it in a receptive space was beneficial and 
helped him to move on. (Hunt & West, 2006, p. 170) 
Celia’s recollection slightly misplaces the onset of the period that she saw as a 
‘depression’. My reaction actually began shortly after the meeting at which I gave her 
the writing.  It then continued beyond the next meeting, when I discussed it with her and 
she offered feedback on what I had written.  What is striking to me is that I didn't have 
much recollection of the content of the feedback that Celia provided, but I did 
remember the quality of her response at both of these meetings.   
6.3.2 Self-experience in the content of the writing 
Celia subsequently shared with me the notes that she made on the writing at the time.  
As well as identifying pieces that she thought had potential for further development she 
made the following comments on some of the personal content in the material: 
…the early ones contain strong images and ideas of reluctance and embarrassment 
(and self-disapproval?) of the desire to let go of form and order and just to give 
yourself permission to allow feelings space on the page.  It's as if one part of you - 
your dominant self-image perhaps - wants to hold on to its view of things and doesn't 
want the more messy stuff to emerge, because it undermines your standing.  This may 
account for the resistances.  But there is also a desire for easy fame - easy success - the 
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desire to create something out of nothing but a reluctance to start from feeling.  Desire 
to be soothed.  (C. Hunt, personal communication January 2007, recorded 2003) 
Celia observed that once my writing moved beyond these defences and I started to let 
feelings emerge the ‘poems’ began to show greater depth.  She also noted some of the 
images and ideas that struck her as personally relevant.  These observations are listed 
below in an order shaped by my own review of the writing: 
1. A desire for ease, for (total) letting go - but something says no. 
2. A desire not to feel uncomfortable feelings from the past. 
3. A dominant self-concept under threat. 
4. Images of defences disintegrating, getting undermined. 
5. Images of exclusion. 
6. Conflict between order and disintegration/chaos. 
7. Conflict between movement and fixity. 
8. Overflowing emotion/pain - pain of change. 
9. Going beyond parental expectations. 
10. Giving up the dream? 
11. Embarrassment at showing the stuff that is coming up - images of dump, cemetery. 
Combining these observations with my own re-reading has led me to identify four main 
strands of self-experience depicted in the uncrafted writing.  These are presented in 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2   Strands of self-experience in uncrafted writing 
1. A desire for greater freedom but resistance to it.  (1-3*) 
2. The breakdown of existing structures and connections. (4-5*) 
3. The tension between holding on and letting go. (6-7*) 
4. The turmoil/consequences of allowing change. (8-11*) 
      * Corresponding themes identified by Celia Hunt 
 
6.3.3 The struggle with change 
Celia's reading of the material confirms its deeply personal and uncrafted nature and 
also highlights how the content of the writing reflected the struggle I had with allowing 
change.  My review of these pieces recognised the features she identified, although I 
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was not conscious of their significance at the time of writing.   I was also freshly struck 
by the underlying tone of sadness and loss that is present. The writing suggests both a 
strong desire to let go of old patterns and constraints, but also of a reluctance to do so, 
and perhaps a fear of the loss, or void, that could be confronted.  The initial pieces 
seemed to suggest the wish for a rapid flight into freedom with their obvious rhymes 
and patterns, and in this example, of emotional purging to uncover a deeply felt dream. 
Oh God! oh no, not this 
a kind of trying to create 
a verse from nothing 
not even the hiss 
of gushing steam 
emotions dammed 
to hold a dream. 
The obviousness of the rhyme seems to act as a guard against more meaningful 
statement, or full contact with uncomfortable feelings.  This is followed by images of 
disintegration or breaking-up, with the idea of things being undermined or spoilt:   
The house isn’t falling down 
but it claims to be: 
the wallpaper lifting around the fire, 
the worktop splitting behind the sink, 
the paint bruised and hand marked 
beside the creaking stairs. 
Many of the ‘poems’ hint at a sense of loss, isolation or exclusion; one is specifically 
titled 'Lost', while another contains the stanza: 
I am rendered by a wall 
forty eight courses wide 
measured across the base 
in concentric annual rings 
made of engineering bricks. 
The conflict between the hold of existing patterns and movement into potential disorder 
is present in a number of the pieces. With this comes the sense of strong feelings 
emerging into awareness, in a powerful and potentially overwhelming way.  There is an 
intimation of what this process of change might involve in the references to death.  For 
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example, one piece refers to gifts for the burial, another to shallow graves and the poem 
that describes the most vivid outpouring of feeling concerns a visit to a cemetery: 
As I sit quietly, wondering and waiting 
bemused and uncertain, there is a change of pace 
a slowing of mind and a new perception 
a rising of forms , rising up into the air 
and reaching out to me, a mass exodus 
a peel of silent  thunder that tears open my throat. 
I am left sobbing for no reason that I know 
Dust to dust - the pattern never changes 
apart from the mess in the middle. 
6.4 Self-experience and the process of writing  
The narrative form and content of my experience, elucidated in Section 6.2, delineates a 
chronological progression from a period of resistance/difficulty in writing poetry, 
through a critical period or 'crisis', to a position of greater freedom in writing 
accompanied by a subtle qualitative change in self-experience.  The intention of the 
thematic analysis reported in this section was to focus specifically on the relationship of 
self-experience to the process of writing poetry throughout the study.  It concerned the 
nature of this relationship and how it changed, but not the sequence of change per se.  
The emergent themes were similar to some of the elements in the narrative analysis, but 
their organisation was underpinned by the aim of achieving a categorical rather than a 
chronological framework of interpretation, centred on the activity of writing.   
6.4.1 Emergent factors 
Four interrelated factors relating self-experience to the writing of poetry were derived 
from the thematic interrogation of the narrative account and associated reflective 
writing.  These factors are presented in Table 6.3 and elaborated below with examples. 
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Table 6.3   Factors relating self-experience to the writing of poetry 
1. The failure of conscious intention. 
2. The interference of an ‘objectifying process’. 
3. An assumed or ‘implicit’ idea of self in the writing process. 
4. A more embodied and fluid experience of self in the writing process. 
 
6.4.2   The failure of conscious intention 
The experience of being unable to undertake the writing that I intended runs through the 
first eighteen months of the reflective journal and is captured in the narrative account by 
statements such as:32 
Poetry, so it seemed was not about to bend to my will.  
The difference was that then […] I had written without much personal expectation or 
deliberation. 
I had a mission […] but I was stuck.  
As early as February 2002, entries appear in the reflective journal that question whether 
my difficulties in writing are linked to the attitudes and intentions that I brought to it: 
The issue of not writing from conscious intention – abandoning this […] issue of not 
having conscious intention and yet managing to write something that seems intended –  
split between conscious / unconscious?  (Journal, 20 February 2002) 
This idea that my inability to get on with my conscious intentions reflects an important 
message or communication.  That I am ignoring something or going at it in a one-
sidedly conscious way – not taking into account other factors and needs.  Not getting 
in touch with my own unconscious feelings and wishes – perhaps even treating myself 
badly. This same idea of there being (at least) two parts involved in action –  
conscious/unconscious – adult ego/inner child or whatever – the tension and conflict 
between them not the necessary combination or synergy.  Giving myself a hard time 
rather than nurturing it.  (Journal, 12 May 2002) 
However, it was difficult to see an alternative to my deliberate efforts, despite their 
repeated failure: 
Perhaps starting a writing session, like this one, with a clear intention, the aim to 
write some poetry, is necessary.  (So far it hasn't worked).  (Journal, 25 March 2002) 
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It wasn't until the summer of the following year that I moved past this impasse, with 
writing occurring in a different spirit after the period of experimentation in other media: 
Called on the Muse this morning.  That sense that this (writing)[sic] isn't about 
personal intention or careful, deliberate and willed action but something much more 
like an act of devotion.  (Journal, 21 June 2003) 
The link between this and the unpremeditated activity in other media is evident in this 
early attempt to grasp the experience of beginning to let writing poetry flow in a 
different and less controlled way: 
Today I have just put Sheila Cassidy on in the background and feel bathed by the 
sound – also without any planning pulled the piano tutor book down after many 
days/weeks of just improvising to remind myself of a few notes and knock out a 
numbered tune.  The part of me that just follows impulse – the urge to do something –  
just follows the feeling – the sense that the time is right – or something is just there – 
not compulsively   […]  but something new in that moment – just arising – so easy – it 
is just like following – listening – letting attention be drawn to things – following 
attention rather than trying to direct and determine it – so often the struggle is there – 
trying to bring attention to bear on things at a time or in an order and to a depth all 
specified in advance by preconceived plans and intentions.  (Journal, 28 July 2003) 
6.4.3 The interference of an ‘objectifying process’  
This category combines themes concerning my experience of self and my experience of 
the poetry that I attempted to compose over the first eighteen months to two years of the 
investigation.  In relation to self-experience there were powerful feelings of being 
alienated, or isolated, from any creative source.  One image in the narrative account is 
of being turned to stone: “...my hand, heart and head seemed equally petrified.”33 
The reflexive nature of the investigation provoked a heightened self-consciousness that 
was repeatedly alluded to in the reflective journal and identified as a potential source of 
my difficulties with writing.  This was linked to the problem of intention described 
above, and also to feelings of paralysis and shame: 
Perhaps I am inhibited by the self-conscious intention (agenda) to use the writing of 
poetry as a means of investigation/reflective/heuristic enquiry […] this gives the 
writing a purpose it doesn't want to carry.  (Journal, 25 March 2002) 
The self-consciousness provoked by conceiving my writing as part of a research 
investigation – is this simply paralysing?  (Journal, 8 April 2002) 
…blocked by self-conscious shame and critical comparison.  (Journal, 2 January 2002) 
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The latter quote indicates the sense of shame experienced in the face of what seemed 
like the critical gaze of both myself and imagined others.  It was as if 'I' had become the 
object of a critical or objectifying perspective.  I could readily identify with that 
perspective and write reflectively and critically from it.  However, in the face of it, my 
capacity to write poetry withered and an associated sense of personal inadequacy grew.  
In this context the question of whether I could ever aspire to be a poet entered my mind.   
I should feel supported in this approach to creative writing but somehow I think I have 
got lost in thinking about it in terms of achievement.  Achieving the status of a 
published poet.  (Journal, 14 January 2002) 
This concern with status seemed connected with the sense of inadequacy or lack that 
arose in the face of becoming an object of inquiry.  Although I had not set out with the 
aim of writing poetry for publication, this now came into question.  Could I aspire to be 
a poet?  If not, my identity now seemed doubtful; it was as if I was a fraud.  This was 
reinforced by contact with others who did have clear aspirations or identities as poets 
and writers. 
… the problem is not being able to write poetry […] (it’s always what makes me feel 
fraudulent about the DPhil and somehow disconnected and inadequate around others 
who are creative writers).  (Journal, 2 December, 2001) 
Along with these objectifying features with respect to my self-experience, any poetry 
that I drafted almost immediately felt alien and separate from me:  “The feeling was that 
what I wrote went 'dead' on the page almost before the ink was dry.”34  This feeling that 
the writing was dead or lifeless appeared an important factor in my inability to sustain a 
process of writing.  As 'I' became more objectified, so did any poetry that I wrote.  I 
very rapidly lost any sense of engagement with it, or sense of how it might be developed 
or added to.  I was left feeling frustrated while the writing itself felt unsatisfactory and 
uninteresting.  As noted previously, I did not experience the same kind of problems with 
other forms of writing.  I carried out writing projects associated with the study 
effectively and through to publication.  Meanwhile, poetry became an increased object 
of study as I read more about poetics.  I also derived pleasure from reading poetry, 
although this was coloured by my own creative frustration. 
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6.4.4 An implicit idea of self in the writing process 
Although my reading and previous experience suggests that I should have had a 
reasonable appreciation of the complex processes involved in creative activity, this does 
not appear to have informed my practice during the early part of the study.  I would not 
have espoused the idea that poetry was composed by conscious intention or objective 
scrutiny, but these ideas seemed part of my “theories in use” (Argyris & Schön, 1974).  
I also appeared to hold limiting assumption about what writing for personal 
development involved. 
The emerging awareness that 'in practice' I was approaching writing poetry in a 
problematic manner is articulated on page 53, Chapter 4.  The confusion was connected 
to the aim of writing poetry whilst also inquiring into its potential contribution to 
personal development.  I was setting out to write poetry and to explore its relationship 
to self-experience.  As a result, I appeared to be looking for some form of ‘suitable’ 
experience to put into words or express.  It was as if there needed to be something to get 
hold of and then shape into language.  My implicit assumption seemed to be that this 
consisted of experience or memories already within me.  Putting this inner world of 
experience into a poem would open it to understanding, both to others and myself: 
“Influenced by psychodynamic ideas I had also imagined that once I had successfully 
articulated my inner world in a poetic form this would be open to symbolic 
interpretation.”35 
This idea, although not necessarily invalid, put an emphasis on the understanding of 
experience once it had found a poetic form but said nothing about the process of writing 
per se, beyond it being something I needed to do.  It privileged the idea of a pre-existing 
store of experience that could be revealed.  It also implied separate acts of expression 
and subsequent understanding; with my ‘self’ as an agent, somehow set apart from my  
'inner' experience and the ‘outer’ form I was trying to produce. 
This implicit model is represented diagrammatically in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1   Implicit working model of self and the writing process 
 
 
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recognition that these assumptions were implicit in, or at least fitted with, my day-
to-day approach and difficulties with writing only emerged when my approach changed 
and I experienced my ‘self’ in the process of writing in a different way.  This will be 
amplified below. 
6.4.5 A more embodied and fluid experience of self and the writing process 
This category brings together a number of themes relevant to the greater freedom that 
began to emerge in my writing, and the changes in self-experience that accompanied 
this, from the end of the second year of the study.  The chronological narrative 
identified a critical period that precipitated this.  However, the development and 
recognition of what was involved took place over a further two years.  Pages 60-66 of 
Chapter 4 describe the unfolding of these observations and my attempt to make sense of 
them. 
Firstly, there was a change towards a less critical or objectifying stance to what I was 
writing when drafting poetry.   This is exemplified in the impact that the advice of 
William Stafford had on me regarding the need for a lowering of standards.36  It 
included a willingness to welcome whatever I wrote and 'let it stand', and was practiced 
through ‘free-lining’ in which each line acted as the trigger to the next, without 
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deliberately groping for something to express.  This connects to a second theme of 
allowing experience to arise or unfold in the process of writing itself.  This emerged 
following a period of improvisational activity in other media.  It was as if there was an 
experience within the process of these activities that led them forward without needing 
to seek it anywhere 'inside'.  This transferred to a new way to engage with the idea of 
self-experience in writing: 
Not analysis or interpretation but giving form to formless experience – having the 
experience rather than being had by it or trying to analyse and understand it […] to 
write to have the experience more…  (Journal, 5 September 2003) 
I had been struck by the sheer physicality of the experience of making pictures, music 
and movement and this served as a model for how my sense of embodiment could 
contribute to writing.  This involved moving out of my head, out of the dominance of 
logical thought and planning, into the immediacy of bodily experience.  There is 
evidence I was aware of my body in the first two years of the study but in a strikingly 
detached way: 
My body is there too.  I may not be my body but at some level my body does have some 
existence.  And yet this I can observe it [sic] – recognise it as a thing. (Journal, 2 
January 2002) 
This contrasts with the immediate sense of the body and its relation to emerging writing 
at a later point in the inquiry: 
Writing from the body, the inner body.  Writing from the present, being present - here 
and now.  […] Looking for the secret – the poetic secret.  Words on the page.  Giving 
form to experience, transforming experience, manifesting on the page […] the blank 
page – already looking crowded.  (Journal, 1 July 2003) 
This awareness of embodied feeling represented a distinct expansion in self-experience 
within the writing process.  Subsequent observations about how such experience 
connected with language arose through recognition of the way imagery could mediate 
between bodily sensations and verbal thought.  This included a disconcerting awareness 
of how much of my general mental rumination was underpinned by subtle, usually 
visual, images of myself in various situations.  These images seemed to fuel thought and 
take my attention away from current bodily sensations.  With regard to writing poetry, 
an image could lead to an idea that I might decide to write about but which I then found 
unable to take forward.  It was only when I returned from the ideas to the bodily feeling 
that accompanied the image that I might find some way to develop it.  It was as if the 
image could be generative of more creative thought through close attention to bodily 
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feeling.  The direction of my attention, from images to thoughts, or images to bodily 
feeling, appeared to make a significant difference.  My observations suggested that 
bringing my attention back from thought to arising images, and the feelings and 
sensations that accompanied them, led the writing of poetry forward; particularly if I 
followed any feeling of interest or spontaneous shifts of attention that might occur: 
Certainly seems important to try and follow the lead of interest and desire – of what 
seems to capture my interest and attention – rather than to impose some 'idea' or 
image of what I should be doing – should be writing.  (Journal, 28 July 2003) 
…mindful to what is passing in the mind – note the value of workshop exercises –  
forced to write quickly/immediately without thinking – so stuff just given door through 
which it can emerge –  uncensored or overwhelmed by the desire to think through one 
idea or record simply ideas – value of advice to attend to images, sensory impressions 
and sounds – take one away from the tyranny of logical thought and abstract ideas –  
another way of tapping in.  (Journal, 29 July 2003) 
This shift in attention to the way images might 'feel', or towards a sense of bodily 
presence when writing, brought a further release from concern with achieving any 
preconceived standard while writing.  The act of attending to my body and any 
spontaneously arising images shifted the locus of evaluation and response from the level 
of ideas, and the imagined perspective of others, to the level of my own immediate 
experience.  As a result my self-experience enlarged and became more differentiated.  
Bodily sensations and sensory images were vividly present alongside verbal thought and 
reasoning.  Each seemed distinctive but none seemed to be exclusively 'me'.  There was 
less sense of any controlling centre but of a variety of experiences, including thought, 
arising in an interconnected way.  Images seemed to serve a function that linked bodily 
feeling to words.  There was a sense that 'I' was observing all of this, however, this had 
the quality of a simple awareness rather than any determining or separate personal 
identity.  The awareness had an open quality and the more I settled into it, the more 
relaxed and at ease I felt when writing.  There was less sense of a fixed or separate point 
of view, and a greater inclusiveness to unfolding patterns of experience linked to 
changes in the direction and focus of my attention.    
In this frame of mind I no longer felt alienated from the poetry that I produced, even if 
critical thoughts did cross my mind.  If something didn't feel right, I could try and feel 
why and look for something else.  In this way writing contained more ‘play’, in the 
sense of a greater freedom of movement.  When writing most productively, it felt that I 
could move between an immersed state of letting the writing emerge, and then step back 
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to view it from a more detached and wider perspective, before moving into it again.  
The quality of my attention seemed critical.  If my attention became too rigid, 
difficulties might appear and my sense of myself could constrict; when it was flexible 
my writing tended to progress and I experienced myself in a correspondingly more fluid 
and inclusive way.  This experience of myself in relation to the writing process is 
depicted in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2   Emergent model of self and the writing process 
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Unlike the model that was implicit in my initial attempts to write, there was no sense of 
experience that needed translation into words by a separate self, or aspect of self, over 
time.  There was, instead, an awareness that could encompass all experience that arose 
in the moment, whether physical or mental.  The process of writing was not dependent 
on an act of putting into words so much as finding words that followed the fluctuation 
of bodily feelings and arising images, and then returning to move them forward in a 
continuously developing way.  The process could start at any place, for example, with 
words that provoked certain feelings and images; hence the use of the coinage 
‘languaging’ in Figure 6.2 in preference to verbalisation or verbal thinking.  This 
activity seemed dependent on allowing attention to move flexibly across the entire 
domain of felt experience, fluctuating as necessary between immersion in and 
detachment from whatever arose.  
6.5  Summary and focus for theoretical explication 
The outcomes of the analyses presented in this chapter and the themes relating to self-
experience found in the poetry in Chapter 5 are summarised in Table 6.4.  This includes 
the narrative structure of my research experience, themes relating to self-experience in 
the selections of uncrafted writing and completed poetry, and factors prominent in my 
experience of the process of writing.  The outcomes of these analyses can be 
triangulated to reveal a consistent overall picture. 
The form of my narrative account corresponds closely to an archetypal or ‘monomythic’ 
pattern of how journeys of personal change, discovery or transformation are frequently 
experienced and depicted (Campbell, 2004).  The themes found in the uncrafted work, 
written in the period leading up to the turning point of the investigation, vividly reflect 
the experience of struggle, turmoil, and impending personal crisis associated with this 
critical period.  In contrast, the themes from the poetry that was completed reflect the 
passage of change across the entire study.  Many of the themes identified here closely 
parallel the storyline of separation, initiation, and reunion described by Campbell and 
other writers.  It was a surprise to discover these correspondences and was confirming 
of my direct sense of having negotiated an unexpectedly difficult but significant period 
of personal development. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of analysis of poetry and narrative account 
 
Narrative Structure of experience 
 
 
Themes from poetry and uncrafted writing 
 
Factors relating self-experience to writing 
 
Chronological elements: 
 
1. Setting out on a journey of discovery. 
2. Experiencing a prolonged period of difficulty 
and challenge. 
3. Allowing a change of direction – following an 
unpremeditated path. 
4. Finding greater freedom to write. 
5. Opening the products of this to external view. 
6. Experiencing and accepting a collapse in the 
feeling of personal agency. 
7. Emerging with a more fluid sense of self. 
8. Experiencing a greater freedom in writing 
poetry. 
 
Narrative form: 
 
1. A journey with a purpose. 
2. An obstacle/confrontation with difficulty. 
3. A crisis. 
4. A breakthrough or turning point dependent on 
relinquishment and acceptance. 
5. An outcome where the sense of self is 
changed. 
 
 
 
 
Themes from uncrafted poetry: 
 
1. A desire for greater freedom but resistance to 
it. 
2. The breakdown of existing structures and 
connections. 
3. The tension between holding on and letting go. 
4. The turmoil/consequences of allowing change. 
 
 
Themes from completed poetry: 
 
1. Seeking connection. 
2. Loss and separation. 
3. Failures of language or meaning. 
4. Search and reunion. 
5. Allusions to death and re-birth. 
6. Recognising what was always present. 
7. Embodiment and awareness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identified  factors: 
 
1. The failure of conscious intention. 
2. The experience of an ‘objectifying process’.  
3. An assumed or implicit idea of self in the 
writing process. 
4. A more embodied and fluid experience of self 
in the writing process. 
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Themes present in the completed poetry prefigure the factors found from the analysis 
that linked self-experience directly to the process of writing.  These concerned: failures 
of language and meaning, separation, recognising what was always present, and the 
place of embodiment and awareness.  The different forms of analysis all suggest that 
writing poetry was associated with changes in self-experience that were largely 
unanticipated and not consciously determined.  They also all suggest that the outcome, 
although ultimately liberating, involved considerable struggle and the need for a form of 
relinquishment or letting-go.   The relation of this to self-experience is revealed most 
clearly in the implicit and changed models of self identified in relation to the process of 
writing.   A striking and unexpected discovery was that it was not the content of 
particular experiences as much as the quality of experiencing that felt critical to these 
changes.  Corroborative connections can thus be discerned across all the forms of 
analysis, with a clear link found between self-experience and a changed process of 
writing. 
As Table 6.4 shows, it would be possible to answer the third research question – what 
are the key relationships found between self-experience and the writing of poetry? – 
with aspects from all of the analyses employed.  However, the factors identified as 
impacting on the process of writing struck me as the most personally important, 
practically relevant, and theoretically significant outcomes. The archetypal pattern of 
the narrative of change is interesting, but does not open up any obvious new ground. 
Further examination of the personal content of my experience and poetry could be 
revealing, but may not have more general relevance. It is thus the four factors set out in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4, relating self-experience to my changed process of writing, that were 
chosen to be the focus of the theoretical examination that follows in Part III. 
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Part III 
Theoretical Explication 
  
Note on aims, structure and associated publications 
The chapters in this section address the fourth research question of the study by 
examining how the relationships found between self-experience and the writing of 
poetry might be understood theoretically.  The aim is to explicate the material presented 
in Part II by drawing on, developing, and where possible synthesising, theoretical 
perspectives that are consistent with the outcomes of the first-person inquiry.  The 
analysis of my experience is employed in an inductive manner to inform the 
identification and critical integration of salient theory.  This is focused on the four 
factors found to relate self-experience to the writing process and how these changed 
over the course of the study.  The hope is to illuminate the lived experience of the 
investigation in a way that remains grounded in that experience while also constructing 
a framework of understanding that has wider practical and theoretical relevance.   
Chapter 7 examines the failure of my conscious efforts to write poetry from the point of 
view of writer’s block and develops a framework of how poetry may be related to the 
combined logic of conscious and unconscious processes. Chapter 8 links this thesis to 
the notion of embodied cognition and the nature and relational context of self-
experience.  Finally, Chapter 9 examines the mediating influence of attentional 
processes on my subsequent experience and practice of writing. 
Some formative aspects of the work presented in this section took place concurrently 
with the personal research investigation.  Two publications emerged from this period.  
One concerns the relationship between unconscious processes and poetry (Maltby, 
2003), the other psychodynamic models of change and development (Leiper & Maltby, 
2004).   
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7   Conscious Intention and the Logic of Poetry 
For two years the basis of my inquiry into writing poetry was critically obstructed.  My 
failure to write poetry that felt personally meaningful was a source of frustration and 
despondency.  I recognised a parallel with Marion Milner’s (1957) account of her 
creative struggles with painting and the realization developed that, like it or not, my 
inability to write was the starting point of my investigation.  Like Milner’s experience 
with painting, writing poetry was something I wanted to do but initially failed to 
accomplish.  I had a clearly formed intention to write but found that nothing remotely 
satisfying emerged.  This invites an initial consideration of my experience in terms of 
the well-known concept of writer’s block. 
7.1   Writer’s block 
7.1.1 Creative blocks and personal imperatives 
Despite widespread use of the term the phenomenon of writer’s block has only 
relatively recently become the focus of critical examination (e.g. Kantor, 1995; Leader, 
1991).  Kantor suggests that it is best seen as part of a broader category of ‘creative 
block’ that can impact on creative work in a range of different disciplines.  This is 
congruent with the similarities between my experience with poetry and Milner’s with 
painting.  Kantor takes a diagnostic approach to this experience, which he does not see 
as a syndrome in its own right but as a frequent consequence of many other disorders.  
His proposed model of therapy is largely supportive and lays stress on the relationship 
between the would-be creator and their environment.  For example he asks: “What can I 
do to help my artist, what can I do to save my artist from the bad effects of changing 
tastes and hostile critics?” (Kantor, 1995, p. 171) 
I certainly searched for some underlying problem to explain my difficulty.  However, I 
was never able to identify a separate problem that adequately accounted for it, in other 
areas of my life I was functioning adequately.  The problem was my inability to write 
poetry when I wanted to do so.  My ensuing distress involved a sense of inadequacy, of 
being unable to achieve my intentions through an act of will.  There was a feeling of 
defeat and powerlessness but no obvious sign of something else being wrong.  
However, there was a definite echo of Kantor’s stress on environmental context.  
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Confusion and concerns about what was expected and what I expected of myself, in the 
context of a doctoral study, loomed large. 
This is not to deny the reality of writer’s block arising from other significant problems.  
For example, Flaherty (2004) presents a compelling account of the opposite extremes of 
hypergraphia and writer’s block through the lens of underlying neurological processes.  
She contrasts the compulsion to write experienced in some manic states with the blocks 
associated with depression and anxiety.  She then makes a significant observation about 
writer’s block: 
Writer’s block is not agraphia, the selective loss of the skill to write (usually caused 
by strokes, and strikingly rare).  Unlike agraphia, writer’s block tends to be restricted 
to a genre of writing or particular project, with all other forms of writing normal.  
(Flaherty, 2004, p. 83) 
This parallels my experience of a specific difficulty with writing poetry while remaining 
productive with other forms of writing.  Flaherty suggests that writer’s block affects 
what matters most to the writer’s self-identity.  For example, Coleridge suffered blocks 
with his poetry while remaining fluent in other areas of writing.  In contrast, Elbow 
(2000) reports that his nascent academic career foundered because of his chronic 
inability to write academic essays after taking up a scholarship at Oxford.  
The above observations highlight the role of the concept of self and the context of the 
work in the experience of creative block.  Both a heightened self-referential concern 
with outcome and a potentially critical context seem plausible contributors to block.  
The anxieties generated by these factors may have a significant functional and 
emotional impact that appears divorced from other areas of life.  Relief from the 
resulting conflict, between intended but inhibited creative activity, could presumably be 
achieved by the act of successful creation, or by simply abandoning the attempt to 
create.  However, the latter solution may not be straightforward if it undermines a 
valued self-identity, or goes against what Kavaler-Adler (1993) has described as a 
“compulsion to create” rooted in the need to resolve or progress an important 
developmental issue.  In these circumstances the creative imperative is fuelled by an 
attempt to address a felt need, so a block represents a shortcoming that may be 
inherently painful.  This has resonance with my desire to conduct a creative 
investigation explicitly linked to my own development. 
125 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Creative block and procrastination 
Creative block can be compared to its close relative, procrastination.  In procrastination 
postponing action is widely seen as a means of reducing anxiety or discomfort and thus 
serves a self-regulatory function (Steel, 2007).  For Boice, procrastination and block are 
essentially “problems of excessive self-consciousness” (Boice, 1996, p. xx).   In his 
scheme procrastination is related to the reduction of an immediate state of discomfort, 
whereas blocking is often stimulated by a context of anticipated public exposure or 
criticism.  The nature of the self-experience involved can also be distinguished.  In 
procrastination relief of anxiety is achieved through avoidance of the task, but in 
blocking there can be repeated but abortive attempts to undertake the task, with 
increasing levels of frustration incurred.  In writer’s block it is common for writers to 
continue unsuccessful efforts to write rather than to abandon the effort.  The 
procrastinator postpones action whereas the blocked writer is more fundamentally 
unable to write, despite their continuing attempts to do so.  My experience with writing 
poetry was consistent with this description of blocking and contrasts with times when I 
have procrastinated over other writing tasks. 
The self-consciousness arising from the context of writing within a doctoral research 
project seemed an important aspect of the block that I experienced.  However, it remains 
striking that I could write successfully and to the level of publication in other forms of 
professional writing during this period.  This suggests something more specific about 
‘creative writing’, or the writing of poetry in particular, that presented a significant 
additional impediment.  This may have been linked to the degree of importance that I 
attached to it; for example the question of whether I was aspiring to become a poet.  
However, my more persistent sense was of simply not being able to find a way to write 
poems that felt real or alive.  My frustration was that I simply couldn’t seem to do it.  
This suggests the importance of looking more closely at the nature of the writing task 
involved and difficulties that may have been related directly to this. 
7.1.3 The challenge of creative writing 
Leader (1991) examines the anxieties involved in creative writing from the perspective 
of both psychoanalytic and literary theory.  The need for defences against anxiety is a 
central aspect of psychodynamic theory.  The relation of these to unconscious aspects of 
creativity will be examined further in Section 7.2.  Leader also identifies specific 
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literary anxieties such as Bloom’s (1973) notion of the  ‘anxiety of influence’ which 
concerns the dilemma faced by writers seeking originality of expression in a culture 
permeated by literary models and standards.  He also explores the romantic notion of 
‘the sublime’ and its association with poetry. 
The sublime is concerned with limitless and therefore formless objects, the sort of 
objects which can only be conceived by what Kant, in the Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgement, calls a “super-thought” of totality.  The experience of the sublime is thus 
one of a discontinuity, of a lack of harmony or correspondence between the object and 
our attempt to represent it. If the object itself is “what is beyond all comprehension 
great,” it cannot be natural because in nature all magnitudes are relative. Only our 
imagination can encompass the absolute magnitudes of sublime phenomena. Hence 
the sublime is “that, the mere capacity of thinking which [sic] evidences a faculty of 
mind transcending every standard of sense.”  (Leader, 1991, p. 135) 
Leader is pointing here to a potential block caused by the nature of what creative 
writing, and particularly poetry, may be attempting to represent from a romantic 
standpoint.  The notion of something transcending conventional forms of thought and 
language as the object of poetry places a daunting challenge in the path of the would-be 
poet.   However, there may be intrinsic reasons why conventional thinking and use of 
language differ from the kind of cognition needed for writing poetry.  For example, 
Jaynes (2000) has proposed that the increasing dominance of left hemisphere 
specialisation for language may have led to a relative atrophy of right hemisphere 
function, and that it is the latter that underpinned the historic importance of poetry.  In 
effect he argues that our dominant modes of cognition have become less poetic.   
Barfield (1999) makes a  historical and literary based argument for a similar 
evolutionary change of consciousness that is reflected in the increasingly abstract use of 
language. 
My relative ease with writing in an expository prose form and my observation that this 
seemed to interfere with the writing of poetry suggests that conflicting cognitive 
processes may have played a part in my difficulties.  Leader (1991) is critical of 
cognitive theories of writer’s block  for ignoring the role of will and affect and reducing 
it to cognitive errors and deficiencies.  However, this criticism is less applicable to 
recent work in cognitive science that places more emphasis on emotion and agency (e.g. 
Núñez & Freeman, 1999).  In contrast to Leader, Hjortshoj (2001) is critical of theories 
of writing blocks that focus exclusively on emotional or personal issues and neglect 
problems inherent in the writing itself.   He suggests that: 
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Our own efforts to produce good writing are the factors that make progress slow and 
frustrating; and these same factors, when they become sufficiently entangled, bring 
progress to a halt.  (Hjortshoj, 2001, p. vii) 
Hjortshoj’s reference to effort is based on his observation that writer’s block often 
afflicts good writers or those seeking to take forward their writing to a new level or in a 
new context.  The conscious intention to write well can lead to inappropriate or 
ineffective strategies for writing.  For example, strategies successful in one context are 
applied to another where they are less appropriate; the resulting problems stimulate 
renewed but further misdirected effort, which ultimately leads to a sense of personal 
obstruction or inadequacy.  Here continued failure is not for the want of trying, but 
because of it. 
7.1.4 The limits of conscious intention 
The inefficacy of my conscious intention was a prominent factor in my experience of 
trying to write poetry.  Although well aware of the limits of conscious determination of 
behaviour from a psychoanalytic perspective, this inclined me to attribute my difficulty 
to conflicting unconscious motivations.  There is, however, another perspective on 
conscious intention that proposes that its function is not determinative at all, but a 
means of ascribing a locus of agency.   
Wenger (2002) offers a persuasive empirically grounded review of  what he suggests is 
the illusion of conscious will.  His argument is derived largely from psychological 
studies.  Among these are investigations of the relationship between the neurological 
precursors of action and the conscious experience of the intention to act.  These have 
shown how actions are initiated before the individual has the experience of intending or 
willing the action.  In other words actions are underway before we consciously intend 
them.  Wenger argues that conscious intention, or the ‘feeling of willing’, accompanies 
some actions and has a useful purpose but isn’t the origin or cause of the action.  Rather 
it provides a feeling of agency, or authorship, that enables individuals to differentiate 
actions initiated by ‘their’ organism from those arising from other sources.  Wenger 
argues that this has real evolutionary advantages.  Without it the ability to recognise and 
accept responsibility is not possible.   It is how we come to the sense that we are the 
authors of our own actions but not of other people’s.  It is a critical component of our 
usual sense of self and agency but does not objectively reflect the nature of the mental 
processes involved in the production of either simple or complex behaviour. 
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Wenger suggests that the illusion of will is compelling.  He gives examples where 
people believe their actions are intended when they could not have been.  “It is as 
though people aspire to be ideal agents who know all their actions in advance” (2002, p. 
145).  Clearly, attempts to exert greater will or effort where the underlying strategy or 
approach is at fault are unlikely to succeed.  It follows that efforts to consciously plan or 
will something of this sort could lead to a sense of failure and may undermining the 
sense of self as an effective agent.  Interestingly, Wenger points to a corollary of the 
above in the potential for a “projection of agency”: 
…the actions our bodies perform are never self-evidently our own.  We are merely 
guided in interpreting them as consciously willed by our “selves” because of our 
general tendency to try to understand behaviour in terms of the conscious willed 
actions of specific minds – along with evidence that, in this particular case, the mind 
driving the action seems to be ours.  The causal agent we perceive at our own core – 
the “I” to which we refer when we say we are acting – is only one of the possible 
authors to whom we may attribute what we do.  We may easily be led into thinking 
there are others.  (Wegner, 2002, p. 187) 
Wenger uses this to explain phenomena such as spirit possession, disassociative identity 
disorder and other forms of what he calls “virtual agents”.  It would also be possible to 
apply this argument to the way poetic or creative inspiration has been understood as the 
activity or inspiration of a Muse, and indeed to how this has been replaced for some by 
the activity of the unconscious mind.  Faced with a failure of will or conscious intention 
poets may seek another source of agency for their work, to relieve some of the felt 
burden of creation, and to account for material and ideas that are recognised to emerge 
outside their bidding.   
It is in poetry, more than any other form of creative writing, that the role of a Muse or 
unconscious has been invoked as a critical source of creative action.  Poetry provides 
the model of the writer’s need for some form of help beyond the usual bounds of self.  
In the many books now available offering advice on the writing of poetry there are only 
qualified claims about how much can be learnt from instruction (e.g. Oliver, 1994).  The 
main recommendation is to read a lot of poetry and practice writing it.  The history and 
principles of prosody can be taught and motivation stimulated, but the emergence of 
satisfying poetry is definitely not guaranteed.  The suggestion is that the writing of 
poetry depends on a process that may be nurtured and enhanced, but not consciously 
engineered. 
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My experience supports the above conclusion.  It suggests that a conscious intention to 
write poetry is insufficient and may even interfere with the processes needed for its 
writing.  In my case, this seemed connected with self-conscious anxieties about success 
and criticism but also with the nature of poetry itself.  It was partly through what Shaw 
(1988) calls the “paradox of intention”, or “reaching the goal by giving up the attempt to 
reach it”, that I found a way through this difficulty.  Critically, this involved a period in 
which I effectively abandoned my attempts to write poetry and followed impulses that 
led in new and unpremeditated directions.  
This analysis leaves open the question of precisely how the writing of poetry may differ 
from the demands of other forms of writing and thus, why poetry was not amenable to 
the same strategies that were effective in my composition of reflective and expository 
prose.   
7.2   The poetic unconscious 
7.2.1 Poiesis 
As many have observed, one of the defining qualities of poetry is that it defies 
paraphrase or a complete rendering of its significance in any other form than through 
the poem itself.  Analysis and interpretation may add to a poem’s appreciation but do 
not constitute its heart.  If poetry is meaningful the meaning seems to reside, at least in 
part, beyond the bounds of logical explanation.  The words used in poetry often point 
beyond their denotative meanings and conjure a form of experience that needs to be felt 
as much as understood.  If the language of poetry points beyond words and conveys 
something that cannot be fully grasped by logical thought, it might be expected to 
require more than a reasoned use of language for its creation.  Indeed, although poetry 
has recognizable devices and forms, it has been argued that it is, “in the last resort, an 
abuse of conventional language” (King, 1975, p. 16).   
The close connection between poetic creation and the inherent qualities of poetry is 
implied in the word poiesis.  The very act of making containing within it the form of the 
thing being made.  As noted above this creative action has long been associated with 
more than the rational power of the mind.   Just as a good poem transcends reductive 
explanation, a poem’s creation involves something beyond the application of conscious 
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reason or known principles of technical accomplishment.  In both form and creation, 
poetry appears heavily dependent on processes that are normally beneath consciousness. 
7.2.2 Psychoanalysis, dreams and the poetic unconscious 
Psychoanalysis has approached the subject of artistic creativity from various 
perspectives and has made influential contributions, particularly regarding the 
motivation for creative work.  Freud (1908) saw artistic creativity as comparable in 
many ways to neurotic symptom formation, in that it was a more socially acceptable 
means of achieving the disguised fulfilment of unacceptable wishes.  In contrast, those 
working within the Kleinian tradition have often focused on the way creative activity 
can serve a reparative function, by striving for the symbolic repair of the object that has 
been damaged in phantasy.  This has the effect of restoring the object and the self 
(Hymer, 1983).  When such unconscious impulses shape creation they may be 
discernible in the created work.  This opens a fruitful door to the critical interpretation 
and amplification of art from a psychoanalytic perspective.  It is this model which 
informed some of my initial assumptions about the way writing poetry could lead to 
personal insight and change. 
However, if we set aside the motivation to create, we find another line of observation 
about the process of unconscious creativity and the form it takes.  The unconscious is, 
by definition, not known to us; we can only know it by its products. Of these the dream 
is perhaps the purest example.  One of Freud’s critical contributions was to look behind 
the dream and to decipher what he described as the dream-work: the unconscious 
process that he postulated manufactured the dream.  In doing so he elaborated his theory 
of wish-fulfilment, but he also described some features of the mental activity that can be 
traced in the way dreams are constructed.  This he formulated as ‘primary process’, a 
form of cognition characterized by the properties of condensation, displacement, 
timelessness, no negation and the replacement of external with internal reality (Freud, 
1915).  Without these qualities our dreams would not be as they are. 
The similarities between the distinctive properties of dreams and the properties found in 
poetry have been widely recognised.  The parallels were explicitly formulated by 
Sharpe (1949) in her work on dream interpretation.  Sharpe argued that dreams and 
poetry could both trace their origins to unconscious experience of some sort, 
particularly of a felt or bodily kind.  The dream functions to communicate this 
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experience but can only reveal what is unknown to consciousness through what is, or 
can be, known.  She elucidates this by comparison with the characteristics of poetic 
diction: 
The laws of poetic diction, evolved by the critics of great poetry and the laws of dream 
formation as discovered by Freud, spring from the same unconscious sources and have 
many mechanisms in common.  (Sharpe, 1949, p. 19) 
Sharpe shows how many features of poetic diction, such as the use of simile, metaphor, 
and metonymy, have equivalencies in dreams and can be used as an aid to their 
interpretation.  She particularly emphasises the importance of the sound of language and 
its unconscious phonetic significance, which she suggests is closely tied to early 
developmental experiences, especially bodily states, and the way that language is 
acquired through speech.  
The parallels Sharpe draws are largely in the service of understanding the nature of 
dreams through comparison with the figures of speech and forms of imagery that have 
been identified in poetry.  The underlying assumption is that both dreams and poetry 
take the form they do because they derive from, and reflect in their construction, a 
common form of unconscious mental activity. For the literary critic, Lionel Trilling, 
adopting this analytic perspective brought with it profound implications.  As he 
pointedly observed, it was a way of thinking “which makes poetry indigenous to the 
very constitution of the mind” (Trilling, 1950, p. 49). 
7.2.3 Language and the poetic unconscious 
The linkage between the structure of language and the unconscious has been 
influentially elaborated by Lacan (2007).   Although our experience of dreaming is 
largely visual, Lacan did not see this as a purely pictorial mode of representation but as 
a kind of text or form of writing.  This is structured by the unconscious according to its 
purposes, which for Lacan were pre-eminently rhetorical.  The function of rhetorical 
language is to persuade or influence rather than to convey accurate information or 
reveal true intentions.  Rhetoric utilizes many of the same forms and figures of speech 
as poetry but in other areas of discourse, perhaps most obviously today in advertising 
and political debate.  However, for Lacan, everyday speech is also saturated by it in a 
way that is often completely unconscious.   
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Lacan’s equation of language and the unconscious is based on the equivalence that can 
be drawn between, on the one hand, condensation and metaphor: where one thing can 
stand for a number of others; and on the other, displacement and metonymy: where 
representation can move from one thing to another, usually by association.  In effect he 
sees metaphor and metonymy as direct functions of the unconscious and privileges these 
linguistic terms over those coined by Freud.  Indeed, we might note in passing the 
metaphorical nature of the terms condensation and displacement, both of which seek to 
illuminate mental activity via a known physical process.  One of the merits of Lacan’s 
emphasis is that it is closer to the account we actually give of our dreams, which is 
usually through verbal description.  It also brings us nearer to the kind of listening 
required in the analytic context, where sensitivity to language can be crucial.  Ogden 
refers to this, in poetic terms borrowed from Seamus Heaney, as “the music of what 
happens” (Ogden, 2001, p. 77). 
Building on a Lacanian framework, Kristeva (1984) has constructed her own distinctive 
model of the development of language as a signifying process. This moves from what 
she labels a ‘semiotic’ pre-oedipal phase, to the ‘symbolic’ post-oedipal order of 
acquired language.  She has endeavoured to redress Lacan’s emphasis on verbal 
language by considering the preverbal stages of development, where the child babbles 
and follows rhythms and patterns of sound in response to its maternal and bodily 
environment.  In this unstable multisensory state of being infants have no fixed identity. 
They are in a state of constant movement and fluid interchange with the world around 
them, in a manner that accords with Freud’s primary process. The acquisition of 
language and its rules is associated with the imposition of an order, associated with the 
father, which is a necessary precondition for achieving a relatively stable and separate 
identity. Although this symbolic order arises from the semiotic, its coherence is 
threatened by any subsequent eruption of the semiotic. This results in the necessity for a 
kind of blanket repression of the semiotic level of experience.  However, the semiotic 
may return in subversive forms such as Kristeva’s trinity of madness, holiness and 
poetry.  Kristeva (1989) believes that it is the experience of the semiotic emerging in 
and through language that produces poetry.  Features such as metaphor, metonymy, and 
musicality arise as a creative disruption of the limiting and differentiating experience of 
language, and thus open access to this more vividly felt area of being. 
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Kristeva’s observations about poetry are connected to those of Sharpe concerning the 
sound of language and the importance of very early forms of sense experience.  Both 
reflect the increasing interest psychoanalysis has taken in these early phases of 
development following the seminal work of Klein.  Kristeva sees the semiotic as 
significant in all forms of creativity and refers to the semiotic ‘chora’, a space or 
receptacle formed by the infant’s link with the mother’s body.  This draws on 
Winnicott’s (1991) ideas about the holding environment, and the necessity for the 
emergence of a ‘potential space’ for the realization of creative experience.  This has its 
origins in the mental and physical space between mother and infant, and provides a 
context for potentially creative transitions in the way objects, including words, are 
experienced and used. 
7.2.4 Repression and poetic expression 
What Sharpe, Lacan and Kristeva all elaborate are links between the nature of poetry 
and a distinctive form of unconscious mental activity, which they see as underlying it.  
This is a form of activity that is in marked contrast to the conventional thinking of 
consciousness and which owes its initial formulation to Freud’s description of the 
primary process.  They represent this activity as fundamentally opposed to our normal 
patterns of thought and language use but as frequently pressing to intrude into it.  This 
opposition, following Freud, is largely considered as an active repressive process that 
sets out to exclude material from consciousness to enable the required order of 
consciousness to be established and preserved.  For Lacan and Kristeva these repressive 
forces take on a cultural dimension, which informs aspects of their wider theorizing.   
Although this emphasis on repression has much to commend it, and may help illuminate 
many of the personal struggles that can be involved in writing poetry, it privileges the 
process of exclusion over what could be termed the constructive difficulties that are 
inherent in the process of creativity.  With poetry, this includes the challenges of 
working in the particular medium of language to realize a satisfying and effective 
artistic product: a poem being quite literally a “made thing” (Drury, 1995).  This 
suggests more than simply overcoming barriers to repressed content; it implies a facility 
with the entire process of creative work.   
My own difficulties with writing poetry did not seem primarily concerned with 
unlocking repressed material.  They felt more about the struggle to make something that 
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adequately conveyed a deeper level of experience: a level of experience that felt 
emotionally alive and real, but which I found inherently difficult to shape into a verbal 
or poetic form.  The sense of achievement of this complex constructive task may be one 
of the profounder satisfactions of successful artistic work.  Indeed Rank (1932) has 
suggested, in counterbalance to Freud, that the neurotic could be seen as a failed artist. 
Within classical psychoanalysis the notion of repression has been central to the 
examination of the unconscious.  The repressed unconscious exists because its contents 
are actively excluded from consciousness.  Although there is a pressure to satisfy 
repressed desires or wishes, this can only be achieved in a disguised form because of the 
need to maintain repression.  Dreams and other manifestations of unconscious activity 
take the form they do partly from the need to maintain this exclusion.  Seen in this light, 
artistic work is a ‘sublimation’ of wishes or drives and the created form serves to obtain 
gratification or expression while still maintaining a level of disguise.  Sublimation is, 
however, a developmental achievement because it is a more adaptive compromise than 
neurosis or symptom formation. 
Despite its centrality to psychoanalytic theory, the nature of how repression actually 
operates as a psychological process has proved difficult to formulate.  Billig (1999) 
argues that this is due to it being conceived of as an inner process, involving abstract 
entities such as the id, ego and super-ego, rather than as something that arises in 
language.  In his view, naturally occurring language and conversation is inherently both 
repressive and expressive.  Social processes determine what can be said and not said, 
and this can be ‘internalised’ as what individuals are able to think about without shame 
or anxiety.  Thus, while sexual repression operated in both society and thought at the 
time of Freud, current language use is more obviously repressive in areas such as race.  
The significance of Billig’s analysis here, is the centrality he gives to language in the 
operation of repression.  This places processes of repression firmly at a verbal level of 
functioning and development, and suggests this is due to what is, or is not, acceptable 
within the linguistic communities in which our language use is shaped.   Billig believes 
this can account for the idea of emotional repression if it is recognised that consciously 
experiencing an emotion relies heavily on discursive practices, as well as sensed bodily 
states.  Repression is thus recast as a social phenomenon concerning things that we 
could speak about but collectively avoid doing, other than in suitably disguised ways. 
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Although repression is at the heart of clinical theory, many analysts have been interested 
in those aspects of unconscious creativity that are not determined by its operation.  
Among these is Marion Milner.  For example she notes the following observation made 
on her work by Pontalis: 
…he then said that I had considered the dream neither as a message or text to be 
deciphered nor as a compromise between repressed  desires and ego defence 
mechanisms, but as a witness of a state of being; in fact as an attempt at symbolization 
rather than as a symbolic language to be decoded…   (Milner, 1987, p. 275) 
This observation points to a process that seeks representation or symbolization for its 
own sake: a process which may seek to give conscious thought or external form to what 
is known or experienced at an unconscious level of being.  Milner points to one source 
of her own thinking about this in the writing of Ehrenzweig (1967) who in her words: 
…came to the conclusion that the inarticulate structure of what he calls the ‘depth’ 
mind is totally ungraspable by the ‘surface’ mind, not because of repression of 
offensive content but because of its structure; and that, because of its peculiar 
structure it can achieve tasks of integration that are quite beyond the capacity of the 
conscious surface mind.  (Milner, 1987, p. 276) 
Ehrenzweig and Milner were both interested in art, particularly visual art, and clearly 
saw in it something more than a creative but disguised expression of the repressed 
unconscious.  Rather, they saw it as an attempt to give form to a level of experience that 
is otherwise ungraspable by the conscious mind, the barrier to awareness existing not so 
much in its content as in its very nature.  Milner argued that we needed a fuller 
understanding of the differences between the “two kinds of thinking” that distinguished 
these areas of the mind.   This was a difference that, in her experience, existed between 
the “kind of thinking that makes an absolute separation of subject from object, me from 
not me, seer from seen, and the kind that does not” (Milner, 1957, p. 160).  She pointed 
out that we know a lot about the logic and laws of reasoning of the former, but less 
about the capacity for fusing or, from a rational point of view, “con-fusing” these 
distinctions, in the kind of thinking that she suggested underpins the formation of art, 
including poetry. 
Following Freud, the psychoanalyst who has devoted most attention to formulating the 
logical form of unconscious processes is Ignacio Matte Blanco (1975; 1988).  In the 
remainder of this chapter I will explore his bi-logical theory with a view to 
demonstrating how this might be applied to the nature of poetry and, in subsequent 
chapters, to the challenge I experienced in writing it effectively. 
136 
 
 
 
7.3  The logical unconscious 
7.3.1 Matte Blanco’s approach 
To talk of the unconscious as logical appears contradictory.  The common perception is 
that the unconscious is irrational and shaped largely by instinctual and emotional forces.  
What must be remembered is that anything we say about the unconscious is necessarily 
spoken from the point of view of the conscious mind, and thus with the logic associated 
with it.  From this perspective, the unconscious does not seem to operate by principles 
that are ‘reasonable’ or conform to the accepted conventions of logical thought.  On the 
other hand, if there was no logic or order to unconscious processes it would be difficult 
to see how any pattern at all would be discernible in them.  The necessary conclusion 
seems to be that the unconscious operates according to a form of logic that is distinctly 
its own.  This is where Matte Blanco (1975) begins in his painstaking investigation into 
the form that this logic takes, and the way that it might be represented and understood. 
The first question that arises is: how are we to understand a logic that differs from the 
logic that we normally use to understand things?  To investigate this, Matte Blanco, in a 
manner reminiscent of Bion, and the later Lacan, turns to a symbolic language other 
than words – the language of mathematics.   This aspect of his work can make it quite 
intimidating and inaccessible to the non-mathematically trained.  It can help to hold in 
mind that mathematics is essentially concerned with the identification of patterns that 
are originally observed from the world of experience (Devlin, 1996).  The abstraction of 
this pattern into a mathematical concept (like numbers or shapes) can lead to an 
investigation of the principles or axioms that operate to govern this.  Through their 
manipulation, these principles may lead to new findings and logical proofs that are 
independent of any observed phenomena, and thus usually rely on an increasingly 
abstract form of notation.  Many mathematicians find these proofs aesthetically 
pleasing, and even when they appear counter to common sense they often lead back to 
tangible applications and unexpected discoveries in the ‘real’ world. 
The observations Matte Blanco starts with are those made by Freud about the five 
characteristics of primary process thinking.  These, as mentioned previously, are the 
features of displacement, condensation, timelessness, no-negation and the replacement 
of external with internal reality.  These do not correspond to the conventions of logical 
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thought, which, from the time of Aristotle, have been based on propositions that are 
either true or false and events that are separated in time and space.  What needs to be 
kept in mind is that this is a form of logic that is abstracted from the way conscious 
thinking operates, and therefore seems natural or ‘logical’.   However, it does not 
represent the only system of logic that is possible.  For example, some of the 
paradoxical discoveries of quantum mechanics seem to be ‘illogical’ from this point of 
view and contradict the assumptions of classical physics. 
Matte Blanco’s approach was to abstract some kind of logic from the observed 
properties of unconscious thinking.  What he proposed was the concept of ‘symmetric 
logic’.  Following a detailed step-by-step argument, he attempted to show that this could 
account for all the properties observed by Freud and thus provide a new perspective for 
thinking about the nature of the unconscious and its activity.  It would be impossible to 
provide a full exposition of Matte Blanco’s argument here.  An excellent introduction is 
provided by Rayner (1995), and some interesting developments by Bomford (1998).  
What I will endeavour to draw out are some of the general features that seem relevant to 
the processes involved in both conscious and unconscious creativity. 
7.3.2 Symmetric logic 
The nature of symmetric logic is developed by Matte Blanco from a consideration of the 
symmetrizations sometimes seen in conventional thinking, and a property of 
mathematical set theory, which means a member of a class can sometimes be identical 
to the class to which it belongs.  A logical symmetrization occurs when the relationships 
between two elements can be reversed.  For example, John is the brother of Peter is 
equivalent to saying Peter is the brother of John.  However, it is normally more common 
to find asymmetric relationships such as: John is the brother of Mary. This does not 
imply its reverse because Mary is the sister of John.  Similarly in classing things in sets 
we find some sets where the elements may be loosely treated as identical to the set, for 
example, the set of ‘apples’ consists of apples.  And in contrast, sets where this identity 
evidently does not hold, such as the set of ‘things in my kitchen’, which may contain 
apples but also bananas, a toaster and assorted cutlery.  Although this is a contrived 
illustration, it gives some impression of the relations that can hold when sets are 
examined mathematically. 
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In a system of pure symmetric thinking these symmetrizations of relationship, and 
identity between the elements and the whole of a set, become the rule.  As a result a 
principle of identification operates which makes things equivalent to each other.  In this 
state of mind one thing can stand for another, a part can become the whole, and what are 
normally thought of as contradictions disappear.  The dimensions of time and space also 
cease to have any absolute significance as if A follows B, in symmetric logic B also 
follows A.  As a consequence these differentiating continua collapse.  
Matte Blanco’s contention is that this form of logic characterizes unconscious thinking 
and is what makes it appear so odd and irrational to normal reasoning.  In fact, he goes 
further than this and suggests that it is the very nature of this form of thinking which 
makes it unconscious.  This has nothing to do with what the unconscious contains but is 
structurally determined by the nature of consciousness.  Our consciousness emerges and 
is constructed by processes of discrimination, particularly the identification of 
differences and hence relations between things in the external world.  This becomes 
embedded in the nature of language and our capacity for conscious thinking.  
Consciousness simply cannot contain too much symmetric thinking because it dissolves 
differences, for example the difference between self and other, or a word and what it 
signifies.  As a result consciousness, as we generally know it, requires symmetric logic 
to function firmly in the background. 
This formulation offers a complementary paradigm to repression for understanding the 
relationship between the activity of the conscious and unconscious mind.  It also opens 
the door to an approach to the role of the unconscious in creativity that is not reliant on 
the construction of parallels with neurotic or reparative processes.  This would be 
congruent with Ehrenzweig’s observation that: 
In contrast to illness, creative work succeeds in coordinating the results of 
unconscious undifferentiation and conscious differentiation and so reveals37the hidden 
order of the unconscious.  (Ehrenzweig, 1967, p. 4)  
7.3.3 Thinking, feeling, being and infinity 
It might be objected that Matte Blanco’s mathematically derived view of the 
unconscious feels too abstract and ‘logical’, and that it fails to capture the intensity of 
                                                 
37
 Italics added. 
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emotional experience that psychoanalysis has located there, or the powerful feeling that 
is reflected in artistic creativity such as poetry.  However, this would be a superficial 
view reflecting an identification of logic with an abstract and purely symbolic form of 
reasoning.  From a symmetric perspective the very distinctions we normally make 
between thinking and feeling are eroded and melt into something much nearer an 
experience of being.  Feeling is thus rescued from its normal opposition to reason.  It 
becomes instead one of the vital ways that we have access to this level of cognition.  
This is most clearly illustrated in intense emotional states where the operation of a 
symmetric mode of thinking becomes almost self evident as it overwhelms the power to 
discriminate according to rational principles.  When you are in love it is ‘reasonable’ to 
see all aspects of the lover as perfectly lovable, despite evidence to the contrary; in a 
paranoid state of mind it ‘makes sense’ to feel fearful, as so much is being located in the 
class of dangerous things. 
Such examples of extreme feeling point to one of Matte Blanco’s most interesting ideas.  
He notes that one of the mathematical properties of sets where the elements are 
equivalent to the whole set, is that the set must be infinite.  For example, as I write this I 
have a number of books on my desk.  Each book belongs to the finite set I might call 
‘the books on my desk’.   Mathematically none of the individual books can be treated as 
the same as the whole set ‘the books on my desk’.  However, each book can be treated 
as identical to the imaginary set of ‘all books’, which is potentially infinite.  This has a 
subtle emotional resonance, as I do sometimes find myself holding, examining, and 
looking at a book as if appreciating and savouring its quality of simply being a book.  I 
can’t imagine any such experience for the quality of a book just being a book on my 
desk.  With extreme emotions this infinitization is experienced far more concretely.  
Thus when deeply in love all that is lovable can actually feel contained in one person or, 
for some, all dangerous ideas may seem located in one book.  In effect symmetrical 
thinking moves from the background of experience to a, usually temporary, domination 
of consciousness.   
If symmetrical thinking dominates experience in a sustained way it can be associated 
with what may become disturbed states of mind.  It would be a mistake, however, to 
conclude that it is somehow the fault of the symmetric form of thinking.  The problem 
lies as much in the failure of consciousness to accommodate it, or more specifically, in 
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the inability of consciousness to entertain this experience while also sustaining its 
capacity to discriminate adequately according to conventional reason.  It’s interesting to 
speculate whether herein resides both the similarity and difference observed between 
madness, mystical experience and poetry.  If the doors of perception were cleansed it 
might indeed be possible, according to symmetric logic, to see the world as infinite.  Or, 
as previously mentioned with regard to romanticism, to approach the sublime.  
However, without the power of discrimination we might not be able to see the world at 
all. 
In discussing symmetric logic and the concept of the unconscious, Matte Blanco makes 
it clear that he sees unconsciousness and symmetric thinking as just two attributes of 
what is a fundamentally different mode of being than the asymmetric form of 
experience that we are usually conscious of.  He describes this deeper level of being as 
the symmetrical mode but indicates that:  
All our descriptions of symmetrical being are inaccurate because symmetrical being is 
indescribable in an accurate way and is ineffable.  (Matte Blanco, 1975, p. 101) 
7.3.4 Bi-logic 
Developmentally, Matte Blanco sees the symmetric mode as the fundamental mode of 
being, and as the base from which asymmetric discrimination arises.  However, in its 
operation symmetric thinking is always united in some degree with an element of 
asymmetric thinking and vice versa.  Neither a totally symmetrical nor totally 
asymmetrical pattern of thought seems cognitively sustainable.  In the former 
everything would merge into a complete identity. We might imagine this as 
nothingness, literally a no-separate-thing-ness. In the latter everything would be split 
through an unlimited differentiation, which would lead to a strangely similar state of 
formlessness.  This necessitates what he describes as bi-logic, the combination of 
symmetric and asymmetric modes of thought.  Bi-logic can take different forms 
depending on the precise pattern and use made of the different modes of thinking.  It 
varies from forms that are largely based on symmetric logic and are thus most deeply 
unconscious, and forms that are largely asymmetric and therefore characteristic of 
conscious thinking.  Bi-logic shifts the focus from the differences between the two 
modes of thought towards a focus on their dialectical interplay in all forms of knowing, 
both conscious and unconscious.  In doing so, Matte Blanco undermines the very idea of 
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‘the unconscious’ as a specific area of the mind, and moves towards a framework in 
which the level and kind of awareness that is possible is crucially determined by the 
form of mental activity involved.  
7.4   Poetry and bi-logical thinking 
7.4.1 Bi-logical forms of thinking 
Following his identification of two logically contrasting modes of thought, Matte 
Blanco introduces his integrative conception of bi-logical forms or structures.  These 
reflect different degrees and patterns of interaction between asymmetric and symmetric 
thinking.  These forms can be applied to the examination of concrete products of mental 
activity, such as different states of mind or examples of speech and writing.  It seems 
probable that any form of recognition or pattern making, including symbolization itself, 
owes its origins to a symmetric mode of thought that enables one thing to be identified 
with another.38  Although the structure of language is largely asymmetric and built on 
discrimination, its development and use seem highly dependent on symmetric forms of 
thinking.  The more language use is focused on factual communication and 
propositional reasoning the more asymmetric it tends to become. When used to convey 
feeling, experience, or value, it exhibits more symmetric features.  As we have seen, in 
extreme emotional states the symmetric mode can even come to dominate both 
discourse and perception of the world, in a manner that parallels Kristeva’s notion of 
semiotic intrusion into the symbolic realm. 
7.4.2 Poetry and bi-logic 
Although poetry is extremely varied in the forms it takes, it is possible to consider its 
generic properties from a bi-logical perspective.  Indeed Matte Blanco suggests, in 
passing, that art and especially poetry corresponds to a particular bi-logical structure, 
which he labels: “Simassi” (1975, p. 68).  This stands for the “simultaneous use of 
asymmetric and symmetric thinking”.  Since poetry is associated with conveying feeling 
and experience we would expect it to contain a high level of symmetrization.  However, 
if this were to predominate it would potentially result in a form of unpersuasive emoting 
rather than the carefully crafted and highly organised form of expression found in the 
                                                 
38
 This is developed further in Chapter 8. 
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best poetry.  Doggerel or overly sentimental poetry could be seen to exemplify this.  In 
order to contain a high level of symmetrization without requiring excessive “poetic 
faith”, or “suspension of disbelief” (Coleridge, 1997, p. 179), it may be necessary to 
simultaneously increase both symmetric and asymmetric features of language use, and 
to find a way of combining these together in a satisfactory way. 
At this stage it may be helpful to exchange Matte Blanco’s logically derived terms for 
expressions that are easier to grasp intuitively in the context of poetry.  My suggestion is 
that we can consider poetry in terms of its exhibition of, on the one hand, ‘patterns of 
identity’, which corresponds to symmetric thinking, and on the other to the construction 
of ‘means of differentiation’, which is an essential feature of asymmetric thinking 
(Maltby, 2003).  In applying these two dimensions it is useful to remember that the 
identities that lie behind symmetric thinking are not merely verbal, but arise from a 
preverbal background of sense experience.  So identities can be established by sounds, 
images, or patterns of movement.  Identities established in these ways can be 
differentiated below a level of verbal statement.  For example, the rhythm of a poem 
like Auden’s ‘Night Train’ has a very clear pattern of identity with the actual rhythm 
and sound of a steam train on a track.  When the tempo of the rhythm alters the identity 
remains, but we have a differentiated sense of the train speeding up or slowing down 
without any need to use these words.  Williams (2006) comments that although this 
example is clear enough it does not go very much beyond the level of a simple 
impression, he suggests a more complex illustration would be Rilke’s Duino Elegies 
that display “symphonic movements of emotional tone, working at a far more 
fundamental level than any verbal argument” (p. 35). 
One of the most widely noted qualities of poems is their condensed use of language.  
This, taken together with the preceding argument, suggests a refined proposal for the 
way we might consider the characteristics of poetry from a bi-logical point of view.  
The proposal is that compared to ordinary language poetry typically makes use of an 
increased density of both ‘patterns of identity’ and ‘means of differentiation’, in a 
constructed combination that enables them to operate simultaneously.  This is an 
extremely general thesis and not an attempt to reductively explain poetry.  It may, 
however, provide a means of linking the nature of poetry with a more extensive view of 
the capacity for knowing and being that can arise through the interrelation of conscious 
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and unconscious processes. More specifically, it provides a means of examining the 
difficulties that I experienced in writing poetry from the perspective of the kinds of 
mental activity that may be intrinsic to poetic creation.  Before considering the process 
that may underpin such creative activity further, it is important to determine whether 
some of the forms and features that are commonly found in poetry can be correlated 
with the bi-logical framework that is proposed. 
7.4.3 The bi-logical nature of poetic form and diction 
The first observation that might be made concerns the very existence of something that 
we recognize as a poem.  When written down a poem is normally easily recognisable as 
a differentiated object in its own right.  It usually stands out from the page in a much 
more obvious way than normal prose and this contributes to its distinct identity as a 
poem.  We are already alerted to approach it in a particular way, as poetry, and thus to 
distinguish it from other forms of writing.  This creates a differentiating boundary to the 
contents of the poem, similar to the way a frame separates a picture from the wall.  All 
that is within is identified together as constituting the poem.  However highly 
differentiated the contents may be, everything must belong to the poem for the poem to 
be effective.  Editing can often involve the painful excision of wonderfully poetic lines 
or phrases because they don’t meet this requirement. 
Poetry is frequently written in verse forms that contain patterns of structural identity in 
areas such as rhythm, rhyme and stanza length.  This creates an identifiable form to 
these poems that ensures the contents are made identical in some respects, for example 
through the continuity of metre or rhyming sounds, while being more clearly 
differentiated in terms of others, for example through the effects of stress, selection of 
rhyme, or position in the formal sequence.  An illustration of the latter would be the 
closing couplet of a Shakespearian sonnet.  Regular verse forms also identify the poem 
as belonging to a class of poems against which its individual features will then more 
clearly stand out.  Even poetry that eschews a regular form is usually written in lines.  In 
fact many people see the line as the defining property of poetry.  The use of lines means 
the usual logic of sentences can be subtly disrupted.  Words are differentiated according 
to their place on the line rather than just through the rules of grammar and syntax.  At 
the same time each line serves to break up and differentiate the poem.  The identity 
between lines is obvious when established metrically, but can also be established and 
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varied through line length and cadence.  Most fundamentally lines share the 
fundamental property of simply being lines, which is, as far as bi-logic is concerned, 
essentially a pattern of identity or symmetry.  Lines thus seem to provide a central 
means through which poems can be constructed to increase both identity and 
differentiation and combine them in a satisfying way. 
Figures of speech such as metaphor, simile, and metonymy have already been 
considered in relation to the work of Sharpe and Lacan.  Metaphor is perhaps the purest 
example of a pattern of linguistic identity between one thing and another, but all tropes 
seem to depend on some form of it for their operation.  Simile, for example, may be 
viewed as an identity where a means of differentiation is inserted by use of the word 
‘like’.  Poetry is of course rich in these figures and their associated imagery, but authors 
such as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) have also drawn attention to how much we rely on 
metaphorical language in everyday life.  It has been noted that what distinguishes 
everyday use of metaphor and the form it takes in poetry is the degree to which the 
metaphors are specific rather than generalized (Holland, 1999).  The choice of words 
and use of metaphors in poetry is usually precise and often original.  The concrete term 
tends to be preferred over the abstract, unlike normal conversation that is usually 
conducted in terms of the familiar and general.  The net effect of this is to make the 
language of poetry, including its use of figurative imagery, highly differentiated and 
particular.  Identities are established but in terms that are very specific and precisely 
chosen. 
We could extend this kind of analysis further into the specific uses of sound, rhythm and 
repetition, but the same essential observation recurs.  There does seem to be a 
demonstrable increase in the density of patterns of identity and means of differentiation 
in poetry.  Furthermore, these symmetric and asymmetric features are tightly 
intertwined, which makes their operation effectively simultaneous.  Poetry seems to be 
characterized by a bi-logical form of high symmetry closely conjoined with high levels 
of asymmetry.  It is as if the one allows or enables the increase of the other in a 
mutually supportive interplay.  Although defined in purely logical terms through their 
opposition, symmetric and asymmetric modes seem to exist in poetry in a remarkably 
intense and condensed degree of synergy. 
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This analysis provides a basis for understanding the particular difficulties that may be 
inherent in the writing of poetry as opposed to prose.  It also provides a framework for 
critical examination of the processes that may have enabled a development in my ability 
to write, and the changes in self-experience that accompanied this.  These areas are 
examined further in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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8   Embodied Cognition and Self-Experience 
I have argued in Chapter 7 that my initial difficulties in writing poetry, while reflecting 
significant contextual factors, were related in an important way to a failure of my 
conscious and intentional strategies for writing.  Furthermore, that this failure was 
linked to the nature of creative writing and the properties of poetry in particular.  An 
analysis of poetry from the perspective of Matte Blanco’s theory of bi-logic was then 
developed.  This adds to previous theories of the unconscious roots of poetry a model of 
how poetry reflects an unusually high degree of coexistence of different logical 
principles, derived from the operation of both conscious and unconscious forms of 
thinking.  All forms of creative writing that seek to have an emotional as well as 
intellectual impact are likely to make significant use of the symmetric mode identified 
by Matte Blanco.  Poetry is distinctive, however, in the way it combines symmetric and 
asymmetric modes of thought in highly condensed and patterned forms that operate 
simultaneously. 
8.1    Accessing the logic of poetry 
8.1.1 Bi-logical variations in writing 
Boice (1990) argues that excessive conscious thought can be disruptive in the 
preliminary stages of many kinds of writing, hence the widespread recommendation of 
spontaneous or ‘unself-conscious’ forms of free-writing to pump-prime composition.  
He suggests that conscious thought leads to self-consciousness and an inhibiting 
tendency to work in a critical, abstract and explanatory mode that stifles generative 
writing.  In Matte Blanco’s terms, this reflects a highly asymmetric mode of thinking.  
Although an excessively conscious mode of thinking can potentially interfere with all 
forms of writing, it is likely to have most impact on writing demanding high levels of 
symmetric involvement, such as creative writing and poetry.  Forms of writing requiring 
conventional logical clarity would be expected to benefit from a greater preponderance 
of asymmetric thinking.  Consistent with this, Boice observes that many who use 
spontaneous writing strategies in an academic context have difficulty making the 
necessary transition to more structured forms of composition.    
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From a bi-logical perspective, all writing would be expected to involve symmetric and 
asymmetric modes of thinking but in different degrees and combinations, and with 
varying requirements for alterations in this when writing.  In my case, consistent with 
reports of others, more critical and self-consciously reflective forms of writing were not 
readily compatible with the contemporaneous writing of poetry.  Indeed, there was a 
sense of active ‘interference’.  This could be seen to reflect a difficulty in alternating 
between strategies of writing that differed in their bi-logical form.  Although this 
provides one means of understanding the difficulties I encountered, it leaves open the 
question of what is necessary for the writing of poetry and how this relates to my 
experience of finding a way forward during the study.   
8.1.2 Following the lead of the body 
The poetry I had written prior to the study had not followed a conscious decision to 
write so much as an immediate and spontaneous impulse to put pen to paper.  Conscious 
processes were put at the service of something initially arising and experienced outside 
the level of verbal thought:  I felt an urge to write a poem without any preconceived 
plan to do so.  The difficulties I faced during the study were only resolved by re-
discovering something of this approach and by finding how to take it forward more 
consistently.  The first step involved a temporary abandonment of any immediate 
intention to write.  Interestingly, this did not occur as a conscious decision but involved 
submitting to a pressing impulse to engage in nonverbal ‘arts’ activities.  Unlike my 
blocked writing these activities carried with them no sense of effort or intention – they 
felt more like play.  A crucial feature of this shift was the acceptance, attention to, and 
following of a felt or embodied level of experience, as opposed to consciously 
formulated ideas. 
It seems significant that the shift was into other forms of expressive or artistic activity, 
however unsophisticated in form.  There appeared to be a basic urge to create 
something, following the prolonged period of frustration with writing poetry.  It is also 
striking that this urge was spread over all the major domains of sensory experience: 
visual, auditory and kinaesthetic.  It was like a rehabilitative immersion into a more 
sensory mode of being. 
What I produced during this period and the process of production felt almost 
inseparable.  The drawings and paintings felt continuous with the movements that 
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created them; the ‘dance’ movements and musical activity were what was immediately 
taking place and had no separate existence.  This could be conceptualised as a more 
symmetric mode of functioning.  Consistent with Matte Blanco’s observations, this 
functioning arose as a form of felt experience or quality of being, rather than through 
conceptual understanding or direction. 
This level of experience has parallels with Kristeva’s description of the semiotic and 
other psychoanalytic formulations of pre-verbal forms of experience, for example the 
‘autistic-contiguous position’ posited by Ogden (1989).  The implication is that it was 
necessary for me to connect with, and act from, a level of felt experience preceding 
language, in order to move out of the impasse I had encountered as a result of the 
domination of conscious forms of thought.  This might be conceived of as a regression 
from a more differentiated level of functioning.  It certainly had a naïve and childlike 
quality, but unlike a ‘pathological’ form of regression there was a distinct imperative to 
create – to bring something into being from this level of experience.  Kris (1952) has 
argued that regression can be an important part of creative activity.  This may be 
particularly true in the arts, which, notwithstanding contemporary trends, are intimately 
linked with pre-conceptual as well as conceptual experience.  In my case, the process 
led me back to a re-enlivened use of language and, ultimately, a more productive 
engagement with writing poetry. 
8.2 Embodied cognition 
8.2.1 Embodied experience and language 
Attention to and immersion in embodied experience seemed necessary not only to break 
the hold of restrictive patterns of thought, but also to enable a more creative and 
poetically effective use of language rooted in a ‘to and fro’ with felt experience.  This is 
consistent with Matte Blanco’s logical framework; it is also congruent with the growing 
interest in the central role of embodiment in human experience and action (Burkitt, 
1999; Gallagher, 2006) and associated developments in cognitive science and linguistics 
(Gibbs, 2006; Turner, 1996). 
Burkitt seeks to redress the tendency towards a discursive or linguistic reductionism 
within contemporary thought by arguing, among other things, that it would be 
149 
 
 
 
impossible to think without our bodies.  Drawing particularly on Merleau-Ponty he 
points to a level of intentionality that precedes that of conscious thought: 
…the body could be said to be a thinking body and to have intentionality prior to the 
emergence of language and self-consciousness.  The body reaching out to grasp an 
object is one of the basic forms of intentional action, and no cognitive representation 
is needed for such performances.  Thinking and intentional activity are therefore pre-
linguistic and pre-cognitive, and prior to the self-conscious subject there exists the 
bodily subject which is its foundation.  (Burkitt, 1999, p. 75) 
Burkitt’s use of the term pre-cognitive in this context equates cognition with conscious 
knowing, but it is now common to use the term cognition more broadly to include the 
very forms of unconscious knowledge and thinking that he is referring to.  Burkitt also 
alludes to the relation of symbolization to this pre-verbal level of embodied experience: 
The symbolic dimension allows us to extrapolate from experience, to build a 
theoretical or imaginary world that is not identical to immediate body experience; and 
yet, the theoretical must always be in some way related to the sensuous and practical 
and can never be separated from it.  (Burkitt, 1999, p. 129) 
Here Burkitt invokes reference to both identity and separateness in trying to capture the 
way symbolization can extrapolate from embodied experience while remaining 
dependent on it.  Symbolization requires a process of differentiation but not total 
separation from embodied experience.  This is also one of the key observations of 
current proponents of an embodied view of cognition and language. 
8.2.2 Cognitive linguistics 
Until recently, cognitive science has been dominated by an ‘information processing’ 
model of the mind.  This has been shaped by conceptualisations of cognition that are 
modelled on the capacity of computers to process vast amounts of information by 
simple operations organised in discrete but interconnected stages.  This model can 
abstract the principles of effective information management from the underlying 
‘hardware’ required to carry out these operations.  The mind can thus be conceived in 
terms of modules, buffers, networks, and loops with an assumed basis in underlying 
neurological structure.  Although this model has provided a useful heuristic, it can 
reinforce a conceptual division between the mind and body, or at least between the body 
and the brain/mind which ‘controls’ it.  However, many features of cognition and 
language indicate a much greater level of mutual influence and interdependence than 
this approach allows for.  
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One of the key strands of research into embodied cognition has concerned language and 
the nature of verbal thinking.   This has included the seminal work of Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980) on conceptual metaphor, and the work of Fauconnier & Turner (2002) on 
conceptual integration.  Lakoff & Johnson  (1999, p. 3) argue that the major findings of 
this research is that: the mind is inherently embodied, thought is largely unconscious 
and abstract conceptualisation is essentially metaphorical.  Within this framework, the 
process of constructing and communicating meaning is seen as dependent on mappings 
between different domains or mental ‘spaces’, with mapping understood as “a 
correspondence between two sets that assigns to each element in the first a counterpart 
in the second” (Fauconnier, 1997, p. 1).  The assumption is that this fundamental 
cognitive process is independent of but underpins language.  The essentially 
metaphorical nature of language is revealed by the way structures relating to well-
established and concrete source domains are used to talk about more abstract or less 
well-established target domains.  Although the cognitive processes underlying this are 
non-linguistic, they are clearly reflected in the form language takes.  
Both everyday language and the creative use of language in literature can be 
interrogated to suggest the fundamental ways in which such conceptual processes 
operate.  Hence Turner (1996) is able to talk about the ‘literary mind’ as a model for 
how we think.  The nature of metaphorical structures in everyday speech provides 
another avenue.  The kind of experience that establishes fundamental source domains is 
rooted in the long evolutionary history of the interaction of bodies with their physical 
environment.  This embodied action in the world is the fundamental source or reference 
for our attempts to conceptualise more abstract domains of experience.  This is one of 
the most fundamental claims of this approach to cognitive linguistics; it insists that 
some form of prior embodied experience, represented by sensorimotor structures or 
‘image schemas’, is an essential component of our language use and capacity for 
abstract thought.  This situates embodied activity at the heart of cognition and meaning 
making. 
8.2.3 Conceptual blending and bi-logic 
Lakoff and Johnson identify a number of ‘primary metaphors’ derived from common 
mappings between an area of subjective experience and a source domain of 
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sensorimotor experience.  An example of a primary metaphor and its component 
elements is provided below: 
Time is Motion 
Subjective Judgement:  The passage of time 
Sensorimotor Domain:  Motion 
Examples:  “Time flies.” 
Primary Experience:  Experiencing the passage of time as one moves or observes 
motion 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 52) 
Following this form of analysis Lakoff and Johnson challenge the notion that reason is 
predominantly conscious and purely literal; instead they propose that it is largely 
unconscious, metaphorical and imaginative (1999, p. 4).  They also insist that it is not 
dispassionate, but profoundly emotionally engaged.  These conclusions strikingly 
corroborate the arguments advanced by Matte Blanco from a psychoanalytic 
perspective.  Although theories of embodied cognition are not derived from principles 
of logic, they lead to a similar reliance on what I described in Chapter 7 as: ‘patterns of 
identity’ operating alongside ‘means of differentiation’ at the heart of cognition.  These 
patterns of identity are rooted in the structured form of bodily and sensory processes and 
their mapping across to new or imaginatively projected domains.  The crucial features 
are that the new domain is known by equating an aspect of it with a source domain, and 
that the source domain is ultimately reliant on our embodied being.  However, without 
some markers of difference the new domain would be conceptually indistinguishable 
from the source domain.  One way that both difference and continuity can be provided 
is by a process of conceptual blending that integrates identities from different source 
domains.  This shapes a new domain so that it is equated in some ways and 
differentiated in other ways from each source domain.  From the perspective of Matte 
Blanco’s work this could be seen to effectively create, or operate as, a bi-logical 
structure, where the degree of identity and differentiation can potentially be highly 
variable. 
8.2.4 Double-scope blending, bi-logic and poetry 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) argue that the process they describe as ‘double-scope’ 
mapping is critical to the development of the uniquely human capacity for  complex 
forms of thinking and symbolization.  Although single-scope networks can input from 
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two source domains, the integration is achieved by the blend adopting what they 
describe as the ‘organising frame’ of one or other of these domains.  This organising 
frame determines how information is related within the blend: in effect, it provides a 
template or generic form to be followed.  This simplifies how the integration is made 
but at the same time greatly limits the extent to which variations can occur.  In contrast, 
double-scope networks arise when the organising frame that is adopted for the blend 
comprises elements of both of the subsidiary organising frames.  The result is an 
emergent form that combines elements of the subsidiary frames in a potentially novel 
way.  This has particularly creative possibilities when the subsidiary organising frames 
appear incompatible, that is when aspects of them ‘clash’ or oppose each other in 
significant ways. 
In such networks, both organizing frames make central contributions to the blend, and 
their sharp differences offer the possibility of rich clashes.  Far from blocking the 
construction of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the imagination; indeed 
the resulting blends can be highly creative.  (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 131) 
Turner (2006) argues that the activity of double-scope blending and the resulting 
‘compression’ in the way otherwise very different phenomena or perspectives are 
related is a central feature of art of all kinds.  Although this is a fundamental mental 
capacity, he proposes that it is utilized and exploited by art in particular ways.  Indeed 
he suggestively refers to this as “forbidden-fruit integration” (p. 110), referring to the 
capacity of art to keep things apart and yet to combine them.  This might be understood 
to have an ‘as if’ quality not dissimilar to that found in play.  Art enables an 
understanding of the ‘separateness of things’ to remain, while finding a way to integrate 
them in original and potentially valuable ways. 
Although Turner does not examine the logical nature of the differences or clashes that 
underlie creative forms of double-scope blending, these incompatibilities can clearly 
have a logical dimension.  For example, if one organising frame places A above B and 
the other places B above A, it is difficult to see how they can be blended, from an 
asymmetric point of view, without changing the relation of at least one frame.  The 
frames clash or contradict each other.  However, as Matte Blanco has shown, symmetric 
logic is capable of maintaining both relations in combination. 
Within the framework of double-scope integration, the process of compression achieved 
by integrating otherwise disparate elements has to be balanced by a process of 
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‘decompression’, to enable these integrated structures to be linked back to the wider 
network of elements in a meaningful way.  Without these differentiated connections the 
resultant blends may fail to be comprehensible or even conscious.  Turner proposes that 
blending is taking place continually but that only a few blends are ‘successful’ and that 
“fewer still percolate into consciousness” (Turner, 2006, p. 112).  Although Turner 
doesn’t elucidate his criteria for ‘success’ or specify the boundaries for entering 
consciousness, this view of the operation of dual processes of compression and 
decompression, underlying the emergence of complex symbols and art forms, is 
remarkably similar to the view of poetry developed in Chapter 7 from the work of Matte 
Blanco.  
Like the bi-logical approach, double-scope integration proposes the need for two 
distinct cognitive processes working in combination to achieve emergent symbolic 
form.  Compression and decompression parallel the processes of identity and 
differentiation previously described in relation to poetry.  Both approaches imply the 
potential for considerable variability in emergent forms.  I have argued that poetry 
reflects a particularly concentrated and simultaneous operation of both identity and 
difference in language.  Matte Blanco’s theory thus offers an account for how effective 
poetry draws us close to felt emotional experience due to the nature and operation of 
symmetric logic.  Work within the field of embodied cognition enables this to be traced 
to a somatic level by highlighting the fundamental role of sensorimotor experience in 
conceptual and symbolic development. 
8.3 Changes in my embodied experience 
8.3.1 Sensory play 
Returning to Burkitt (1999), quoted above, it could be argued that by letting go of the 
conscious intention to write poetry, and following the impulse to engage in other forms 
of creativity activity, I was allowing the preverbal intentionality of the body greater 
freedom to operate.  The reduction in self-conscious thought, and the expanded scope 
for improvised action and embodied imagination, are congruent with this feeling like 
play.  The willingness to follow a ‘felt impulse’ without a conscious objective seems 
critical here.  This only seemed possible after the repeated failure of my conscious 
intentions and was thus associated with a sense of giving up or ‘letting go’.  It brought 
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with it a sense of relief and an increase in activity, as though I was doing what I wanted 
to do, rather than what I imagined I should. 
It also seems significant that the impulse led me into multisensory modes of creative 
activity rather than into only one domain.  Turner (2006) admits that the question of 
precisely how the creative blending characteristic of the arts operates is daunting, but he 
suggests that synaesthesia may be one important element.  Sensory modalities normally 
appear separate; this may reflect a highly differentiated conscious relation to sensation 
that can obscure recognition of more integrated and cross-modal forms of sensory 
experience.  As Kristeva (1984) and more recently Charles (2001) have argued, it is 
from the latter kind of experience that lively artistic and poetic forms typically appear to 
emerge.  Poems combine auditory, rhythmic and visual elements within a combined 
form that doesn’t depend on the separation of these elements for its effect.  The 
elements can be distinguished by critical analysis, but this is secondary to the integrated 
effect of the poem.   
My impulse to engage in different modalities of sensory activity arose spontaneously.  
Thus, although the value of this process may have been implicitly known or intuited, it 
was followed in an unpremeditated and trusting manner: by following a series of felt 
impulses and with no conscious plan, even the plan to follow my impulses.  I was 
familiar with the mantra “trust the process” (S. McNiff, 1998b) but not how that might 
mean trust the body, or what that felt like in practice, particularly concerning self-
experience and how poetry could be written.  These discoveries will be examined 
further below and in Chapter 9.  Prior to this, some consideration needs to be given to 
the steps that took me from activity in nonverbal media towards the writing of poetry. 
8.3.2 ‘Lowering’ standards 
The return to an engagement with writing poetry was initiated by reading Stafford’s 
(1978) recommendation about the need to lower standards.  Stafford’s advice has been 
greeted with both appreciation and concern (Andrews, 1995).  The suggestion to lower 
standards can be seen as an injunction to blatantly disregard quality and craftsmanship.  
Poetry often involves laborious care spent drafting and re-drafting work, over long 
periods.  However, Stafford is addressing himself to the poet who is unproductive and 
as such spoke directly to me.  His relaxed but prolific approach to writing also 
connected with my experience of painting, movement and musical activity, where I had 
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been very productive without concern about standards or quality.  Most important, this 
activity had felt engaging and enjoyable, unlike my increasingly aversive struggles with 
writing poetry. 
 The significance of ‘standards’ as a block to my writing can obviously be connected to 
the context of the work as discussed in Chapter 7.  However, the question remains as to 
what standards I needed to lower.  It is apparent to me, in hindsight, that I did have 
standards when I resumed writing, but that these were markedly different from those 
that I previously prioritised.  The standards that I lowered concerned the assumed 
evaluation of other people and the immediate objective qualities of what I wrote.  
However, in their place was a raised level of sensitivity to my feelings and sensations 
about what was emerging on the page.  In effect, I moved from prioritising a third 
person objective standard about what I wrote, towards a more subjective standard 
concerning my experience of what I wrote. 
The relevance of this shift in the subjective quality of my experience will be examined 
further shortly.  At this point, the shift in attention from objective standards towards felt 
experience can be taken as supporting the importance of a more embodied mode of 
cognition when writing poetry.  My attempts to break out of my impasse by learning 
more about poetry had not proved successful.  This more objective stance, while it may 
have informed what emerged and been necessary to its later crafting, was not helpful to 
the production of meaningful or lively writing.  It is likely to favour a more asymmetric 
mode of cognition, which, I have proposed, is precisely what contributed to my 
difficulties.  By favouring attention to the immediate felt experience of writing I found a 
means of access to a more integrative and bodily-informed process of composition.39   
8.3.3    Free-lining 
My re-engagement with poetry was aided by my adoption of a strategy of free-lining 
that contributed directly to the nature of the writing produced.  Normal rules of free-
writing eschew concern with grammar, spelling or punctuation.  Beside these principles, 
I introduced the basis of verse into this otherwise open form by structuring the writing 
in lines.  No conscious thought was given to line length, this was determined by the 
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 I have subsequently found bodily-informed methods of generative writing advocated by Metcalf & 
Simon (2002) and Perl (2004).  
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rhythmic feel of the lines as they emerged, as were occasional breaks between blocks of 
lines into stanza-like patterns.  Whereas the shift in attention towards felt or embodied 
experience when writing could be seen as favouring greater access to a symmetric mode 
of cognition, the use of lines may have provided greater scope for patterns of identity 
and differentiation to find a form in the structure of the writing.  In other words, the use 
of lines provided a critical hook for the application of both symmetric and asymmetric 
forms of thinking, with minimal need for conscious reflection.   
8.4 Self-experience 
8.4.1 Changes in self-experience 
The framework developed to this point emphasises the difficulties and changes that I 
experienced with writing from the perspective of the conscious and unconscious 
cognitive processes involved.  Accompanying this shift was a qualitative change in self-
experience.  During the period in which my efforts to write poetry were obstructed I had 
become increasingly self-conscious.  I realised I was stuck and felt frustrated by the 
fruitlessness of my efforts.  When I reflected on this, it was as if I functioned according 
to the implicit model of the writing process depicted in Figure 6.1.  I was a distinct 
conscious agent trying to access and express some form of separately existing 
experience.  This sense of myself as a conscious agent was largely divorced from the 
body – it was as if I existed inside my head and had a body.  I also had an unconscious 
store of experience that influenced me but was not me.  My efforts were accompanied 
by a distinct sense of separation and objectification that left me feeling detached and 
alienated from the poetry I attempted to write.  Ultimately, being unable to write felt 
shameful, it seemed to point to a lack, or deficiency of will, that undermined what I took 
myself to be.   
Abandoning the willed effort to write poetry brought a feeling of relief and 
emancipation.  My sense of discrete agency gave way to the momentum of 
spontaneously arising feelings and impulses.  It was as if another source of action had 
now taken centre stage.  When I resumed writing, my orientation had shifted from a 
predominantly detached perspective to one rooted in my immediate experience of the 
process of writing.  This reflected not only a new sensibility but also a different quality 
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of self-experience: immersion in experience and what was currently present took 
priority over my sense of self in time. 
One of the consequences of these changes was to significantly reduce the ‘objectifying 
process’ that I had experienced with respect to both my writing and myself.  It was not 
that I did not think about myself as a person in time, or my writing as separate from me, 
but I was now capable of taking this perspective flexibly as opposed to feeling 
exclusively identified with it when writing.  At a fundamental level the idea of having a 
self, or being a particular self, gave way to a more flexible and inclusive experience that 
contained changing bodily sensations and thought, within a broad and indeterminate 
state of simply being aware. 
8.4.2 Levels of self-experience and consciousness 
The pattern of my self-experience highlights the role of embodied experience and a 
changed sense of self-awareness when writing.  This can be illuminated through 
consideration of Damasio’s (1999) neurologically based account of different levels of 
self-experience arising in conjunction with the emergence of ‘core’ and ‘extended’ 
consciousness.  Damasio’s understanding of consciousness is rooted in the body and in 
felt experience.  He proposes that there is a form of core consciousness that is always 
located transiently in the present and that is mediated by the state of the physical 
organism.  In addition he proposes the existence of an extended consciousness that, with 
the aid of memory, is the source of the autobiographical sense we have of our identity.   
Damasio’s core consciousness derives from neural patterns that give rise to mental 
images in different sensory modalities. These images arise continuously and can serve 
to represent the current state of the organism together with images relating to external 
and internal ‘objects’ of attention.  The arising of a core self-consciousness is 
particularly associated with neural patterns that provide information about the changing 
state of the organism in relation to these objects.  Damasio refers to the continuous 
neural representation of the state of the organism as the ‘proto-self’.  As this changes 
there arises a “subtle image of knowing, the feeling essence of our self”, which he calls 
the core self (Damasio, 1999, p. 171). 
A significant aspect of core consciousness is its pulsating recurrence; although this is 
always in the present, it gives rise to an impression of continuity.  Extended 
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consciousness and the autobiographical self are dependent on the elaboration of this 
continuity of consciousness by language and memory, so that consciousness can be 
displaced from the present moment and extended over time.  Damasio thus locates the 
roots of conscious self-awareness in bodily feeling, and sees language-dependent 
models of consciousness and self as applicable only to the operation of this extended 
field of consciousness. 
Damasio’s model has its critics but is intuitively compelling and increasingly 
influential.40  It suggests how a change in self-experience might occur through attention 
to immediate bodily feeling as opposed to reflexive thought.  For example it would 
predict that immersion in bodily experience should lead towards a greater sense of being 
in the present moment, which is precisely what I experienced.  Prior to that I felt more 
narrowly identified with an idea or image of self that was trying to manipulate 
experience.  In Damasio’s terms, a sense of self associated with extended consciousness 
prevailed over a more primary or core sense of self.   
8.4.3 Self-experience, consciousness and bi-logic 
Damasio’s model attempts to integrate aspects of self-experience (core and 
autobiographical) with emergent levels of consciousness (core and extended).  From the 
perspective of a bi-logical view of consciousness, these should exhibit different patterns 
of symmetric and asymmetric functioning.  Extended consciousness would be expected 
to develop in the direction of increasing asymmetry, based on the discriminative use of 
memory and language.  The problem with increasing asymmetry is that it could lead to 
fragmentation, and even disintegration, of coherent thought, unless balanced by strong 
and consistent forms of identification or symmetry.  A fundamental way this could 
potentially happen is through an increasing symmetrization of self-experience as 
extended consciousness develops.  Thus ‘autobiographical’ forms of self-experience 
could emerge through recognition, and identification with, ideas or images of a ‘self’ 
that can be remembered and projected over time and place.  This could ultimately be 
experienced as a sense of self that has a separate and enduring identity.  Such a sense of 
self depends on core consciousness, but moves identification away from the immediate 
state of the body in relation to its current environment, towards a more abstracted form 
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of identification.  In keeping with bi-logic, this identification would be felt and might 
even seem ‘absolute’, in that strong symmetrizations are experienced as qualities of 
being.   
The area of the autobiographical self is often understood in terms of the linguistic and  
social construction of identity, however, such identities are often  tenaciously held and 
surprisingly resistant to change or deconstruction.  From the above analysis, this could 
arise from the need for an underlying sense of self that provides a felt continuity of 
being and identity in an increasingly differentiated world.  An enduring sense of self 
appears crucial to social and personal development and may enable useful ‘illusions’, 
such as the experience of conscious will discussed in Chapter 7 (Wegner, 2002).  It is 
also a plausible explanation for my strong implicit sense, held against intellectual 
conviction, of being a conscious agent somehow separate from both my body and 
experience. 
If this speculative analysis is correct, we might expect corroboration from studies of 
how the self is presented or determined linguistically.  But before examining this, it is 
worth noticing an important reason for not simplistically equating Damasio’s notion of 
the core self with ‘the body’41, as if the body is ‘the self’, as opposed to being the source 
of this form of self-experience.  Core consciousness depends upon making certain 
neural patterns into ‘objects’ of experience against the background of a change in other 
neural patterns representing the state of the organism.  However, both of these sets of 
neural patterns arise in the same organism.  When neural patterns reflect an ‘object’ in 
the external environment the changing state of the organism may suggest a self that can 
be identified with the body, as opposed to the object in the environment.  However, 
neural patterns directly reflecting aspects of the body can also be taken as objects of 
experience.  For example, I can observe my hand, listen to my heartbeat, or experience a 
headache, in a manner that distinguishes them from what I feel as my self.   
Consciousness in Damasio’s scheme is inseparable from the emergence of self-
consciousness, it consists of a fundamental and changing distinction between what has 
the feeling of being ‘self’, and what has the feeling of being something ‘other’ that is 
known by the self through changes in the organism.  
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 Meaning the physical organism including the brain. 
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8.4.4 The subject-self schema 
To see whether identification with an abstracted notion of self is reflected in language, 
we can return to the study of metaphor in cognitive linguistics.  Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999) have examined metaphors used in descriptions of the self and conclude, from 
their use of language, that people consistently experience themselves in terms of a 
metaphoric split between a subject and one or more selves.  They describe this as a 
SUBJECT-SELF schema. 
The Subject is the locus of consciousness, subjective experience, reason, will and our 
“essence,” everything that makes us uniquely who we are.  There is at least one Self 
and possibly more.  The Selves consist of everything else about us – our bodies, our 
social roles, our histories, and so on.  (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 268) 
They map the basic SUBJECT-SELF schema as follows: 
A Person   Æ The Subject 
A Person, Thing, or Place Æ The Self 
A Relationship  Æ The Subject-Self Relationship 
This linguistic structure of self-experience is compatible with Damasio’s notions of 
extended consciousness and personhood.  However, alongside the idea of an 
autobiographical self (or selves), the indeterminate and inclusive notion of being a 
‘subject’ is emphasised.  Thus the duality of self-experience in Damasio’s core 
consciousness is preserved and extended.  Alongside the felt discrimination between 
what is self and what is other, we have a linguistic sense of ourselves as both 
experiencing subjects and as potential objects of experience.   
Lakoff & Johnson point out that the subject in the SUBJECT-SELF schema:  “…by its 
nature, exists only in the present.”42 (p. 269)  Thus the experiencing subject is rooted, 
like Damasio’s core consciousness, in the immediate present, unlike the 
autobiographical self that extends over time.  However, it is not defined in terms of 
specific bodily experiences, but as an abstract locus or ‘essence’ that we reference 
ourselves by.  The SUBJECT-SELF schema thus supports identification with an abstract 
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or metaphorical subject rather than embodied experience.  In such a state it may be 
experientially true to say that “I feel out of touch with myself”, even though “I” must be 
present to make such a statement.  I don’t presently feel in touch with myself as a 
differentiation has arisen between my embodied experience and the sense of being 
identified with a subject who is aware of it.  Indeed, Lakoff & Johnson argue that the 
schema reveals a fundamental propensity to “experience ourselves as split” (p. 269). 
The SUBJECT-SELF schema corresponds with my sense of feeling like a separate 
agent divorced from experience, and my tendency to objectify myself through my 
conscious efforts to write poetry.   In fact, it can be associated with a variety of specific 
patterns concerning self-experience and writing poetry that arose in my investigation.  
For example the ‘self’ can be treated as a physical object that needs external effort to 
move, as in ‘I forced myself to write’.  Alternatively the self can be treated as a 
container as in ‘I looked for experience within myself’.  As Slingerland (2003) points 
out, such expressions are metaphoric rather than literally or ontologically true.  “There 
is no ‘me’ that is literally separate from ‘I’ that can be forced to do something” (p. 28), 
or an actual container of inner experience.  However, this is how self-experience might 
be structured, either helpfully or unhelpfully.  In my case the effortful and self-
conscious attempt to make myself write poetry was unproductive, as was the idea of 
accessing an inner container of experience.  Both seemed to reflect a sense of being 
separate from my experience combined with an assumption of excessive conscious 
control over the process of writing. 
The changes that occurred can also be considered from this perspective, particularly my 
experience of abandoning my efforts and then breaking through into productive writing 
after a long struggle.  Slingerland (2003) explores this kind experience in his inquiry 
into the traditional Taoist teaching of Wu Wei or ‘effortless action’.  He uses the 
framework of conceptual metaphor to illustrate how this ideal results in what feels like a 
paradoxical injunction to act without any effort or attempt to do so.  The basic 
SUBJECT-SELF schema is present in the language of traditional Chinese texts in a 
similar way to its occurrence in English.  Slingerland sees the horn of the dilemma 
posed by Wu Wei as resting on the metaphorical split between the subject as agent and 
the self.  It is only by giving up the sense of acting from an isolated source that the 
individual can enter a state of flow, or the Tao.  However, from the perspective of the 
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SUBJECT, it can appear incomprehensible to act without effort or intention, so the 
achievement of this is problematic, and may involve the paradoxical experience of 
surrender or giving up.  
8.4.5 The rhythm of self-experience 
The SUBJECT-SELF schema illustrates the way that talk about the self contains but 
often confounds what we experience as a duality: on one hand the subjective sense of ‘I’ 
that observes and on the other, the sense of ‘me’ as an object that can be observed.43 
The ‘I’ seems a given that is impossible to reflexively penetrate while the ‘me’ is an 
ever-changing emergent construction derived from experience and usually shaped by 
the body. One is self as subject, the other self as object.  This duality can be elaborated 
many ways, but in relation to my experience the observations of Bollas on what could 
be called the rhythm of self-experience are pertinent.  Bollas formulates this through the 
idea of simple and complex selves: 
The concept of self experiencing is ironic, as its referential ambiguity (does it mean 
the self that experiences or the experiencing of our self?) is strangely true to the 
complexity of being human.  All self experiencing involves this split, which can be 
described as a division between ourselves as simple selves (when we are immersed in 
desired or overlooked experience) and ourselves as complex selves (when we think 
about experience).  (Bollas, 1993, p. 27) 
Bollas sees this division as enabling an oscillation in the way any activity is experienced 
in relation to the self: 
The simple experiencing self and the complex reflecting self enable the person to 
process life according to different yet interdependent modes of engagement: one 
immersive, the other reflective.  (Bollas, 1993, p. 15) 
Life is a cycle of reciprocal transformations from complex to simple self, from 
intrapsychic dialogues and thoughtfulness (complex states) to a seeming suspension of 
such internal density as we yield to an occasion in which we become a particle 
participant.  (Bollas, 1993, p. 17) 
This suggests that self-experience changes and develops through a complex interplay 
between reflection on and immersion in experience of various kinds.  Self-experience is 
thus not experience of being a static thing called the self, but the elaboration of a vast 
potential for experience given through embodiment in the world.  For Bollas, it is not an 
experience so much as a texturing of experience, which can be creatively developed and 
changed through our active participation with things in the ‘object’ world.  It may range 
from the isolated experience of ‘being depressed’, to the mystical experience of ‘being 
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at one’.  In Bollas’ terms the ‘simple self’ mode would enter these states of experience, 
whereas the ‘complex self’ mode would involve reflection on them. 
Bollas also talks at some length about the idea of a unique personal idiom, which is his 
development of Winnicott’s (1991) idea of the ‘true self’.  He does not argue that there 
is an essential self, but that there is an endogenous core to each individual which has its 
own unique aesthetic, partly determined by inheritance and partly by very early 
experience.  This idiom is in some ways incommunicable but, according to Bollas, can 
realize itself through our object choices.  It may be experienced as having a quality of 
personal authenticity and recognizable pattern, comparable perhaps to someone ‘finding 
their voice’ in writing.  In fact, Bollas gives as an example our ability to recognise the 
unique style or quality of a familiar poet’s writing solely from the text of their poems 
(Bollas, 2002, p. 27).  This implies the need for a degree of autonomy in creative work, 
analogous to my experience of a shift in standards from those ‘I’ tried to impose, to 
those arising in the act of creative activity itself. 
The key points of this in relation to my own experience are: that self-experience can 
develop and change through a dialectical interplay with immersion in experience and a 
more detached quality of awareness, and that there is a quality in this that may have 
important idiomatic and creative significance.  Bollas suggests that this can only be 
realised through our choice and use of objects.  My experience was that this ‘use’ first 
required some form of embodied action that took place without conscious intention.  It 
felt like giving up effort and choice and entering into a self-sustaining action.  It was 
only after this that a fluid sense of movement, between a detached quality of awareness 
and an immersion in experience, appeared in my writing. 
8.5 The self in relation 
8.5.1 Disclosure and deadness 
The analysis to this point has focused on the processes involved in moving from an 
experience of being blocked to a more productive and engaged mode of writing.  
However, this was followed by a significant further development after sharing some of 
my uncrafted writing in supervision.   It is striking that this, like my move into other 
media, occurred in an impulsive and unplanned way.  What followed, although perhaps 
foreshadowed by my uneasiness about showing the work, was completely unexpected.  
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Initially a profound and lingering sense of deadness emerged.  This involved the feeling 
that there was little or no source of personal agency – just responses that arose to 
whatever was taking place outside of me.  Following a gesture of acceptance towards 
this experience, I enjoyed a revitalised but subtly changed sense of personal initiative.  
This enabled my writing to proceed again, and to be crafted for sharing in workshops 
and public readings. 
The disclosure of my work was a significant event that I experienced as critical to the 
subsequent return to and further development of my writing.  What marks the 
experience is that it moved my uncrafted ‘poetic’ writing from a private first-person 
domain into a shared or relational context.  None of the ideas so far employed to explore 
the changes that I experienced emphasise the relational aspects of self-experience.  
However, the psychoanalytic framework underlying the work of both Matte Blanco and 
Bollas is fundamentally relational in nature.  Indeed, the emphasis in recent 
psychoanalytic theory has been increasingly towards a relational and inter-subjective 
understanding of therapeutic change (Leiper & Maltby, 2004).  
The period of activity that produced the writing that I shared in supervision took place 
over a summer period when I was removed from the university and the writing groups 
that I participated in.  My immersion in this writing may have been facilitated by a 
relative freedom from concern about the perspective of other people.  Sharing the work 
in supervision abruptly brought both it and myself back into the gaze of an ‘other’.  
Although I felt the writing was viewed with an attitude of interest and acceptance, my 
subsequent reaction might suggest that there was something negative about the 
experience.  I do not believe it was a negative reaction in the sense of a concern about 
what Celia might think, or a state of negative appraisal or ‘depressed’ perception of my 
work or myself.  It was a more fundamental feeling that in some important respect I did 
not exist at all, a feeling I could best characterise as a state of absence or deadness.  In 
hindsight, the negative, in the sense of painful or confusing aspect of the experience, 
was mostly to do with my subtle resistance to it.  It was as if I should not feel this way – 
this was not normal.  When I allowed it fully, it simply dissolved and I felt entirely 
‘normal’ again, albeit with a feeling of having been vitally changed by this act of 
acceptance. 
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8.5.2 Vitality and compliance 
My experience of solitary writing over the summer period could be viewed in terms of 
Winnicott’s (1958) observations about the important developmental step of  infants 
enjoying solitary play.  In this early situation the other isn’t totally absent, but is a non-
interfering presence.  The attuned mother instinctively knows when to step in and when 
not to interfere, thus enabling the infant the room to develop in its own way, secure in 
the presence of a needed other but not required to excessively adapt or comply with 
their needs.  In this way the infant can be safely immersed in its own experience rather 
than having to be vigilant to the requirements or expectations of another.  Herein lies the 
infant’s elaboration of its own ‘idiom’ in Bollas’ terms, or core self-experience, using 
the framework proposed by Damasio.   
Winnicott identified many difficulties in adult life with the development of an overly 
adapted and compliant self, which could act as a buffer between core idiomatic 
experience and the demands of an external environment that has been experienced as 
intrusive.   This image or sense of self may become a feature of an individual’s 
recurring self-experience, reflecting the way they need to be in relation to others based 
on past experience.  However, it is a more objectively than subjectively formed sense of 
self, in that it is heavily determined by the anticipated reactions and perspectives of 
other people.  If isolated from a more direct and embodied sense of vitality, it could 
give rise to feelings of deadness or even futility.   
8.5.3 Self-identification and absence 
Eigen (2004) has explored the experience of deadness, which he thinks is a significant 
aspect of the self-experience of people seeking analysis who otherwise function 
effectively and successfully in the world.  He relates this to both Winnicott’s ideas and 
the work of Bion, Freud and Klein. 
There are many variations of psychic deadness.  For some people deadness does not 
consume much psychic space.  It is a circumscribed counter-pole or sub-theme in a 
fuller, richer existence.  It comes and goes and nags in the background.  At times it 
becomes prepossessing, and one wonders, with a chill, what one would do if it 
swallowed existence, if it became all there was.  One waits for it to fade and usually it 
does.  It moves along with a variety of moods and states of being.  (Eigen, 2004, p. 3) 
Eigen sees the experience of deadness as part of the ongoing experience of being rather 
than as a pathological state.  In fact, the implication is that the avoidance of the 
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experience may represent more of a problem than the experience per se.  Thus manic 
activity, or self-soothing through some form of object use, may sustain a sense of 
liveliness in an otherwise superficial or adaptive self, whereas tolerating the deadness 
that can accompany identification with this form of self can lead to renewed contact 
with a more vital core.  He indicates that in creative work and creative living there may 
need to be movement between alivening and deadening experiences.  He suggests that: 
“What emerges is not an end to deadness, but a new and better movement between 
aliveness and deadness, a rhythm or oscillation.” (Eigen, 2004, p. xvi) 
Eigen’s argument suggests that deadness may in part be an inevitable accompaniment to 
a certain form of self-identification.  That aspect of the sense of self that is based on 
adaptation to others, or being-for-others in Sartre’s terms, is a highly objectified form of 
self.  It is some thing.  However, drawing on Bion, Eigen indicates how treating the 
psyche like a thing effectively kills it (2004, p. 45).  Hence in Bion’s enigmatic writings 
we find the emergence of a counter-pole: the idea of a ‘no-thing’ at the heart of psychic 
life, sometimes represented by ‘O’, the ineffable or infinite.  This guards against any 
form of reduction or literalism in our experience of self but also points to an absence, an 
absence of any thing at the core of self.  Thus, the feeling of deadness associated with 
an objectified self may also be accompanied by the feeling of absence of any internal 
entity called self, because there is no such objective thing – only the unfathomable 
continuous arising of the awareness of living experience. 
Winnicott shows a similar concern with the tension between the realms of objectivity 
and subjectivity.  While pure subjectivity leaves one potentially isolated in a domain 
disconnected from the minds of others, pure objectivity risks leaving one as only an 
object of experience.  Eigen suggests that Winnicott was searching for a way of 
formulating “the sort of experiencing that felt free” (2004, p. 75).  Essentially a form of 
experiencing that broke the boundaries of objective-subjective, or inner-outer, and 
allows for a quality of being that remains both connected to the world and that enables 
one to feel true and alive.  This requires that the falseness of any fixed external identity 
be acknowledged along with the absence of a permanent internal self that has some 
objective status.  As Eigen observes (p. 73), when one is most alive it is not possible to 
locate experience as simply inside or outside, self-experience is continually unfolding 
or, as Winnicott might say, in a process of becoming. 
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My experience of writing prior to showing my work had the quality of a free immersion 
in experience.  It fits well with Eigen’s description of play or transitional experiencing: 
One does not have to irritably reach after facts or meaning or anything else at all.  One 
can just be and grow into and out of just being.  One can be missing.  The great secret 
of being missing, which is so taboo, can be experienced.  One can relax into not being 
there and stop pretending. One can stop forcing oneself this way or that.  The 
possibility of being truly alive – free – in the presence of another person emerges. 
(Eigen, 2004, p. 79)  
However, my writing did not truly come into the presence of another person until it was 
shown in supervision.  Prior to that, as an adult at play, a sense of the other may have 
been present in mind but not in actuality.  At this point my simple immersive experience 
of ‘having gone missing’ might have been complicated by the perception of my work, 
and myself, by a tangible and significant other.  Thus I could have been suddenly 
returned to a more objective mode of self-perception, and become abruptly self-
conscious again.  However, my perception was also directed to work produced during a 
period of immersion or absence.  It is possible to imagine that my objectifying gaze 
could not then encounter or reconstruct the usual sense of myself.  What I may have 
encountered at that point was the direct experience of absence.  From the perspective of 
a self-objectifying awareness this might have been experienced, as suggested by Eigen, 
as a feeling of deadness.  The previous immersed experiencing of aliveness thus 
effectively being killed by an objectifying gaze.   
8.5.4 The gesture of acceptance 
One of the key indicators of this sense of absence was the lack of any feeling of 
personal agency.  I could act effectively but not on my own initiative.  I simply 
responded, perfectly adequately, to what needed doing; there was just no sense of ‘me’ 
initiating it.  The abandonment of personal control and conscious intention had been a 
key feature of my experience over the summer.  However, this was accompanied by a 
strong sense of following some kind of embodied impulse or feeling.  I was immersed in 
this experience and it felt as if it had some intentionality or agency of its own.   My 
experience after sharing the work was that I had lost contact with that source of 
direction.  
The experience of deadness did not feel ‘normal’ and prompted speculation about what 
might be wrong with me.  There was a sense I should not feel this way and that it would 
be concerning for others to know how I felt.  Thus, there was a wish to be free of it.  
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However, there was also a contrasting intuition that this was something to be 
experienced rather than avoided.  I believe this might be critical to the capacity of such 
an experience to be helpful and transformative rather than lead to further difficulties.  
Eigen describes the tendency to reject experience in a particularly helpful way: 
I-feeling tends to identify with pleasure and reject pain.  One tries to set pain outside 
ones boundaries: I try to exclude pain from myself.  Pain may be the most intimate 
aspect of experience but I make believe it is a stranger.  (Eigen, 2004, p. 5) 
In addition, he highlights the tendency that can arise to try and control experience rather 
than suffer it.  By staying with the experience I eventually reached a point where I made 
a conscious movement of ‘total’ acceptance.  I no longer wished to offer any resistance 
to the experience.  It was from this point that my sense of aliveness returned.  In Eigen’s 
terms a critical movement or oscillation had taken place and a new rhythm was 
established.  I was no longer simply lost in the pleasurable immersive experience of 
creative activity, but from then on was also able to return to my work in a more 
objective and critical way.  I could also move more freely between my own subjective 
experience and the imagined perspective of others, as I began to entertain the thought of 
future readers. 
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9   Dimensions of Attention and Identity 
In Chapter 8, I argued that my experience of obstruction and breakthrough in writing 
poetry, could be illuminated by integrating a bi-logical analysis of embodied cognition 
and poetry with the embodied, linguistic and relational foundations of self-experience.  
In this chapter I will examine how my writing of poetry changed, following the critical 
midpoint of my investigation, by examining five features that characterise my changed 
process of writing.  I will attempt to elucidate how this altered approach to writing is 
connected to a more flexible modulation of attention, and how this attentional flexibility 
may be intrinsically related to modifications in self-experience.  
9.1 A changed process of writing 
One of the most unexpected things about the changes in self-experience that I 
encountered during the study was that they did not stem from the content of my writing, 
but were connected to a change in my ability to write at all in a personally satisfying 
way.  Although the poetry produced contained corroborative personal themes, these 
seemed to follow, rather than determine, the adjustments that took place in my ways of 
working.   
The contrasting models presented in Chapter 6, of my sense of self and the writing 
process,44 attempted to capture and integrate the crucial changes that took place in my 
experience of writing poetry during the first four years of the study.  These included a 
shift from the sense of being a separate and self-conscious agent, to a more fluid sense 
of being embedded in and aware of different levels of interacting experience arising in 
the act of writing.  This involved a greater sensitivity to felt bodily experience and 
imagery, alongside and in co-ordination with the formulation of words, both in the mind 
and on the page.  The boundaries between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience became more 
fluid, and all experience seemed to be unfolding more in the present. 
Since that time, I have had further opportunity to refine my observations of the quality 
of this activity and its links to the nature of my experience in other contexts.  I have 
                                                 
44
 Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
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been particularly interested in identifying and specifying the conditions, or factors, that 
are associated with undertaking the process of writing more effectively.  In other words, 
I have tried to provide myself with a practical means to understand and support my own 
process of writing poetry, and have begun to connect this to other forms of creative 
work and personal activity.   
It has proved quite daunting to ‘unpack’ what is a complex, intangible and changing 
configuration of processes.  However, I found that a useful check on the utility of an 
observation was whether I could draw on it helpfully when writing, or not.  Thus, based 
on my earlier analysis and continued observations, I have identified five features that 
seem to contribute most to my changed approach to writing poetry.  These are presented 
in Table 9.1.   
Table 9.1   Features of my changed process of writing  
 
1. The willingness to surrender conscious intention and to follow unconscious 
intentionality. 
2. The flexibility to widen and modulate the nature of my attentional focus. 
3. The use of images as a bridge between embodied experience and poetic formulation. 
4. The following of cyclical movements of immersion and differentiation with regard 
to experience.  
5. The acceptance of fluid changes in self-experience associated with movements of 
attention and awareness. 
 
Although these features are distinguished for analysis, they are not separate ‘steps’ but 
form part of an integrated process.  Table 9.1 thus provides a framework to help 
structure and synthesize this chapter’s examination of how my changed process of 
writing related to my self-experience.   
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9.2 From intention to intentionality 
9.2.1 Realms of the will 
In the analysis of my initial difficulties with writing poetry I have described the problem 
that an excessively self-conscious and deliberate intention to write created, and how 
giving up that intention was the first step towards finding my way into a meaningful 
process of writing.  Underpinning that analysis was Wegner’s (2002) empirically based 
argument that the experience of conscious intention is not in itself a prime mover of 
action, but something that is 'felt' in order to differentiate personal from external sources 
of action.  The failure of conscious intention may therefore be viewed not as a failure of 
will, but as reflecting the failure of a particular kind of action or strategy.  The 
paradoxical nature of intention can be recognised in the phenomenon of only being able 
to reach a goal by giving up the attempt to reach it, exemplified in the concept of Wu 
Wei (Shaw, 1988; Slingerland, 2003).  The result can be a relatively effortless form of 
action or activity, in contrast to strained attempts to pursue a goal in an excessively 
determined way. 
It has remained my experience that something more than a conscious intention or wilful 
effort to write a poem is required to engage successfully in the process of writing.  This 
does not mean that no effort or application is required, particularly in the process of 
crafting the work over time, or in deepening understanding of that craft; however, 
simply willing writing does not guarantee success and can be frustrating.  Farber 
identifies will generically as that which moves action: "I understand will to be that 
category through which we examine that portion of our life which is the mover of our 
life in a direction or towards an objective in time." (Farber, 2000, p. 76)  He then 
distinguishes two realms of the will using the example of playing tennis: 
When our game is most fluid and effortless, we cannot really be said to be planning 
our shots and strategies:  if we are thinking about the game, we are not aware of 
thinking; though will is involved in our shots and maneuvers, we cannot be said to be 
aware of will itself.  We are, so to speak, of a piece - mind and body seamlessly and 
unselfconsciously joined in a totality.  Will is so wedded to our faculties, our 
perceptions, our motor possibilities that it may be said to be unconscious in this first 
realm.  It is only after the fact, retrospectively, that we can infer the place of will, 
thought, footwork, and other components.  Now let us assume that because of our 
opponent or ourselves our game goes badly, requiring us to assess our failure.  "It is 
the forehand that's at fault", we say.  "Too slow and too much topspin."  Will, clearly, 
has become conscious, for now we will ourselves to stroke the ball differently and are 
conscious of our willing.  This ordinary state of affairs, in which will can be 
experienced consciously, I term the second realm of will.  (Farber, 2000, pp. 76-77) 
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Farber proposes that the first realm of will moves in a ‘direction’ rather than towards a 
specific object.  Direction, he argues, is "a way whose end cannot be known" (p. 78), it 
is open to different possibilities including the possibility of failure to reach any 
significant outcome.  As such, it contains a sense of freedom rather than the colouring 
of a preconceived goal.  In contrast the second realm of will corresponds to a movement 
towards a specified and conscious objective.  This is where action is deliberately 
employed to achieve a particular end, with a corresponding experience of intention or 
the conscious and sometimes effortful willing of a result.  The second realm of will is 
the more common utilitarian use of the term will but, in Farber's opinion, both realms of 
will pervade our lives. 
One aspect of the second realm of will that Farber highlights, is its limitations.  It seems 
adequate to some situations but is evidently inadequate to others.  For example, I can 
exercise an effort of will to go to bed but, as any insomniac will testify, I cannot 
consciously will falling asleep.  Similarly, I can make an effort of will to read a complex 
textbook, but understanding it is not something that I can dictate.  It usually contributes 
very little to tell someone who is confused to be clear, or someone who is in a panic to 
stay calm.  Wegner would probably argue that the efficacy of will in both realms is not 
as a primary mover, but in the second realm of will it usually appears that way, until 
that is, the failure of conscious willing becomes evident in certain situations. 
9.2.2 Action and intentionality 
My observation, which is supported by Farber's account, is that the second realm of will 
is most applicable to actions and outcomes that are discrete and specifiable.  As actions 
become more complex, multifaceted and related to indeterminate situations, they 
become less amenable to being consciously willed or successfully proceduralised.  They 
then require a continuous blending of previous experience and new possibilities in an 
integrated movement that cannot be precisely anticipated.  This is evident in learning 
some practical skills like driving a car.  Initially separate actions have to be learned and 
exercised deliberately, with frequent failures of total integration.  However, when such 
an integrative skill develops, it can take place without conscious interference and in 
many critical situations must do so to be effective.  More complex and creative activity 
can sometimes have an extended quality of being followed rather than deliberately 
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willed, which may be related to the sense of feeling 'inspired'.45  Something is simply 
taken forward, without a fixed or known objective, relying on some 'feel' or intuitive 
sense of where to go next. 
The relevance of Farber's first realm of will to my experience is the recognition of some 
intentional, but not always conscious, sense of direction in complex creative activities 
such as writing poetry.  In my experience with writing poetry, the failure of conscious 
willed effort requires giving up or relaxing conscious intention, but not the 
abandonment of a sense of intentionality.  Simply giving up means there is no further 
engagement with writing, whereas being ‘willing’ to engage in writing demands a 
certain faith in a sense of direction that does not have to be predetermined, but might 
emerge.  By intention, I mean: an aim that guides action, whereas with intentionality46 I 
mean something nearer to: the state of being formed or directed by a process that is 
intentional.   In the former the intention is an explicit and conscious goal that I aim to 
achieve; in the latter what is intentional may be conceived as being ‘unconscious’, or 
implicit in whatever action is followed or allowed to take place.  
In applying this to writing a poem, there may be a need for what Keats described as 
negative capability: "that is when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, 
doubts without any irritable reaching after fact or reason." (Keats, 1970, p. 45)  
However, my own experience is of picking-up on a sense of direction as well as 
tolerating a quality of not knowing.  This is echoed by Spender’s remark that writing a 
poem involves following something “as though it had an impulse in a certain direction” 
(Spender, 1952, p. 118).  Usually at a quite visceral level something moves the attention 
and feelings to suggest the possibility of a poem, or a movement towards one.   
I can illustrate this with an example when, following sudden heavy fall of snow in 
April, I felt a sudden urge to go outside into the garden to look more closely.  My mind 
pointed out that there were other practical things to be done, but I had a distinct and 
urgent sense of curiosity and of a passing opportunity.  Almost absent-mindedly, I 
picked up a camera as I went out and found myself trying to frame some shots of tree 
branches bent over with snow.  The thought arose that this was the stuff of haiku.  
                                                 
45
 See for example Clark (1997). 
46
 The concept of intentionality has specialised uses in philosophy but 'aboutness' and 'pointing beyond 
itself' are its generic features according to Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p. 109). 
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Returning inside, I looked at the pictures on the computer and selected one to send to a 
relative abroad, as evidence of our unseasonable weather.  I kept returning to an image 
that showed branches against the sky.  As I examined it I found myself playing with 
some words that eventually crystallised into the following haiku, which I found 
satisfying enough to send with the picture47: 
A net of branches 
cast against an open sky 
snow blossoms in spring 
 
The crucial point in this example is that I didn't have the conscious thought: 'Oh it's 
snowing, I could write a poem about this'.  I am confident that if I had, no poem would 
have been written. The poem emerged from following the movement of my attention 
and curiosity.  It demanded putting other more practical purposes aside and following an 
impulse that was not obviously about writing a poem at all, but that ultimately included 
it.  The whole experience had a spontaneous and 'creative' quality, but it also involved 
the sense of a directed movement – the physical act of going outside and bringing my 
attention closer to both the fallen snow and my excited response to it. 
It is notable that the origins of the word intention are from the Latin intendere meaning: 
‘turning attention to’ or ‘stretching out towards’ (Barnhart, 1988, p. 535). The current 
sense of having a ‘purpose or plan’ developed later.  Intentionality, as I am using it, 
reflects this earlier meaning, in that to follow something requires attention to move in a 
flexible and responsive way rather than be focused on a particular action or outcome.   
9.3 A wider and more flexible attentional focus 
9.3.1 Varieties of attentional focus 
Although attention has been the subject of extensive study in psychology, it has always 
proved an elusive concept to adequately distinguish and define.  William James 
proposed one of the earliest definitions according to what he saw as the ‘common’ 
understanding: 
                                                 
47
 A copy of the picture is reproduced in Appendix VI. 
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Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains 
of thought. […] it implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively 
with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, 
scatterbrained state.  (James, 1890, p. 403)  
This emphasises the quality of ‘focus’ and illustrates one way that this can operate: to 
selectively attend to one thing rather than others with adequate concentration.  However, 
this contrasts a useful state of selective focus with an apparently undesirable state of 
confusion and disorder.  In practice the ‘focus’ of attention can vary in many ways, the 
value of which depends more on the situation than the state of attention per se.  For 
example, when performing different tasks, it is possible to recognise changes in the 
breadth of focus, the intensity of focus, the stability or continuity of focus, and the 
flexibility of focus.  Indeed, as Styles (2006) points out, attention is probably not a 
single entity at all, but the consequence of a number of interrelated and context 
dependent processes. 
9.3.2 Attention and my experience of writing poetry 
My initial difficulty with writing poetry was accompanied by a narrowing of attention 
when I tried to write.  I would often attempt to concentrate on the idea for a poem and 
how it might be written.  Similarly, after periods of free-writing, I can recall focusing 
closely on the writing produced to look for material to shape into a poem.  What 
characterised this attention was a focus on thoughts, words, and possible poetic forms, 
to the exclusion of other aspects of available experience.  For example, I paid little 
attention to bodily sensations, my surroundings, irrelevant background thoughts or 
uninvited mental images.  This narrow and exclusive focus was often highly 
concentrated and effortful but, as has been documented, failed to lead to satisfying 
work. 
My experience of releasing some of my conscious and premeditated efforts to write was 
that it allowed a distinct relaxing and expansion of my attention.  This initially 
supported an immersion in nonverbal sensory activities, but ultimately became part of 
how the process of writing poetry itself was experienced.  It felt a bit like ‘zooming 
back’ so more of my presently available experience could enter the picture.  With a 
wider field of attention it became possible to 'scan' many simultaneously arising 
experiences.  These could be thoughts, bodily sensations, external stimuli, mental 
images and so on.  While resting in such a wide focus of attention, it is possible to 
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highlight one area of experience a little by bringing it temporarily more into the 
foreground of attention, while simultaneously retaining some appreciation of another 
experience in the background of awareness.  This figure-ground relation can then be 
reversed.  A visual illustration of this would be to hold in awareness peripheral as well 
as central features of the visual field.  To do so requires a relaxing of the eyes and a 
softening of focus.  In my experience, objects in the visual field then feel less 'grasped' 
by the mind and more present as an integral part of the entire scene.  This quality of 
different experiences being connected, or belonging together, seemed important to my 
improved ability to develop a satisfying and integrated poetic form. 
9.3.3 Models of creative and disordered attention 
My recognition of the phenomenon of wide or open attention dawned on me with the 
vividness of an original discovery, but I soon remembered that something very similar 
had already been well-described by Marion Milner as: “two ways of looking”.  She had 
also explicitly connected the shift from narrow to wide attention with the abandonment 
of conscious purposes: 
Wide attention. – The second way of perceiving seemed to occur when the 
questioning purposes were held in leash.  Then, since one wanted nothing, there was 
no need to select one item to look at rather than another, so it became possible to look 
at the whole at once.  To attend to something and yet want nothing from it, these 
seemed essentials of the second way of perceiving.  I thought that in the ordinary way 
when we want for nothing from any object or situation we ignore it.  Or if we are 
forced to attend to something which does not offer us any means of furthering our 
desires, then sheer habit makes us attend in the narrow focus way, looking at separate 
details and being bored.  But if by chance we should have discovered the knack of 
holding wide our attention, then the magic thing happens.  (Milner, 1986, p. 106)  
In my experience of writing poetry this widening of attention provides the room 
necessary to attend, not only to the totality of experience, but to the relation between 
different aspects of experience, in particular to bring into play felt bodily experience 
alongside verbal thought.  As previously discussed, this connection with embodied 
experience seems vital to the emergence of forms of language that can convey feeling as 
well as ideas effectively.  Similar to Milner, I have found that narrowly focused 
attention tends to be habitual, and is reinforced by situations that are purpose-driven and 
evaluative.  Work and education often seem to demand that we pay attention in a 
narrow way, whereas play is often associated with a wider or more relaxed focus.  In 
addition I have observed that thinking often exerts a gravitational pull into a ruminative 
and narrow focus of attention.  For example, I find it common to walk to work in the 
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morning taking in a great deal of my experience along the way, only to walk home in 
the evening oblivious to my body and surroundings, with my attention preoccupied with 
thinking over the events of the day.  Needless to say, I am more likely to form the seeds 
of a poem during the morning walk than on the way home.  In contrast, on holiday there 
can be an experience, often after an initial period of restless adjustment, of a widening 
of attention that deepens progressively in a very relaxing way.  Returning home can be 
accompanied by a startling appreciation, albeit temporary, of simple things that had 
previously gone unnoticed. 
Research has indicated that some forms of attention, particularly self-focused attention, 
are associated with emotional disorder and stress (Wells & Matthews, 1994).  Fehmi 
and Fritz (1980) have identified a specific contrast in the concomitants of narrow and 
wide attention from their research utilizing neurofeedback48.  This has led to a strategy 
of attention training described as ‘open focus training’ (Fehmi & Robbins, 2001, 2007).  
The underlying theory is that narrow forms of attention are connected to the 
evolutionary ‘fight and flight’ response and are therefore not optimal to everyday 
functioning.  Wider and more open forms of attention are associated with autonomic 
homeostasis and therefore reduced stress.  While the ability to achieve a narrow focus is 
useful, they believe it may become problematic unless it oscillates with more open 
forms of attention.  They suggest that narrower modes of attention are now reinforced in 
many contexts and, for some, have tended to become almost habitual.  This could 
contribute to the increasing incidence of attentional ‘problems’ seen in both children 
and adults. 
In the training offered to develop open forms of attention, it is striking that what has to 
be overcome is any tendency to try too hard: “…to be successful trainees must learn to 
give up their effortful orientations to the biofeedback task.”  Trainees report most 
improvement after “they had given up on the task altogether” (Fehmi & Fritz, 1980, p. 
24).  This is similar to my experience and the observations of Milner, as is the change in 
attention that they encourage: 
                                                 
48
 Neurofeedback is a form of biofeedback that uses the frequency and synchrony of the brain’s electrical 
activity from EEG monitoring. 
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To achieve the open focus state, one must allow awareness to broaden to 
simultaneously include all of those perceptible events which are salient in the nervous 
system.  (Fehmi & Fritz, 1980, p. 24) 
Milner discovered that she could assist achievement of her wider form of attention with 
various imaginative or bodily gestures, but she also found that this often met a strong 
resistance.  I will consider this further below in relation to the processes of identification 
and differentiation that can accompany movements of attention.  However, before this I 
will examine the important part that imagery came to play in my writing. 
9.4 The use of images as a ‘bridge’ 
9.4.1 Focusing on a felt sense 
Widening my attention to simultaneously arising experience allowed room for an 
attentional dance to take place between different sensations and mental contents during 
the process of writing.  Tuning in to the perception of an interesting object, or noticing a 
passing thought or memory, might evoke a sensation that, when attended to, led also to 
a word or phrase.  When words or phrases were transferred to the page they invited 
further attention, which could lead back to a new felt experience, a search for other 
words and so on in a recursive, iterative and often unexpected directions.  This process 
reflects an experience of language, or languaging in my original model (Figure 6.2), 
which links it intimately with felt experience. 
Eugene Gendlin's (1997b) process philosophy and derived practices of 'focusing' and 
'thinking at the edge' (TAT) represent a systematic attempt to formulate the way 
language can be understood not simply structurally, or in a deconstructed manner as 
self-referential, but as a “carrying-forward” of felt or embodied experience.  In Thinking 
Beyond Patterns, Gendlin (1991)chooses to use poetry and psychotherapy to illustrate 
his thesis and offers the following description of writing poetry: 
The poet stops in midst of an unfinished poem.  How to go on?  Perhaps there is only 
confusion.  No leads. 
The poet reads and rereads the lines.  Where they end something does come!  The poet 
hears (knows, reads, senses.....) what these lines need, want, demand, imply ....  What 
the next line must say is already here - in a way.  But how to say that?  What is that?  
It is .... – the poet's hand is silently rotating in air.  The rotating gesture says that. 
The poet tries this line and that.  Many lines come.  Some seem good.  The poet listens 
into what each of those lines can say.  Poets constantly listen into an unexplored 
openness – what can this new phrasing say?  A great many lines come and are 
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rejected.  The poet reads to the end of the written lines again and again.  Each time 
that .... comes.  The lines that offer themselves try to say, but do not say – that.  That 
seems to lack words, but no.  The .... is very verbal: It knows the language well 
enough to understand – and reject – all the lines that come.  The blank is not a bit pre-
verbal; it knows what must be said, and it knows that the lines that come don't say 
that. (Gendlin, 1991, p. 48) 
Gendlin has been criticised for his use of poetry and psychotherapy to exemplify his 
arguments about verbal thought precisely because they are atypical contexts of language 
use (M. Williams, 1997).  However, for my purposes his choice of poetry is apt and 
helpful.  He illustrates vividly that in searching for words to fill his trademark ellipsis 
(....), there is a felt reference that gives a quite precise sense of what will and won’t do.  
However, if an acceptable form of words is found this may immediately suggest the 
need for change in what has gone before, by drawing attention to something lacking in 
the new totality or by pointing to a new emergent (....).   
The bodily reference in Gendlin's practices of focusing and TAT is called a 'felt sense' 
and is usually characterised as a quality of bodily feeling that gives information about 
the total situation to which attention is directed.  There is a recognisable shift in this felt 
sense that confirms finding words that adequately formulate an implicit thought, 
emotional state, or other specific but unformulated experience.  Finding words thus 
carries forward the experience into language and at the same time changes it.  Gendlin 
doesn't see language as purely referential, but as a process, or activity, of experiencing.  
Although language use can be superficial and repetitive, when rooted in carrying 
forward lived experience it is potentially creative and transformative.49  
9.4.2 The generative image 
While my experience echoes Gendlin's process in the interplay I have noticed between 
verbal thought and bodily feeling within a widened attention, what I have found to be 
central to the genesis of many poems is the emergence of a generative image, or 
sometimes a sequence of images.  This imagery often has a dream-like quality but can 
also be an actual object or situation seen or pictured.  It may involve other senses but 
has mostly been visual.  The image usually arises much earlier than the stage of writing 
                                                 
49
 Gendlin’s ideas are the basis of the creative writing strategies developed by Perl (2004). 
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Gendlin uses in his example, where the form of the poem is already appearing on the 
page.  It seems to act as an embryonic source for the poem as a whole, or a significant 
aspect of it.   
The example of the haiku given previously is an example of a literal use of an image 
derived from a picture to trigger a poem.  More often the image is imaginary.  A simple 
example of this is provided in my description of the genesis of Toc tic,50 which was 
generated via the imagined picture of people walking backwards and regurgitating their 
food.  In Gendlin’s example, the ‘that’ the poet is searching for is not preverbal but 
implicitly verbal.  However, my experience is that to get to the stage of having a ‘that’ 
to find words for, I often need to find a generative image that constellates a felt 
experience prior to the search for verbal formulation.  This seems consistent with 
Gendlin’s theory of experiencing, as imagery can be also be used in focusing, however, 
it has been recognised that it may contribute to the process in a different way than words 
(Purton, 2007).  For example, Gendlin has indicated that imagery may help in the 
formation of a specific feeling or felt sense that can then be focused on (Gendlin, 1970). 
A generative image seems to carry with it a charge or quality that can be returned to and 
explored through the image, until some verbal form begins to take shape.  It is as if the 
image carries a felt sense of meaning, which is then open to ‘carrying-forward’ in words 
as Gendlin suggests.  It seems probable that images can carry-forward preverbal or more 
unformulated levels of experience or meaning than words.  This provides a connection 
between Gendlin's practical and philosophical understanding of the iterative process of 
carrying-forward felt experience, and the role of imagery and image schema in recent 
psychoanalytic studies of symbol formation and creativity discussed below.  Gendlin’s 
concern, in the example, is on carrying-forward a felt sense or (…) into words, but 
patterns and imagery may be necessary to constellate some kinds of felt sense, 
particularly from the deeply embodied levels of experience that can find words in poetry 
and psychotherapy. 
An image can emerge spontaneously, as in dreams, but then be modified or played with 
deliberately to a much greater degree than experience that remains purely embodied.  
This may be a purely imaginative process, as described by Hunt: 
                                                 
50
 See Section 5.1 for poem, pages 62-63 for description. 
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…locating a strong image in one's memory and then half-closing the mind's eye, as it  
were, and allowing the image to go sufficiently out of focus, so that the imagination 
can get to work on it and reshape it into a new and concrete form which still 
nevertheless contains the essence of the original.  (Hunt, 1998, p. 97) 
It can also involve verbal description, which is how dreams are usually communicated.  
The fact that this changes the nature of the original dream image is often overlooked.  
Seen in this way, imagery has the potential to enable two-way communication between 
conscious and unconscious levels of activity and experience.  Roland (2002) makes just 
such an observation of its role in artistic work: 
The artist's imagery provides one of the essential bases on which his creativity rests.  
His use of imagery cuts two ways: on the one hand, the poet is able to formulate new 
integrations and meanings through the use of poetic metaphor, paradox, and other 
structures; on the other hand, he is able to draw upon his own unconscious and express 
it metaphorically.  Images can thus be likened to a ladder that reaches up into the 
artist's imagination and down into his unconscious.  (Roland, 2002, p. 73) 
Bucci's (1997) multiple code theory provides a parallel to Roland’s ‘ladder’ in cognitive 
processing terms.  Based on an integration of cognitive and psychoanalytic theory, she 
posits three major systems of emotional processing and representation: the symbolic 
verbal, symbolic nonverbal and subsymbolic.  The term subsymbolic is chosen to 
indicate that at this level representation occurs but in a bodily enacted (e.g. sensory and 
motoric) as opposed to symbolic form. She proposes that subsymbolic representations 
"constitute the affective core of the emotion schema, the bodily component of the 
schema and the basis on which the organization of the schema is initially built" (Bucci, 
2007, p. 51).  This becomes closely connected to imagery arising from the context and 
circumstances of life, but only more distantly, or connotatively, to language.  Positioned 
in this way, imagery is of vital developmental and therapeutic significance, and a 
primary means of linking unformulated or enacted emotional experience to specific 
feelings and ultimately language.  
9.5 Movements of immersion and differentiation 
9.5.1 Immersion and aesthetic absorption in experience 
I have described how my changed process of writing poetry includes a willingness to 
relinquish any preconceived purpose in favour of following a more enacted form of 
intentionality, and how this involves a widening of attentional focus in which imagery 
plays a key role in mediating between embodied experience and words.  In this section, 
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I will examine the subtle way that my sense of identity can fluctuate when writing, 
between states of near fusion or absorption in experience, and positions of apparent 
separation and distance from experience.  In Section 9.6, I will attempt to connect this 
explicitly to the attentional processes involved. 
In Chapter 8, I linked my feelings of detachment from and immersion in experience 
when writing to Bollas’s descriptions of object use and ‘rhythms’ of self-experience.  
My experience of ‘immersion’ also has similarities with the account given by Benson 
(1993) of the phenomenon of aesthetic absorption, which concerns both identity and the 
feeling he describes as 'not I'.  Benson states the problem of arriving at some 
understanding of this in the following terms: 
...describing aesthetic absorption means focusing on the phenomenology of the 
particular self who becomes absorbed.  It means trying to understand how that 
person's point of view is transformed from being apart from the object of attention to 
becoming part of it.  (Benson, 1993, p. 80) 
Benson examines this movement with respect to both subjectivity and intentionality.  
He connects individual subjectivity, "what it is like to be me doing something", with 
intentionality: "that to which my thinking or perceiving or imagining is directed or 
about." (p. 80)  He suggests that this movement is linked to shifts in attention connected 
with returns from imaginative absorption to the "twofoldness" of perception. 
I believe that the experience of being aesthetically absorbed has something to do with 
these 'returns' or transitions or shifts and with the type of role the subject of the 
experience plays in each type of state.  (Benson, 1993, p. 81) 
Benson's analysis focuses on the psychological difference between the linguistically 
centred use of ‘I’ and the sense of perceptual centeredness.  He doesn't elaborate further 
on the attentional processes involved or indicate if they might relate to creative work as 
well as aesthetic appreciation.  I will return to Benson's conclusions in Section 9.6.4 to 
compare them to my account of how these processes could operate.  
9.5.2 Merger and separation as a dimension of attention 
When I am fully engaged in the formative stages of writing a poem, there is usually 
some rhythm or movement in my attention that I now recognise involves both an 
expansion and contraction in the breadth of focus, and a movement into and away from 
identification with experience.  If these movements cease, creative momentum is easily 
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lost.  For example, I can easily find that I have become adhesively fixed in my thinking, 
as if I am ‘thinking’ and nothing else.   
Milner became acutely aware of a similar absorption in thinking and found the way out 
involved allowing a movement, not of control, but of separation or standing back: "I 
must neither push away my thought nor let it drift. I must simply make an internal 
gesture of standing back and watching..." (Milner, 1986, p. 102) Milner links this 
gesture to her 'two ways of looking' and the widening of attention, but she then 
describes the persistent difficulties she encountered in reliably achieving this as a 
problem of differentiation from her experience.  Milner's descriptions indicate that this 
was not just a difficulty of separating from thought, but a fear of allowing states of 
merger with other kinds of experience. She found that this led to a tendency to resist 
such movement, even when it was desired, out of a fundamental concern about the 
imagined loss of personal boundaries and dread of annihilation.   
Milner’s characteristic descriptions of the strategies she used to alter her attention were 
spatial in nature, for example “to put myself out of myself” (Milner, 1986, p. 70), and in 
relation to painting, “spreading the imaginative body to take the form of what one 
looked at” (Milner, 1957, p. 55).  She subsumes these and the difficulties she 
encountered as part of the process of widening attention.  However, I think it is 
theoretically helpful, and phenomenologically more accurate, to distinguish the 
processes of widening the breadth of attention to include more, from the change in the 
quality of attention that is felt as merger with or separation from experience.   
Fehmi (in press) argues that the breadth of focus and degree of identification with 
experience are two distinct dimensions of attention that combined give a helpful scheme 
for representing how we are paying attention or modulating awareness at different 
times.  His method of developing an “open focus” of attention allows for movement 
along both dimensions independently.  Breadth of focus varies from narrow to diffuse, 
while identification varies from being entirely immersed in experience to being 
objectively distanced from it.  This is illustrated in Figure 9.1.  Fehmi does not account 
for how the ‘immersed – separate’ dimension arises, but he describes its distinctive 
quality as feeling either subjectively merged with or objectively detached from 
experience in a way that accords with my experience and the descriptions of Milner.   
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Figure 9.1   Fehmi’s dimensions of attention51 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Taken together Fehmi's two dimensions provide a useful framework for thinking about 
how awareness can be modulated with regard to both content (breadth of focus) and 
quality of identification (merger-separateness).  He provides guidance on how to 
broaden attention, for example, by attending to more senses and widening awareness to 
peripheral areas.  He also encourages the use of what he describes as: ‘objectless 
imagery’.  This, in an interesting parallel with Milner, involves attending to the qualities 
of ‘space’ and ‘time’ by attempting to imaginatively experience or sense their presence. 
The strategies offered for broadening or narrowing attention are self-explanatory, but 
the effect of objectless imagery is not so obvious.  Fehmi observes that it can alter the 
quality of experience to attend to ‘things’ that cannot be easily objectified.  However, he 
does not provide a theoretical explanation of this. 
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 Adapted from Fehmi & Robbins (2007) and Fehmi (in press). 
Wide: diffuse/inclusive 
Separate: objectively detached 
Immersed: subjectively merged 
Narrow: concentrated/exclusive 
Narrow—separate                      
e.g. concentrated observation 
Wide—separate                
e.g. broad monitoring 
Narrow—separate          
e.g. specific identification 
Wide—separate                
e.g. spacious absorption 
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9.5.3 Merger and separation in the context of bi-logic 
Although Fehmi does not provide a theoretical explanation for how the process of 
merger with and differentiation from experience arises, he distinguishes it in his model 
as a fundamental dimension of attention.  Milner clearly acknowledges its importance 
but subsumes it within her two fundamentally different ways of perceiving, one rooted 
in verbal thought and the other in embodied and usually unconscious experience.  Matte 
Blanco's bi-logical approach offers a framework for understanding both Milner's and 
Fehmi's observations. 
Matte Blanco’s theory provides a means of linking conscious conceptual thought with 
unconscious cognition and felt experience in various combinations or patterns.  It does 
this by proposing different structural blendings of two contrasting forms of logic 
(asymmetric/symmetric), which I have characterised as relating to 'identity' on the one 
hand and 'differentiation' on the other.  Consciously we can only know or grasp what is 
asymmetrically differentiated; it has to stand apart or be objectified to come into being.  
However, Matte Blanco argues that there is always some form of symmetric logic or 
process of identification going on.  For example, when I see a bird in the garden I see 
one bird, but also have an awareness that it is a ‘bird’ and thus in some sense the same 
as all other birds.  Without this sense every differentiated object would stand completely 
apart in isolation, it would have no wider context of meaning.  Alternatively, I might 
form an identification that gives the single bird a more questionable felt meaning or 
identity, for example seeing a large black bird as being a bad omen.  Such variations in 
thought and experience can be viewed as variations in our ‘normal’ bi-logical ways of 
experiencing the world.  
A corollary of Matte Blanco's analysis is that when we view anything as separate, that 
is, as an object different from ourselves, we are implicitly exercising an identification 
with ourselves as the subject.  We come into felt being as a subject through 
identification with ourselves as the observer of a differentiated object.  This is a bi-
logical process of identification and differentiation.  In our usual unexamined patterns 
of thought we take this subject to be in some sense identical with the image we might 
have of ourselves as an embodied person, but as soon as we take any particular aspect of 
this sense of 'me' to be the object of our attention we recede from it, we become 
differentiated and our identification is with a sense of being something other.  This 
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reflects the ubiquitous nature of the subject-self schema described in Chapter 8, and is 
consistent with Damasio’s account of the development of core and extended 
consciousness.52  
It is thus possible to see how merger with or separation from an object of attention could 
reflect a change in bi-logical orientation.  Differentiation would imply greater 
identification with a separate subject while merger would suggest an identification that 
actually includes, or extends out to, the object of attention itself – or at least some aspect 
of it.  Consistent with Matte Blanco's theory the identification required for merger might 
take place unconsciously but be felt or experienced as a quality of being.  However, it 
might be possible to cultivate it as both Milner and Fehmi have found.  Focusing on 
space or volume as suggested by Fehmi’s ‘objectless imagery’, and by Milner in her 
imaginative extension of her body in space, might rely on the fact that space itself 
cannot be attended to as a separately sensed ‘object’.  It exists between and inside all 
objects but in itself has no limits and is ultimately infinite.  This is in accord with one of 
the fundamental qualities of symmetric logic based on infinite sets: all space is identical 
to the category of ‘space’ – there is no such thing as a space, only a concept of it.  This 
would suggest that space can only be experientially grasped through some form of 
identification.   
A similar argument can be applied to the sense of time and would potentially offer one 
explanation of why in states of intense absorption in an activity it is often reported that 
the sense of time alters. Absorption in the moment, or the immediacy of an activity, 
could alter our normal feeling of being separate from the passage of time and thus 
change how ‘its’ speed or duration is experienced. 
This bi-logical analysis provides a theoretical basis for the experience of both merger 
and separation within the models of attentional practice described by Milner & Fehmi.  
It is also consistent with their emphasis on bodily sensation and feeling, given the 
congruence found between bi-logic and models of embodied cognition discussed in 
Chapter 8.   
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 Damasio (1999) sees attention as critical to core consciousness as the differentiated experience of 
having consciousness of an object arises when attention is directed towards it. He relates extended 
consciousness to spreading attention over a larger domain but does not detail the attentional processes 
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9.5.4 Movements ‘in and out’ and ‘to and from’ when writing poetry 
My experience of writing poetry is that there needs to be a very flexible movement, or 
oscillation, in identification with and then differentiation from different aspects of 
experience during the process of composition.  Simply to merge or be identified with an 
experience has not led me to write more effectively than when I was initially solely 
trying to objectify my experience in writing.  For example, the immersed experience of 
being caught in the headlights of a car on a dark lane and jumping instinctively for 
safety underpinned the poem Invisible man53.  The experience was intense enough to 
stay with me and led to a feeling of anger, which I initially felt only partially 
undifferentiated from: ‘I am angry – he could have killed me!’   
caught full beam 
staring out from blindness 
mind no longer recycling 
However, when an image later popped into my mind of ‘rising up from the ground with 
wings’ my attention altered from the initial experience, which I felt strongly identified 
with, to an image that I ‘saw’ in a more objective or separate way.  It was something I 
could vividly picture, and which invited attention to itself in a way that was 
accompanied by a shift in my previous absorption in the 'near miss' experience.  As I 
played with the image in my mind I became increasingly interested and absorbed in it.  
This was accompanied by a shift in my felt experience that was strangely calming and 
peaceful. 
rooted in a body 
but raised from the ground 
both feet in the air 
quite still 
As I noticed and moved towards that experience, while still holding the image in mind, 
there was a spontaneous reaching out for further words or images to try and give this 
new feeling a more tangible form.  A process had been initiated which I then recognised 
could lead to a poem.  A recurrent oscillation between bodily feelings and words via an 
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image, in a process marked not just by a 'to and fro', but by movements both in and out 
of, and to and from, temporary identifications and separations from experience. This 
eventually included the experience arising from reading words on the page. 
In the next section I will try to develop a more complete understanding of the processes 
involved in this attentional fluctuation by drawing on the dynamics of ‘tacit knowing’ 
proposed by Michael Polanyi.  I will also attempt to connect this understanding directly 
to self-experience by synthesising it with the bi-logical model developed thus far. 
9.6 The attentional correlates of identity and self-experience 
9.6.1 Focal and subsidiary awareness 
Polanyi’s  (1966; 1969) concept of tacit knowing concerns the way we come to know 
the world and experience meaning.  Critical of positivist philosophies of science, he 
sought to demonstrate that no knowledge is formed entirely objectively or impersonally 
but is always reliant on personal forms of knowing.  He proposed that this personal 
knowledge arises from experience and depends on a process of ‘tacit’ knowing.  This is 
captured by one of Polanyi's well-known epigrams: "we know more than we can tell." 
(1966, p. 4)  One of his major achievements was to demonstrate how such knowing 
could function across different practical contexts.  
In Polanyi’s account, tacit knowing is structured according to an attentional dimension 
that involves a movement between subsidiary and focal awareness.  In one example 
Polanyi, who was multilingual, describes reading letters in different languages and of 
grasping their meaning without being aware of what language the letters were written 
in.54 In this situation a letter's meaning is the focal aspect of awareness while the 
particular words and language employed are subsidiarily attended to or, to emphasise 
the dependent relation, attended through or from.  In other examples he describes the 
skilled use of tools, where the awareness of the tool becomes subsidiary to a focal 
awareness of the particular use to which the tool is being employed.  So, in using a 
hammer, we don't focus on the feel of a hammer in the hand but to the point at which 
the hammer strikes its target; we are only subsidiarily aware of our hand’s contact with 
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the hammer (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 33).  In Polanyi's view there is always an 
integrative movement from the subsidiary aspects of attention to the focal aspects, that 
is, to whatever it is we are consciously attending to in any moment.  This integration 
may be relatively simple but can also be highly complex and intuitive, as in many high-
level skills and forms of creative activity.  Polanyi indicated that although there was 
such a thing as imaginative ‘work’, such intuitive integration could not be deliberately 
determined but was experienced as spontaneous and effortless (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, 
p. 96). 
Conscious focal awareness is always dependent on the subsidiary levels of awareness 
and is arrived at through one of the many possible integrations of this background field 
of relevant information, or what Polanyi referred to as 'clues'.   What is at one point 
functioning as a 'clue', or subsidiary aspect of awareness, may later become the object of 
focal attention.  This would require a reconfiguration of what is in subsidiary awareness 
to enable attention from that to the new object of attention.  In making this shift, what 
was previously the focal object of attention can potentially become part of the new 
subsidiary field of awareness.  Thus we can attend to things focally as differentiated 
objects of conscious experience, or subsidiarily as undifferentiated aspects of a usually 
less conscious level of awareness and experience.  Crucial to my argument here is the 
scope this provides for a back-and-forth movement in which experiences attended to 
focally can then be attended from, in an iterative manner that allows for the emergence 
of new patterns or forms of focal experience. 
9.6.2 Awareness, bi-logic and poetry 
The attentional from-to movement of awareness in Polanyi's scheme of tacit knowing 
can be integrated with an embodied bi-logical account of conscious and unconscious 
processes.  Focal awareness is what we are consciously aware of whereas subsidiary 
awareness can exist at different levels of consciousness and embodied functioning: 
If this analysis convinces us of the presence of two very different kinds of awareness 
in tacit knowing, it should also prevent us from identifying them with conscious and 
unconscious awareness.  Focal awareness is, of course, always fully conscious, but 
subsidiary awareness, or from-awareness, can exist at any level of consciousness, 
ranging from the subliminal to the fully conscious.  What makes awareness subsidiary 
is its functional character, and we shall therefore claim subsidiary awareness for 
functions inside our body, at levels inaccessible to us through direct experience. 
(Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 39)  
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Thus focal awareness could correspond to a dominantly asymmetric mode of 
functioning in which experience is differentiated, objectified and hence made conscious.  
In contrast, subsidiary awareness could incorporate more pronounced degrees of 
symmetric functioning, which would be associated with a greater experience of non-
separateness from and between aspects of experience.  This effectively adds to Matte 
Blanco's conception of different bi-logical 'structures' of experiencing at different levels 
of consciousness, a description of how experience could be developed and creatively 
transformed by a process associated with movements, or modulations, of attention. 
Polanyi uses the example of poetry to illustrate the particularly complex nature of the 
integration of subsidiaries in metaphor and art.  He suggests that the meaning of poetry 
depends on the complex patterning of many specific aspects of a poem, such as rhythm, 
sound, rhyme and grammar, which are not usually focally attended to, unless of course 
the poem is subject to close reading.    
The subsidiaries composing metaphors and poems are joined together by an 
imaginative performance much richer than any imaginative action required for linking 
a word to its meaning.  To reduce a metaphor or a poem to the disconnected 
subsidiaries is to extinguish the vision which linked them to their integrated meaning 
in a metaphor or poem.  What is left is a caricature of their true meaning.  (Polanyi & 
Prosch, 1975, p. 82)  
The terms ‘imaginative performance’ or ‘vision’, which Polanyi utilizes, suggest the 
active process required to link or integrate subsidiaries in the appreciation and 
composition of a poem.  This has similarities to the theories of conceptual blending 
discussed in Chapter 8, including the generative notion of ‘double-scope blending’, 
where different source domains are mapped onto a new domain through the emergence 
of a novel integrative framework.  What Polanyi's analysis adds to these abstract models 
of cognitive processing is the delineation of an activity that may have a practical bearing 
on the modulation of awareness and self-experience during the process of composition. 
Polanyi's attentional movements can be viewed along a linear dimension from 
subsidiary to focal awareness, but a more compelling image is of a centre and periphery 
of awareness, with focal awareness at and surrounding a central area and subsidiary 
awareness further out, towards and beyond the periphery of what can be 'seen' without a 
shift or expansion of attention.  In fact, localised focal awareness of sound, feeling and 
other senses suggests subsidiary awareness of a space that extends out three-
dimensionally and infinitely around whatever focal area is selected.  Any change in the 
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size or position of the focal area alters what can potentially be incorporated into 
subsidiary awareness as illustrated in Figure 9.2. 
Figure 9.2   Shifts in focal and subsidiary awareness 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polanyi's model of attention and awareness thus compliments the dimensional analysis 
of attention presented earlier in the chapter by highlighting the ‘from-to’ movement 
between, and potential interchange of, focal and subsidiary areas of experience.  These 
movements may be felt as widening/narrowing the attentional field, and are connected 
to changes in the degree of identification with or separation from particular areas of 
experience.   
Widening focus to include aspects of 
subsidiary awareness 
Moving and narrowing focus with original focus 
incorporated into subsidiary awareness 
Focal awareness 
 
 
Subsidiary awareness 
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9.6.3 Indwelling and self-experience 
Polanyi recognised the fundamental way that self-experience changed as part of changes 
in attentional integration and focus.  In his terms, whatever we are subsidiarily aware of, 
we at least temporarily 'indwell'.  The concept of indwelling is critical to Polanyi's 
model and involves the idea that whatever is indwelt becomes experienced as an 
extension of ourselves.   In effect, what we are subsidiarily aware of is identified with, it 
becomes or feels part of us.  It is through this that we recognise something as other, 
something that can be differentiated and consciously known.  Polanyi suggests that 
indwelling gives us the same relation to things in subsidiary awareness as we have to 
our own bodies: 
...there is one single thing in the world we normally know only by relying on our 
awareness of it for attending to other things.  Our own body is that unique thing.  We 
attend to external objects by being subsidiarily aware of things happening to our body.  
[…] We may say, in fact, that to know something by relying on our awareness of it for 
attending to something else is to have the same kind of knowledge of it that we have 
of our body by living in it.  It is a manner of being or existing.  (Polanyi & Prosch, 
1975, p. 36)  
This conception points immediately to the potential fluidity and openness of this aspect 
of self-experience but raises the vexed question of what it is that indwells the body or 
other aspects of subsidiary awareness.  As previously discussed with regard to 
Damasio’s core self, although the body is normally a subsidiary feature of awareness it 
can also be focused upon and objectified, at which point the sense of a simple identity 
with it breaks down.  Polanyi's model is then open to what Kettle (2000, p. 22) calls 
“habits of the Cartesian imagination”, with the positing of an individual subject or 
'knower' that indwells the body but is also somehow separable from it.  Indeed, 
Polanyi's view that the relation of subsidiary to focal awareness is formed by the “act of 
a person55 who integrates one to the other”, is open to this interpretation (Polanyi & 
Prosch, 1975, p. 38).   
An alternative approach is to avoid the dualities and potential infinite regress of 
literalising the subject-self schema and focus instead on the process or action that 
Polanyi highlights.  An activity takes place that links subsidiary to focal awareness by 
mediating between aspects of experience that awareness is 'in' to aspects that there is 
conscious awareness 'of'.  This reciprocal attentional dynamic gives rise to both the 
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sense of self and of not-self or ‘other’.  The sense of self and not-self thus come into 
being in an active, interdependent and essentially relational manner.  This is associated 
with the experience of at least some separation in space and, in Damasio’s extended 
consciousness, the potential for separation in time.  The idea that there is 'someone' who 
is aware arises through the almost ubiquitous identification of awareness with its 
primary vehicle of subsidiary attention – the  body. It is, however, at least plausible that 
‘awareness’ indicates something that is not the effect of an objectified source, but is 
intrinsic to the very capacity for such objectification.  For example, the differentiation 
of awareness in space and time could be more fundamental to consciousness than the 
process of attending from a body that can also be viewed as an object within that 
consciousness.   
From this perspective, the very idea of 'merging with' or 'being absorbed in' aspects of 
so called external reality presuppose the primary experience of indwelling of the body 
as defining the boundaries of the self.  This is where the self-other boundary is usually 
experienced although there is now strong evidence that the body is neurologically 
mapped to allow extension into space.56  This includes extensions through tool-use that 
appear to corroborate Polanyi’s phenomenological descriptions (Iriki, 2006).   
When the body is focally attended to, or referred to within the reflexive structure of 
language as ‘my’ body, the relation to the body assumes a subject-self structure.  Here 
the body becomes an object and a subject emerges that may be imagined or felt to move 
further 'in', to indwell that which reflective thought relies on subsidiarily: the processes 
accompanying reflective thinking itself.  Notwithstanding previous arguments about the 
embodied nature of thought, the sense of this being 'in my head' could be an intuitively 
accurate reflection of the primary neurological location of subsidiary awareness when 
we are immersed in thought.  
9.6.4 Identity and the modulation of attention 
The preceding analysis points to a primary indwelling of subsidiary awareness in 
patterns of bodily experience, and a secondary capacity to indwell the processes 
underlying reflective thinking.  This would correspond to the dualities that are often 
assumed between the body and its environment, and the mind and its body.  The body is 
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known primarily through indwelling, whereas the 'external' world is known through the 
body as objectified and other.  With focal objectified awareness of the body comes the 
additional complexity of a sense of identity that feels distinct from the body but that 
may indwell the use of language and conscious thought.    
As Milner and I found, freeing oneself from identification with thinking can be difficult 
particularly if there is a strong sense of trying to do something.  Such trying or willed 
effort may reinforce a structure of self-experience and identity that is antithetical to the 
flexible modulation of attention required for some forms of activity and experience.  To 
return to previous examples, actions that can be physically objectified, like going 
upstairs to bed or reading a book, may feel consciously willed by a sense of an 'I' 
directing 'my' body, even if this is deemed an illusion.  But actions that require more 
complex shifts in attention and awareness, such as into sleep or into a text to seek its 
meaning, may require the movement of subsidiary awareness away from this particular 
identification.  Milner found strong resistance to loosening the boundaries of the body to 
unite with wider aspects of experience.  I needed to abandon myself to more diverse 
forms of embodied activity before finding a way to write poetry.  The potential fluidity 
of our self-experience may have been constrained by a rigid body-world distinction, 
which could contribute to fears of a loss of control, separateness or even of annihilation.   
Nonetheless, as Milner and others have testified, significant movements into greater 
identity with the world can be associated with experiences of greater freedom, openness 
and a profound expansion of reality.  These movements could also play a crucial part in 
some forms of creative activity and aesthetic experience. 
The account Benson gives of aesthetic absorption and shifts in identity, introduced 
earlier, seems explicable in terms of the changes in attentional awareness developed 
above.  He argues that in aesthetic absorption, particularly appreciation of works of art, 
there is what he describes as a 'non-deployment of the I' (Benson, 1993, p. 101).  He 
sees this as an imaginative shift that is inevitably followed by a return to the 'I' 
perspective, from which the fact that such a shift took place can be recognised.  One 
becomes lost 'in' a picture, or perhaps even more commonly in a panoramic view or 
exquisite sunset, and then has a sense of returning to oneself.  In such states of 
temporary absorption, internal verbal commentary and the desire to speak often subside.  
Naming the experience seems associated with a return to oneself as the localised 
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linguistic subject 'I', whereas absorption is associated with a more distributed and 
immersed sense of presence.  Similarly, Clark refers to the act of writing poetry in terms 
of “crossing a psychic threshold” in which “the word ‘I’ is no longer ‘myself’ but a 
signifier in the space of composition” (Clark, 1997, p. 21).  I would predict that 
Benson's 'non-deployment of the I' and Clark’s ‘psychic threshold’ are accompanied by 
a distinct shift in attention that allows the movement of subsidiary awareness out and 
into wider aspects of available experience. 
This understanding of the attentional modulation of awareness in the context of bi-
logical processes of identification and differentiation, leads to a formulation of self and 
self-experience that is potentially highly fluid and flexible.  As previously argued, the 
writing of poetry seems to require a particularly high level of involvement of both 
symmetric and asymmetric processes, and also the capacity to allow a free movement of 
attention both ‘in-and-out’ and ‘to-and-from’ different areas of experience.  This may 
help release and expand the sense of self or expose its rigidities.  In my own case, I 
think it did both.  In the mirror of my own poems I believe I started the investigation: 
disabled by fixed meanings, 
the static interference 
of chattering minds57 
But ended it with an understanding that there is: 
No need to note 
what is known 
only that  
which escapes words, 
a sense less clear,  
an intimation  
of deeper things.58 
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Part IV 
Reflective Evaluation 
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10   The Nondual Imagination 
If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by 
acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses' madness, he will fail, 
and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been 
driven out of their minds.  Plato59 
 
This chapter reviews the investigation as a whole and offer some reflections on its 
potential implications.  The outcomes of the study are summarised in the context of its 
primary aim and conclusions are drawn for comparison with related work.  
Consideration is given to the developmental benefits that I have experienced and to 
some of the practical and therapeutic implications that arise from the analysis.  The 
value and limitations of the research approach adopted are then discussed in relation to 
the secondary aim of the study.  In conclusion I offer, for further investigation, some 
reflections on poetry and self-experience that arise from the activity of what could be 
called ‘the nondual imagination’. 
10.1 Aims and outcomes of the study 
The primary aim of the study was to investigate the way that writing poetry could 
impact on self-experience.  The key outcomes of the study relating to this aim are 
summarised below.  A secondary aim was to contribute to the development of combined 
forms of first-person creative and critical inquiry, this will be considered separately in 
Section 10.3. 
10.1.1 Key outcomes 
The experiential and creative outcomes of the study can be summarised in answer to the 
first three of the four research questions that framed the conduct of the investigation. 
Question 1: What is my experience of undertaking an extended personal experiment 
with writing poetry? 
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My experience of the first four years of the investigation was presented in a narrative 
form in Chapter 4.  This was characterised by a prolonged inability to write effectively, 
followed by a spontaneous change of direction. This change ultimately led to a more 
productive and satisfying way of working that was grounded in embodied experience 
and an increased flexibility of attention and awareness.  
Question 2: Is there anything significant or relevant to self-experience reflected in the 
poetry written? 
A selection of poems was presented in Chapter 5 as creative outcomes of the study 
together with a commentary on some of the prominent themes they contain relating to 
self-experience. This included themes suggestive of loss and separation, a search, 
failures of language, and finding what was always present.  There were also allusions to 
processes of death and rebirth, embodiment, and changed awareness. 
Question 3: What are the key relationships found between self-experience and the 
writing of poetry? 
The narrative account was subject to an analysis and interpretation presented in Chapter 
6.60  This revealed that the account had a narrative structure corresponding with a 
mythopoetic pattern of personal transformation, and contained themes that had 
similarities with those found in the poems.  Four major factors relating my self-
experience to the process of writing poetry were identified: the failure of my initial 
conscious intention to write; the experience of a process that felt objectifying of myself 
and my writing; an implicit idea of a separate sense of self in the writing process, and a 
changed experience of ‘self’ that felt more embodied and yet highly fluid. 
Chapters 7 to 9 presented a theoretical explication of my experience in answer to the 
fourth research question: 
Question 4: How can any relationships found between self-experience and writing of 
poetry be formulated theoretically? 
A theoretical understanding of the conscious and unconscious processes involved in the 
writing of poetry was developed that integrated the bi-logical model of Matte Blanco 
with theories of embodied cognition and consciousness, relational psychoanalysis and 
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attentional processes.  It was argued that poetry has a bi-logical form that 
simultaneously condenses and integrates patterns of both difference and identity in 
language to an unusually high degree.  This requires the mutual interplay of conscious 
and unconscious processes in composition that was facilitated, in my investigation, by 
an increase in embodied awareness, a decreased exercise of deliberate volition, and a 
facilitative use of images.  This enabled a move away from a ‘separate’ and objectified 
sense of self, and its objects of experience, to a more fluid experience of self and the 
creative process.  The process was marked by an oscillation in awareness modulated by 
attentional movements that mediated the breadth of attention, and the degree of 
identification or separation from experience, in a manner that simultaneously altered the 
boundaries of self-experience. 
Although derived from a first-person study this formulation leads to the following 
general propositions or ‘conclusions’ about poetry and self-experience: 
1. The writing of effective poetry requires an intensified and flexible use of conscious 
and unconscious processes through a combination of verbal discrimination and 
access to embodied feeling.  
2. The cognitive and affective processes underlying the composition of poetry can 
usefully be conceived of in terms of bi-logical patterns of differentiation and 
identity. 
3. The process of creative composition intrinsically involves alterations of self-
experience associated with modulations of attention and awareness. 
These conclusions will be briefly compared to some related areas of work to indicate 
their broad consistency with, and distinctive contribution to, existing research and 
theory. 
10.1.2 Accessing embodied feeling 
Nicholls (2006) has recently found confirmation of the importance of embodiment in 
her experience of creative writing.  She undertook a study of her own process of writing 
for personal development that commenced with: “an instinct that what I needed to do 
was something called ‘writing the body;’ that I needed to access and express the bodily 
nature of my feelings in order to rediscover something crucially important about 
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myself.” (2006, p. 5)  Through reflection on her writing, which included poetry and a 
novella, she concluded that her critical finding was that she had “found a more ‘real’ 
sense of myself”, which she referenced to the sense of a  “felt bodily ‘I’ ” that she found 
through her writing and which extended into her life (p. 202). 
Nicholls’ account provides an interesting parallel with my experience.  Although her 
study commenced after my own and with the same supervisor, I was unaware of it until 
the final stages of writing my thesis and was therefore not directly influenced by its 
outcomes.  Although there is some cross-fertilization of theoretical ideas through a 
common supervisor, our experiences remain distinctive and are fundamentally 
corroborative of the importance of embodied feeling in creative writing.  Some of the 
differences are also worth noting. Whereas Nicholls set out with the intuition of needing 
to write from the body, I found that my writing of poetry required it; indeed I stumbled 
upon it without any preconceived expectations.  Her emphasis is on how creative 
writing can facilitate a felt bodily sense of self, whereas the direction of my own inquiry 
extended to how this felt sense relates to the operation of conscious and unconscious 
processes and the nature of poetry in particular.  Nicholls arrived at a stronger sense of 
her own “I-ness”, which she correlated closely with the body.  In contrast, I found that 
this sense of I-ness was open to continuous transformation in conjunction with 
attentional processes. 
10.1.3 Poetry and patterns of difference and identity 
A number of influential accounts of creativity have seen the contrast and combination of 
two distinct forms of thinking as a key feature of the creative process.  This has often 
been seen to involve some interaction between conscious and unconscious processes.  
For example, Arieti (1976) sees this in terms of a ‘magic synthesis’ of primary and 
secondary processes.  Ehrenzweig (1967), on the other hand, highlights the involvement 
of a process of unconscious ‘dedifferentiation’.  Ehrenzweig distinguishes the active 
process of dedifferentiation from the more static idea of undifferentiation.  This 
formulation allows for the possibility of a dynamic of creation in which new patterns 
can form and be dissolved.  Bollas (1995) provides an evocative description of both 
integrating and ‘cracking up’ up experience in creative and free-associative activity that 
I will draw on in Section 10.4. The compelling but largely descriptive processes of 
magic synthesis, dedifferentiation and cracking up, postulated by these accounts, can be 
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formulated relatively parsimoniously by Matte Blanco’s bi-logical theory.  The latter 
also enables links to be made to the quality of experience involved and the creative 
medium employed, as I have attempted to demonstrate with poetry.   
Other dual-aspect theories of creativity include Koestler’s notion of ‘bisociation’ in 
which “two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference” are 
combined (1964, p. 36), and Rothenberg’s (1979) formulation of ‘Janusian’ and 
‘homospatial thinking.  Janusian thinking concerns the ability to use opposite or 
contradictory ideas simultaneously, whereas homospatial thinking refers to the ability to 
actively merge or synthesise these in some way.  Both of these formulations highlight 
the fact that differences are combined into new patterns of identity within the content of 
creative work, including poetry, which Rothenberg uses as a major example.  The 
current investigation has led to an explicit formulation of how contradictions are 
combined by symmetric thinking, and how this can lead to specific bi-logical forms 
such as poetry. 
My description61 of the bi-logical nature of poetry has been likened by Williams (2006) 
to aspects of the work of Jacques Maritain on poetic intuition, in that it crosses the 
boundaries between different modes of cognition.  Maritain contrasts ‘poetic sense’ with 
‘logical sense’.  He sees the poetic sense and poetic intuition as rooted in preconscious 
and unconscious embodied being and as necessary for a  “liberation from conceptual, 
logical and discursive reason” (Maritain, 1955, p. 55).  I have found that Maritain’s 
description of the ‘poetic sense’ and the ‘logical sense’ have some correspondence with 
the processes I have attempted to describe.  However, his poetic sense would be equated 
with a different logical sense in my formulation and, following Matte Blanco, I have 
placed greater emphasis on their bi-logical integration.  
Within poetry itself, Coleridge saw the “balance or reconciliation of opposites or 
discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference” as an important and revealing feature 
of poetry’s nature (1997, pp. 184-185).  Indeed Wheeler (1981) suggests that identity 
can be found in difference in her analysis of Coleridge’s own work, thus pointing to 
something akin to the notion of a bi-logical structure.  Beyond these suggestive parallels 
I am grateful to have been pointed towards the semiological analysis of Yuri Lotman for 
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a theoretical approach to poetry that appears to lead in a similar direction to my own.  
Commenting on Lotman’s work, Kristeva (1994, para. 6) describes how, for Lotman art: 
“... redistributes the primary logic of language according to new logical rules, conferring 
on humanity new mental (or, as one would say today, new cognitive)62 possibilities, 
different principles of logic for the reconstruction of the self and the world.”  Eagleton 
presents Lotman’s analysis of poetry as a “peculiarly overcoded”63 pattern of interacting 
systems.   
A poem is both a system of rules, and a system of their violation.  It establishes 
equivalences, but also differences.  Think, for example, of rhyme, which forges a 
phonic (sound) equivalence between two words, but highlights their semantic 
difference in doing so.  The same double effect can be achieved by rhythm.  
(Eagleton, 2007, p. 54) 
Eagleton argues that poetry for Lotman is an intensely condensed form of regularity and 
deviation from regularity, which enables it to contain extremely high levels of 
complexity and information.  Without this organization, or patterning, there would 
simply be too much information for it to contain.  This parallels, in terms of information 
and complexity, what I have suggested the bi-logical structure of poetry enables us to be 
consciously aware of, or appreciate, through its combined asymmetric and symmetric 
features.  Eagleton does question whether Lotman’s analysis is universally true for all 
poetry, but sees it as applicable to at least the post-romantic context.  Although I have 
argued that poetry is characterized by particular bi-logical qualities, this doesn’t mean 
that this would be unvarying across all forms of poetry.  For example, there might be 
revealing differences associated with historical and cultural changes in consciousness if 
linguistic paradigms of the evolution of consciousness are correct.64 
10.1.4 The modulation of self-experience 
The proposed model of attentional modulation of awareness, in the context of bi-logical 
processes of identification and differentiation, leads to a formulation of self-experience 
that is similar to many writers who emphasise the ‘self’ not as a thing but a process.  For 
example Fast (1998), writing from a relational psychoanalytic perspective, has proposed 
that rather than talking about ‘the self’ we would do better to refer to ‘selving’, a 
preference that is echoed by many others who see the advantages of thinking about ‘it’ 
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as a verb rather than a noun.  There is however considerable debate about how this 
action or process is viewed.  Thus, although there is widespread agreement about the 
dangers of reifying the concept of self, there is still dispute about whether the concept of 
self is valid or whether it is more accurate to conclude, as Metzinger (2003) does, that 
we might have the phenomenal experience of ‘being someone’ but there is ‘no-self’ that 
can really be said to be having that experience.  Zahavi offers a contrasting 
phenomenological view that the self is not something separate from the ‘givenness’ of 
experience:   
In short, the self referred to is not something standing beyond or opposed to the stream 
of experiences, rather it is a feature or function of their givenness. It is the invariant 
dimension of first-personal givenness in the multitude of changing experiences.      
(Zahavi, 2005a, p10) 
This debate is interesting from the point of view of this study because both Metzinger 
and Zahavi take first-person experience seriously as a datum of investigation.  A key 
difference between them seems to be whether phenomenal experience is seen as 
‘transparent’, that is not representing a more substantial entity that can be identified as 
self, or whether the self is, as Zahavi suggests, an inherent dimension of experience 
(Zahavi, 2005b).  One consequence, for Zahavi, of Metzinger’s eliminative view of self, 
is that it undermines the experiential basis of not only knowing the self but the world.  
Everything could be seen as illusory or a ‘phenomenal reification’ in Metzinger’s terms 
– not just the sense of self (Zahavi, 2007). 
My account of the attentional modulation of self-experience does not presuppose a 
position on the above debate but does suggest a perspective from which it can be 
viewed, which I will elaborate in Section 10.4.  What my argument does strongly 
suggest is that self-experience is an actively modulated aspect of phenomenal 
consciousness, and that the activity of writing poetry can lead to changes in attention 
that are intrinsically associated with changes in self-experience.  The sense of self can 
be held more or less rigidly, but in creative composition it may need to be in an adaptive 
state-of-flux.  This capacity for self-experience to be fluid and changing is not just the 
linguistic construction of different selves, but is associated with fundamental changes in 
the quality and location of awareness. 
I believe this formulation is consistent with the way psychoanalytic theory has 
developed from an objectified account of instincts, drives and internal structures to 
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object-relations, and more recently intersubjective accounts of self-experience, based on 
the interaction between the analyst and analysand.65  These demand a highly fluid and 
modifiable view of self-experience, which is closely related to following movements of 
attention within the boundaries of sessions, and the construction of meaning through 
what Newirth (2003) calls ‘generative’ unconscious processes rooted in very early 
forms of experience.  This approach has been extended to the creative process by other 
psychoanalytic writers, for example, Charles uses poetry to illustrate how patterns are 
shaped from attention to sensory images and nonverbal levels of experience prior to the 
construction of symbolic meaning and poetic representation (Charles, 2001, 2002).   
10.2   Developmental benefits and therapeutic implications 
10.2.1  Finding what was always present 
One of the advantages of the extended period over which my study unfolded is that I 
have had considerable opportunity to gauge its contribution to wider personal change.  
However, this also makes it harder to differentiate changes brought about by the study 
from other factors, not least the passage of time itself.  Nevertheless, I do feel changed 
and continue to be changed through my experience of writing poetry.  My long-
established practice of keeping a self-reflective journal has largely ceased, indeed it may 
be that I was pursuing something there that I now find available in poetry.  I can best 
describe this as a greater quality of ‘presence’, which I feel as a stronger sense of 
interconnection, or potential inter-being, with the world around me.  I have a sense that 
this was never absent but was previously more obscured, and was perhaps searched for 
in reflective thinking and writing. 
While I was still keeping my journal I made reference to the doctorate as ‘a profound 
self-therapy’.  By that I think I meant it felt a far-reaching experience, something that 
went deep, particularly the period of critical transition that involved an experience of 
something I equated with deadness.  However, I’m no longer sure I would describe it as 
a self-therapy, with the implication that the self is the co-terminus agent and recipient of 
something.  My lasting experience is of my sense of self continuously being changed in 
the movement and flux of arising experience.  This was not lived as ‘a hero’s journey’ 
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so much as an unfolding of experience that can only later be presented as a narrative 
with a protagonist.  The feeling is of both being more and less than the image I used to 
hold of myself and with the boundaries far less defined.  The practical consequence is 
that I generally do feel more relaxed and less compulsive than I used to, and more able 
to enjoy the moment.  This is linked to a stronger connection with my embodied 
experience.  It is also connected to a sense of feeling more intimate with all experience 
and yet less exclusively identified with anything in particular. 
In Chapter 2, I pointed out that creative writing, unlike the 'talking therapies', could take 
place both within and outside of a therapeutic or facilitative relationship.  Although the 
majority of my investigation took place in a private and solitary context, there was a 
critical point at which the presence of a supportive relationship was crucial to the 
changes that unfolded.  I believe the quality of the personal response I received in 
supervision when I presented a batch of uncrafted writing was critical in facilitating the 
changes that ensued after that time.  The response was primarily one of acceptance, but 
I also experienced it as a kind of faith or trust in my own emerging experience.  Celia 
was careful not to be intrusive in her comments and encouraging in her appreciation of 
the work I had done.  This felt extremely supportive and provided the necessary 
conditions for me to stay with my subsequent experiences, and to be able to bring them 
back to supervision for reflection.  I think this has also had an enduring impact on my 
willingness to respect and follow my intuitions and impulses, whereas before I was 
inclined to seek reasons or rational justifications for everything I did. 
10.2.2 Poetry as a discipline of attention 
In my working through of the changes I experienced, I have become increasingly 
interested not only in the significance of embodiment but the crucial way that attention 
relates to all experience, including self-experience.  This has influenced my professional 
practice and teaching as well as my writing of poetry.  For example, I have taken an 
active part in the current wave of interest in the development and application of 
mindfulness-based therapies to mental health problems.  I arrived at this not only 
through my practice of meditation but also through my recognition that writing poetry 
contained the elements of an attentional practice.  At one point I even drafted some 
writing guidelines based on these observations: 
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• Don’t try too hard. 
• Relax and open attention to all available experience. 
• Separate from passing thoughts and become more aware of bodily sensations and 
external stimuli. 
• Move between a sense of separateness from what arises to coming as close to it as 
possible – as if you are it or are experiencing it fully as it is. 
• Follow any images that might arise which capture your attention but hold a sense of 
your bodily feelings about them or any words that might come to mind in relation to 
them. 
• When you have to – write.  Then come back to it later. 66 
I don’t remember following these guidelines systematically, the process just didn’t seem 
to work that way.  The notes were more an attempt to grasp something crucial about 
what happened when I did write creatively.  What they did underline for me was the 
important role that attention played. 
This led me to see poetry as a ‘discipline of attention’, something that could be practised 
but not deliberately engineered.  My experience, when my attention operates in this 
flexible manner, is that my sense of both myself and external objects change in the fluid 
ways that I have already outlined.  This is not always immediately pleasurable, but even 
difficult experiences seem to unfold and become either more meaningful or, eventually, 
simply dissipate.  Meaning can eventually be embodied in a finished poem but even 
fragments of writing can further this experiential change and unfolding. 
10.2.3 Therapeutic parallels 
One of the therapeutic implications arising from the study derives from the unexpected 
finding that the content of my experience, such as feelings, memories and specific 
relationships, felt less important than the change that came about in the way I related to 
my experience.  Writing poetry did not become a way of expressing feelings, or of 
organizing or understanding my experience in a more coherent way, so much as a 
means of experiencing differently.  This does not deny the potential therapeutic benefits 
of expressive writing, or the value of the insights it may provide, but this simply wasn’t 
central for me.  While this undoubtedly reflects individual factors, including perhaps my 
age and previous experience of therapy, it also has some parallels with a shift currently 
occurring in mainstream models of cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
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Cognitive-behavioural therapy has traditionally been associated with the modification of 
thoughts, beliefs and behaviours to change unwanted experience.  Notwithstanding its 
widespread adoption and theoretical advance on behaviourism, it has generated 
controversy partly because of its pragmatic assumptions and relatively directive 
approach to therapy (House & Loewenthal, 2008).  This has contributed to a ‘third-
wave’ of approaches that effectively switch the emphasis from changing experience to 
accepting it, and becoming more aware of how experience is arising and changing 
(Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004).  Most of these approaches have been influenced by 
research into the benefits of mindfulness meditation and are either based on it, for 
example mindfulness-based stress reduction and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy67; 
or employ it within a wider frame of reference, for example, acceptance and 
commitment therapy and dialectical behaviour therapy.  These approaches have 
similarities with established Japanese approaches to psychological therapy that have 
also been influenced by meditation practices, such as Naiken and Morita therapy 
(Reynolds, 1980).  
Besides accepting experience, mindfulness informed approaches place significant 
emphasis on the way attention mediates experience; they thus attempt to cultivate 
formal and informal means of recognising how attention operates and how it may be 
used more skilfully.  Surprisingly little research has been undertaken on the role of 
attentional variables in other forms of psychological therapy, despite the fairly obvious 
fact that any form of psychological intervention is likely to alter attention in some way.  
Many therapies that promote rapid benefits associated with claims of, as yet, unverified 
mechanisms, may be failing to fully recognise how the culture and enactment of their 
embodied approaches could alter attention and awareness in direct and far-reaching 
ways.68  As noted in Chapter 2, it has been recognised by Brody and Park (2004) that 
some of the benefits of the expressive writing paradigm might be explicable in terms of 
parallels with mindfulness, and there are many examples of developmental creative 
writing activities being linked to the fostering of attention and awareness, for example, 
in aspects of Steiner education. 
                                                 
67
 Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy is now a recommended intervention for depression in the NHS.   
68
 For example, eye-movements and tapping energy meridians. 
208 
 
 
 
Within the psychoanalytic context the imperative to change experience has usually been 
seen as secondary to, and subsumed by, the fundamental work of analysis.  Change 
follows the analytic process of obtaining greater access to experience and of making 
sense of that experience, particularly its relational configuration.  As a result the 
outcome of analytic therapy is, or should be, far more indeterminate than more 
prescriptive styles of intervention.  This is one way in which analysis finds itself 
entering the arena of psychological creativity.  Despite numerous elaborations, the 
process of analytic work remains grounded in the dual foundations of the analysand’s 
openness to their unfolding experience through the paradigmatic injunction to ‘free-
associate’, and the analyst’s attention to this in a manner that has been characterised as 
‘free-floating’ or ‘evenly suspended’ by Freud (1912), ‘reverie’ by Bion (1962), and 
‘listening with the third ear’ by Reik (1948).  This leads to something that Ogden (2001) 
has vividly described as the interplay of “conversations at the frontiers of dreaming”, 
which he explicitly parallels with poetry. 
What I conclude from these observations is that although there is obviously scope to 
develop more systematic forms of ‘writing therapy’, particularly by combining aspects 
of a relational therapeutic framework with different forms of creative and reflective 
writing activity, there may be a more primary way that writing poetry can operate 
beneficially.  This resides in its capacity to facilitate a more creative mode of 
experiencing that has parallels with process or experientially orientated therapies, and 
practices such as meditation and focusing, and yet is also distinct from them in terms of 
the form of the creative work involved.  I would argue that all disciplines bring with 
them cultures and expectations that can distort as well as promote the capacity for more 
creative experience, and that individuals have predilections for different activities or 
combinations of activities.  It is therefore helpful to recognise the specific contribution 
that poetry can make.  
One of the values of a bi-logical understanding of poetry is that it links poetry explicitly 
to conscious and unconscious psychological processes.  This provides support and a 
more substantial theoretical basis for the argument, described in Chapter 2, that the 
differences in mental health difficulties between poets and other creative writers could 
be linked to the different forms of logical or imaginative activity involved (Ludwig, 
1998; Post, 1996).  A bi-logically informed understanding could help structure further 
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investigation in this area, and potentially lead to more refined means of mitigating the 
risks to some individuals. 
10.2.4 The attention paradox 
It took me a considerable time after completing my first-person investigation to find a 
way of conceptualising how my attention altered in the act of writing poetry.  
Formulating this seemed important, as attention was something over which I thought I 
might have some control.  Milner focused on attention for similar reasons although she 
found that, in practice, this was not straightforward.  Fehmi’s work is also based on the 
assumption that attention can be trained but he is clear that making a deliberate effort 
inhibits this.  Similarly, Polanyi did not think tacit knowing could be deliberately 
determined, he saw it developing in highly skilled activities through a process of 
personal apprenticeship to a skilled or master practitioner – somebody who embodied 
the activity.  Meditation practices can also be seen as forms of attention-training, but 
many have observed that there are problems in applying them as ‘techniques’ outside of 
the wider culture in which they were developed, as this normally cultivates change in 
many aspects of an individual’s life and outlook. 
My experience confirms these observations and has led me to an operational view of 
attention that sees it neither as a cause nor effect of my experience.  I often have the 
feeling that I am directing my attention, but when I look more closely I notice that 
usually movements in attention simply take place and that the idea of attending follows.  
In Damasio’s terms, I have a feeling of paying attention but I can’t choose the moment 
when this will occur.  More often my attention is simply moving in correspondence with 
feelings of the moment such as curiosity, concern, boredom, energy, fatigue or external 
demands, none of which I feel I have specifically chosen.  When the sense of selective 
agency arises it is more like a form of remembering.  I remember that I could pay 
attention differently and what follows is a shift in my attention.  I could say that the 
more I have practised this the more I seem to remember, and hence the more refined and 
nuanced this attentional awareness has become.  However, this hides a tautology.  It 
implies that remembering more occurs because of remembering more.  
I think there is a paradox in trying to train attention, or directly alter self-experience, 
that parallels my previous consideration of conscious intention and the writing of 
poetry.  Becoming more aware of the movement of my attention may reflect a 
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metacognitive perspective, but not something that is under simple voluntary control.  
Changes in attention are a shorthand way of referring to changes in conscious awareness 
or modulations of that awareness.  These changes seem to be accompanied by changes 
in self-experience but do not necessarily cause them; it would be more accurate to say 
that they are inseparable from them.  So, paradoxically, this modulation of awareness 
feels like it both arises from and gives rise to the experience of a changed way of being 
in, or following Polanyi, ‘indwelling’ the world.  This, I suspect, is what writing poetry 
may depend on and what good poetry can sometimes stimulate.   
10.3   Research experience and implications 
10.3.1 Challenges of a first-person, creative and critical inquiry 
The form of first-person investigation that I pursued presented a number of inherent 
challenges.  As it transpired, taking my own experience as the focus of study while 
undertaking a creative activity contributed to the very difficulties in writing poetry that 
became central to the inquiry.  I think this was accentuated by my adoption of a 
research-framed approach from the outset, as opposed to following a more open-ended 
and creatively led approach typical of doctorates that are undertaken by creative writing, 
where an original contribution to a genre of writing is the primary imperative.  My 
experience suggests that it is less problematic to undertake creative work and then 
return to reflect on and theorize the process of working later, than to actively combine 
these processes.  However, I think there is much to be gained if sufficient flexibility can 
be established between immersive and reflective levels of experience to make this 
possible.  As I will argue below, these processes can become mutually enriching.  This 
could be seen as one of the methodological conclusions of my investigation: that there is 
a need to develop such flexibility to conduct a critical first-person inquiry into creative 
activity. 
The combination of creative and critical modes of inquiry initially seemed dauntingly 
opposed, but became less so.  I have come to see the challenge that exists here as 
concerning different ways of experiencing and formulating or, after Gendlin (1997a), 
‘carrying-forward’ experience.  Creativity implies some form of making and often 
originality, but critical work can also be ‘creative’ in this sense.  Its opposition to the 
creative seems associated with an idea of criticism as censorious or judgemental, and 
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therefore inhibiting.  However, criticism requires discrimination, and in this sense 
creativity is also ‘critical’, it involves an enhanced capacity to discriminate as well as 
integrate aspects of experience.  Both creative and critical activities depend on some 
source material or experience, and have a recognised form to which the activity leads.  
In poetry the source is, as I have argued, often quite deeply embodied and unconscious, 
and the form is an intensely condensed bi-logical use of language.  In critical 
scholarship the source is often already linguistically formulated and the product needs to 
conform to an abstract kind of reason and logic.  I have found this way of thinking 
helpful, in that it avoids an unhelpful opposition and can aid transition between different 
forms and modes of creative and critical work. 
 I found the self-referential focus of first-person inquiry unrewarding in itself, despite 
the feeling that it could be perceived as self-indulgent.  In fact, as already mentioned, 
the experience seems to have cured me of self-reflective journal writing. What was 
rewarding was finding a way to write poetry that felt meaningful to me, and developing 
a theoretical understanding of my experience that might have wider relevance.  What 
was most problematic in the conduct of the investigation was the indeterminate and 
continuously unfolding nature of my experience.  It was fortuitous that I had to take an 
intermission from study, as this interspersed a pause that I took to define the end of the 
main part of my first-person inquiry and, on resumption, the commencement of a more 
formal analysis of it.  Had this not occurred, it I think I would have found it more 
difficult to impose a defining boundary on my research experience.   
The challenge of theoretical formulation involved both remaining grounded in my 
experience and trying to encompass a diverse range of largely unrelated literatures.  The 
formulation of clear research questions, and the discipline of constructing answers to 
them, assisted both of these problems and helped maintain an integrated focus.  
Although it was a considerable personal challenge to sustain the project over an 
extended period alongside full-time work commitments, I think taking this amount of 
time enabled me to process my experience in some depth and find ways of 
understanding it that I could genuinely own.  I am indebted to Matte Blanco for 
providing me with an underpinning vehicle for this. 
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10.3.2 Reciprocal processes v confounding variables 
My initial research training was in quantitative methods and I am still inclined to 
assume the need to isolate selected variables from other confounding variables in the 
research process.  From this perspective the research approach that was adopted is 
riddled with problems.  For example, the development of some of my core theoretical 
ideas about poetry took place alongside my first-person investigation and cannot be 
simply divorced from it.  While I have attempted to draw upon theory to make sense of 
my research experience, this experience, particularly concerning attentional processes, 
has undoubtedly been influenced by my developing theoretical ideas.  Most powerfully 
I was shocked when reviewing Milner’s work to recognise so much of my thinking and 
experience in her work.  I first read her books over twenty years ago and know that they 
were seminal in shaping my interest in both creative writing and undertaking formal 
training in psychotherapy. 
One artefact of applying assumptions of research control to a first-person investigation 
lies in imagining that its main elements, my experience and my understanding of that 
experience, are best kept separate.  The discipline of trying to separate them, and 
consider their mutual influence, has proved of real practical and abstract theoretical 
value in the project, but the operational reality is that they function in recursive patterns 
of mutual influence.  In Gendlin’s terms, my understanding serves to carry forward my 
experience and in so doing helps set the context for new forms of experience to arise.  I 
believe, for example, that Milner’s work must have shaped my own experience but one 
could also ask why was Milner’s work so meaningful to me?  Perhaps it was resonating 
with aspects of my experience but not completely adequately, it may then have set in 
motion a need to explore this more fully for myself.  This understanding may not satisfy 
those who seek knowledge that looks objectively unassailable, but it has the validity of 
that form of knowledge that is both reasoned and feels true to first-person experience.  It 
is important, however, to remember that both kinds of knowledge are always open to 
change and development. 
10.3.3 Value of the research approach 
The research approach adopted was very much a ‘bricolage’, a term used by Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) and McLeod (2001) to describe the need for qualitative researchers to 
use whatever methods and strategies seem most suited to their research aims, and to do 
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so in a way that reflects what they bring to the research as unique individuals.  As such, 
it cannot provide a map for future research although it may provide a stimulus to further 
innovation.  I believe it has, however, illustrated the utility of the framework proposed 
by Reason and Heron (Heron & Reason, 1997), presented in a modified form in Table 
3.2.  The distinctions this framework makes between experiential, presentational, 
propositional and practical knowledge had a guiding influence on the conduct of the 
study and its eventual structure.  This has offered a valuable holding frame of reference 
that supports the relevance of this model beyond the context of participative inquiry.   
Although it was recognised at the outset that the study would be into ‘lived’ experience 
it was not clear the extent to which this would, in practice, involve working directly 
with embodied experience, or the degree to which theoretical development would be so 
dependent on an embodied or enacted understanding that preceded words.  This ‘felt’ 
understanding seemed to guide the search for suitable theory, and then developed in 
response to the selection and integration of ideas.  This process has strong connections 
with the forms of “embodied enquiry” described by Todres (2007) drawing on the 
phenomenological tradition and the work of Gendlin.  The fact that this took place 
without any prior commitment to this approach could be taken as strongly corroborative 
of the importance and value of embodied experience in first-person research and 
theorising. 
Since I started the investigation, there have been calls for research that is more relevant 
to the experiential dimensions of creativity and that is consonant with the therapeutic 
dimensions of poetry.  For example Petrucci observes: 
…there is hardly a surfeit of concerted and applied research concerning the ways in 
which creativity functions at its root, or looking (for example) at the processes and 
types of creativity which occur across disciplines, cultures and histories. Some warm-
blooded attention in this area (rather than icy analysis) would be fascinating and 
fruitful. 
An experiential, participative, empirical approach would do well as one possible 
starting point in this enterprise. We need to develop modes of analysis (or rather, 
engagement) which take into account the heuristic nature of creativity, and which 
themselves embrace its experimentation and play.  (Petrucci, 2001, paras. 7-8) 
With regard to poetry therapy Furman (2006) observes that traditional methods of 
research might be inadequate to the needs and values of those using poetry 
therapeutically.  She advocates the exploration of new methods including the use of 
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poems as research, as does Speedy (2008) who, starting from a narrative perspective, 
has become increasingly convinced of the value of attending to and utilizing poetic 
language in therapy and research. 
The main methodology of this study has been the writing of poems and an 
accompanying form of reflective ‘writing as inquiry’; it is thus an example of what 
Furman is calling for and what Speedy is persuaded of.  It has also been rooted in an 
experiential process similar to what Petrucci’s envisioned.  In practice, this has involved 
not only warm-blooded attention but a good deal of cooler thinking.  I would like to 
think that this is nevertheless a strength of the work undertaken:  the combination of the 
creative and critical, if not in balance, at least in a helpful interplay.  For this reason, it 
was important for me to present a selection of my poems as an integral part of the thesis, 
whatever their merits as poems may be.  Although commented on they are intended to 
invite their own reading, and reading between the lines.  I hope that this will enable 
readers to glean a richer feeling for the study and provide a complementary source of 
insight into what emerged. 
10.4   Nondual imagination and the poetics of experience 
I will conclude by offering some lines of thinking that emerge from the study and that 
could benefit from further research and creative inquiry.  These can be introduced as a 
response to Auden’s frequently quoted line: “poetry makes nothing happen”, which 
seems incompatible with the thesis presented here.  However, when viewed in its 
original context, Auden was not asserting this as one-sidedly as is often assumed: 
For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives 
In the valley of its making where executives  
Would never want to tamper, flows on south  
From ranches of isolation and the busy griefs,  
Raw towns that we believe and die in; it survives,  
A way of happening, a mouth.69 
                                                 
69
 From In Memory of W.B.Yeats (Auden, 1991). 
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As Szirtes observes, it is all too easy to miss the counterpoint that poetry is “a way of 
happening”.  However, he goes on to ask:  “what does it mean to be ‘a way of 
happening’?  Does it mean anything at all?” (Szirtes, 2005) 
The answer suggested by this investigation is that writing poetry, and by extension its 
reading, can be viewed as a way of experiencing that can give access to a changed 
experience of self and the world.  This is rooted in the nature of poetry, particularly its 
association with alterations in the quality of awareness, which can reveal a poetics of 
experience beyond the limits of conventional thought.   
In describing poetry Hirschfield captures the essence of this ‘poetics of experience’: 
…it will know more than can be said in any other way. And because it thinks by 
music and image, by story and passion and voice, poetry can do what other forms of 
thinking cannot: approximate the actual flavor of life, in which subjective and 
objective become one, in which conceptual mind and the inexpressible presence of 
things become one. Letting this wideness of being into ourselves, as readers or as 
writers, while staying close to the words themselves, we begin to find in poems a way 
of entering both language and being on their own terms. Poetry leads us into the self, 
but also away from it.  (Hirschfield, 1997, p. 32) 
10.4.1 Poiesis revisited 
A way of experiencing implies an active process with respect to that which is ‘being’ 
experienced.  The roots of poetry in poiesis are suggestive of the nature of this action 
that “transform and continues the world” and “reconciles thought with matter and time 
and man with the world”.70  This is more than simply making, or bringing into being; it 
points to an unfolding and continuity of being in the world. 
The model of poetic creation implicit in the bi-logical view developed here reflects 
more than the activity of the repressed unconscious, or simply the creative 
representation of the unconscious in a conscious form.  Rather the creative process 
requires a complex coordination between conscious and unconscious forms of thinking 
and feeling to create new forms that carry forward both.  This process involves a 
modulation of attention and awareness and is also the generator of new forms of 
experience, or ways of experiencing.  As Hirschfield states: “while writing the mind 
                                                 
70
 From Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poiesis, accessed 20 July 2008. 
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moves between consciousness and the unconscious in the effortless effort of 
concentration.” (1997, p. 16)  
Matte Blanco argued that for symmetric thinking to enter consciousness at all requires 
some form of translation or unfolding function.  This meant that conscious thinking 
could only represent symmetric logic in a modified or indirect way.  He suggested this 
could be visualized by mapping points in a higher dimension of space to the 
corresponding points represented in a lower dimension.  Thus if you picture the corners 
of a triangle that has been cut out from a card they are clearly spread out; however, 
looked at endways they correspond to three points on a line.  The reality of a two-
dimensional space is always modified when it is represented in a one-dimensional form; 
it thus loses some of its most important qualities.  This is equivalent to saying that 
poetry cannot be paraphrased. 
Moving in the opposite direction, if you take a one-dimensional form like a line and 
imagine bending it round until the ends touch, you have created a circle which contains 
a two-dimensional space.  Similarly, if you fold the line ninety degrees at three 
equidistant points and join the ends you enclose a two dimensional space in the shape of 
a square.   Through similar acts of folding you can move from a two-dimensional space 
to a three dimensional one, which should be apparent if you imagine how a box can be 
formed from making a series of folds in a flat sheet of cardboard.  From a mathematical 
point of view this process can be carried on indefinitely.  From a poetic point of view 
we have an analogy for how high levels of symmetry may be enclosed in language by 
increased amounts of asymmetric differentiation.  In poetry the symmetrical mode does 
not appear to be simply unfolded or translated into a conscious form of thinking.  On the 
contrary, it seems more accurate to say that it emerges actively enfolded in language.  
We might imagine this as arising through the construction of numerous linguistic folds 
where the differentiated words, sounds and images are bent back to meet in symmetrical 
patterns of identity. 
In the practice of writing poetry the process of folding and unfolding can take place 
repeatedly in the search for adequate means for ultimately embodying patterns of 
identity and difference that arise from experience.  A bit like origami it may take an 
extremely complex series of folds, creases and tucks before any worthwhile poetic 
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shape can be achieved.  In the meantime, from my experience, quite a lot of paper ends 
up in the basket. 
This idea of repeatedly moving between an integrating and differentiating process when 
writing poetry parallels Bollas’ analytic description of how creative use is made of 
objects to elaborate experience.  Bollas (1995) proposes that in creativity there is a 
largely unconscious process of repeatedly ‘cracking up’ and recombining experience.  
He argues that this is at the heart of the dream-work and the process of free association 
in psychoanalysis.  Psychic experience or intensities gather or combine into the 
symbolic contents of dreams, which are cracked up by free association and are then 
recombined into further emerging themes.  He posits this as the psychoanalytic 
equivalent of the process of artistic creativity that works through alternating processes 
of fragmenting and unifying experience in the medium of the art form.    
10.4.2 Self or no-self? 
To view poetic creation as way of experiencing, including experiencing ‘the self’, is 
consistent with models that emphasize the active verb-like quality of self-experience 
and see it as arising in the context of an active process.  Such models typically 
emphasize the sense of self that arises in the context of the activity of language, or the 
activity of the body.  The approach, in both cases, involves demonstrating that the self 
being delineated is inseparable from a wider process of which it is an arising aspect.  
For example Damasio does this in terms of a bodily derived core consciousness, 
whereas Moran (1993) does so in the context of language by proposing that ‘language’ 
and ‘self’ are an interdependent duality, that is as a recursive process, rather than 
viewing them dualistically as two separate things.71 
One difficulty with this general conceptual approach is that the sense of inseparability is 
experientially and linguistically difficult to keep hold of.  It is easier to grasp the self as 
something emergent from the process, or to equate it with the process.  In this way the 
self either becomes separate again or easily disappears into being something else, such 
as a reductive identification with ‘language’ or ‘the body’.  I think one reason for this is 
made clear in Damasio’s work.  The self doesn’t feel like a process, it has a feeling of 
                                                 
71
 Moran’s work is based on an application of Giddens’ (1986) concept of structuration; this views 
structures and actions of elements within structures as mutually determinative. 
218 
 
 
 
‘being’ that makes it seem natural to refer to it as a noun.  I experience myself as fluid 
and changing, but not as a process of change. 
The key problem is how to grasp the condition of being non-separate while retaining the 
feeling of ‘being’ that is normally associated with an identification with the sense of 
being separate from something else.  A particular use of the term duality may be 
illuminating here.  Whereas dualism refers to the idea of two distinct or separate things 
that may be in interaction, duality can be used to refer to a fundamental identity between 
different phenomena or processes.  Probably the most famous of these is the wave-
particle duality of light in which two different and separately useful descriptions of light 
are mathematically equivalent.  So the question ceases to be whether light is a wave or a 
particle, ‘it’ is simply observed to ‘behave’ in a way that corresponds to both.   
The question then is whether such a recognition of ‘identity in difference’ can also be 
experienced with regard to the self and whether it would cast any light on the debate 
about self versus no-self.  I suspect that it is frequently experienced but that it is almost 
invariably interpreted in a dualistic or asymmetric manner.  As previously discussed, 
the feeling of becoming one with experience can be highly valued, but it is usually 
conceived as some form of ‘merger’, not access to a fundamental identity.  It has largely 
been the province of religion and the poetic imagination to try to configure a more 
direct perception of this.  The understanding I have of my experience indicates that this 
is because it cannot by achieved by conceptual understanding alone.   It does, however, 
seem accessible to the exercise of a process of nondual imagination that can be fostered 
through the bi-logical structure of poetry, and through other attentional or contemplative 
disciplines such as meditation. 
10.4.3 The nondual imagination 
To take a nondual perspective is an act of apparent negation.  It is an assertion, or 
experience, that things do not essentially exist separately, even though they may still 
appear to do so.  It is thus a rejection of dualism.  However, this is not the same as the 
assertion that things are essentially one, as in monism, which is a conceptual belief 
about reality.  Nonduality, in the sense that I am employing it, is a verbal pointer 
towards identity in difference not an essentialist statement about unity.  It implies that it 
is in difference that the experience of a deeper identity can be found.  However, to 
recognize this one must see through the appearance of separateness. 
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The bi-logical structure of poetry can potentially foster a process of this kind through its 
integration of principles of identity and differentiation, or symmetric and asymmetric 
logic.  This can be conceived of, as an active process of imagination, in which the 
capacity of symmetric logic to find identity in difference is given unusually free 
attentional play and, with the concurrent intensification of asymmetric functioning, is 
able to bring this into conscious awareness.  Through this process of nondual 
imagination an increased fluidity of experience is made possible including changes in 
the boundaries and form of self-experience. 
From a nondual perspective any definitive statement about the self’s existence is 
problematic and circular because it assumes a dualistic view: self or no-self.  This is 
illustrated in religious traditions that have well-developed nondual teachings such as 
Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta in Hinduism.  Buddhism is often thought to promote a 
belief in no-self, but the Buddha is clearly reported to have refused to answer the 
question of whether there was or wasn’t a self, because to do so would reinforce the 
very dualism that he saw as at the centre of suffering (Bhikkhu, 2004).  The teaching of 
‘anatta’ or no-self is thought by some Buddhist scholars, such as Bhikkhu, to be better 
rendered as ‘not-self’ and employed as a practical strategy for deconstructing habitual 
forms of self-experience.  As Loy (1988) has pointed out, the problem with describing a 
nondual perspective is that it inevitably becomes interpreted in terms of our 
conventional experience.  Thus to say things are not fundamentally separate is 
understood as saying things are one.  Given that our experience is structured in terms of 
what is self and what is the world or other, this leads to a conundrum which is typically 
resolved by denying the reality of one or other pole.   Thus there is a tendency to deny 
the self in the Buddhist outlook and to see the world as illusory within Hinduism. 
Seen as a way of experiencing, rather than as an ontology, the nondual imagination can 
gives rise to movements in the experience of self and world that are potentially radical 
and transformative, even when only transitory.  This can be illustrated by glimpsing the 
infinite not as an idea but as an imaginative and poetic experience.  Logical thought 
leads us to the idea of infinity because we can understand that the largest number we 
can think of could always have one added to it.  However, this does not enable us to 
imagine it.  There seems to be no adequate means of representation.  And yet, for many 
people, the contemplation of infinity does give rise to a definite quality of experience, 
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for if infinity cannot be imagined then neither can a completely finite world.  Blake has 
immortalized his poetic rendering of this:  
To see infinity in a grain of sand, 
And heaven in a wild flower, 
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, 
And eternity in an hour.72 
 
The key Blake offers is to see the infinite in the particular, to find one within the folds 
of the other.  This is not a reductive process but a dialectical one.  Through it we may 
glimpse how the ‘concrete universal’ (Wimsatt, 1954) could come to exist in poetry.  In 
mathematical terms an infinite set is made up of a potentially infinite number of 
elements; it is only when there are an infinite number of elements that any particular 
element can be treated as identical to the whole set.  This means that the capacity for 
ever greater differentiation is directly associated with a state of identity with a wider 
whole.  As Matte Blanco noted: “It can be said that it is in the infinite that both natures 
of man, the symmetrical and the asymmetrical, meet.” (Matte Blanco, 1975, p. 289) 
What in conscious thought can only be conceived with difficulty may at an unconscious 
level be recognized through a form of felt experience.  This constitutes a type of 
knowing which may only achieve realization through an act of imagination that can 
both unfold and enfold it in a particular created form.  This activity is at the heart of the 
nondual imagination and, from it, can offer an ever-changing and poetic relationship 
with lived experience.  As a result we may recognize ourselves in the words of Milosz 
(2006): “And yet the world is different from what it seems to be / and we are other than 
how we see ourselves in our ravings.”  Ultimately, one of poetry’s deepest personal 
values might be its capacity to dismantle and flexibly re-configure the boundaries of 
self-experience. 
The purpose of poetry is to remind us 
how difficult it is to remain just one person, 
for our house is open, there are no keys in the doors, 
and invisible guests come in and out at will.73 
                                                 
72
 From Auguries of Innocence. 
73
 From Ars Poetica? by Czelaw Milosz (2006). 
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Appendix I 
Poem written for a poetry course in 2001 at the start of the investigation. 
 
Neanderthal Man 
It stills my heart to find you here again 
within the soil and fossil faeces spread, 
a broken record built from your remains 
to reconstruct our life beyond the dead. 
The sharpened flints in layered ashes tell 
a tale of fireside feastings spent together, 
of meat that’s gone before its bone that fell  
to ground and on to splinter time forever. 
The story written now unfolds, your life 
in brief, a short uncertain pained affair, 
inscribed in dust as ruthless risk and strife, 
a life demeaned, deformed and unaware. 
Can I conclude this reading of your part –  
or is it you, in deed, that reads my heart? 
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Appendix II 
Adolescent poem written circa 1972. 
 
Am I thinking? 
Am I thinking when 
My feelings take control? 
When anger burns a hole 
In my good nature 
So easily destroyed. 
When sorrow saps the strength 
Of my beliefs, 
To leave me searching. 
 
Is it good to have a mind 
Which rejects one’s own emotions as alien? 
Which rationalises at the approach of love, 
Philosophises at the approach of death. 
 
Thought in conflict with emotion 
Leads me to confusion. 
Is it poetry or words? 
Love or desire? 
Am I thinking when 
My feelings take control? 
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Appendix III 
The collection of spontaneous’ free-lined’ writing from my reflective journal, which was 
presented in supervision at the beginning of the third year of the investigation.  
Reproduced without modification or correction in the journal’s standard print format. 
 
# My body aches  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 11, 2003, 5:24 AM 
 
my body aches 
my eyes are shut 
I feel discomfort 
in my gut 
I want to lie 
my body down 
until its lying  
on the ground 
then let sweet peace 
sliding creep 
as I drift back 
off to sleep 
 
 
# Oh God!  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 11, 2003, 1:08 PM 
 
Oh God!  oh no, not this 
a kind of trying to create 
a verse from nothing 
not even the hiss 
of gushing steam 
emoitons dammed 
to hold a dream. 
 
So now I wonder why 
I try, to put together 
words at all, just 
silly sonnets to apall 
my finder tastes 
and sentiments 
a kind of purile 
linement. 
 
Whatever functions 
so to jest 
this sorry tableaux 
wins no prizes 
just a pattern 
to entertain 
guns and roses 
are what remain. 
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Will I continue 
in this part 
lines gettting shorter 
and out of sorts 
only a fashionable 
rendering finds 
this cry of pain 
from far behind. 
 
 
# This is rubbish  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 12, 2003, 5:44 AM 
 
This is rubbish, your descent is like a cry 
against all dreams and anguishments 
this is rubbish you insist and who am I to deny. 
Words on pages what can it mean? 
much less what will its value be 
why even bother - well why? 
 
I'm counting numbers in my head 
trying to form a symmetry 
putting in some sequence what appears 
brooding in autistic misery. 
can't imagine what's the point 
of such an unextended, homespun jaunt. 
 
So now you're rhyming you decry 
a load of cobblers bye and bye 
Into couplets off we go 
shunting crap under the snow. 
Now the truth, what a wastrel word 
is ready to fly, oh my god - 
like a bird. 
 
So how much more must we endure 
of poxy verse and rhyming cure 
tum de tum de tum de tum 
get a flannel and wipe my bum 
brought a smile to my face 
a gurgled chuckle of disgrace. 
 
 
# Blood supply  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 14, 2003, 5:40 AM 
 
There was blood in my veins  
but it is not blood I feel now 
pulsing under the skin 
more the restless passage 
of fragmented separations 
each adding to the weight 
that anchors to the ground 
the quick drying cement 
still setting below the surface 
to form a watertight barrier. 
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Not the elasticity of skin 
but a compulsive layer of the mind 
suffocating the conscious heart 
from its arterial supply 
 
 
# Beach photograph [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 15, 2003, 6:23 AM 
 
On the beach circa 1930 
bare feet on the shingle 
hands clenched on knees 
a shy smile and double crown. 
The dark blazer reminding 
of school and separation 
a formal cut against the skin 
stinging out through the softeness 
of shorts and T-shirt 
against the backdrop  
of the wooden breakwater. 
 
She stands behind you, 
her hair bunned, 
a floral print dress 
with matching bonnet 
clutched to her waist 
a domed swollen womb 
without place of entry 
or departure 
just the silent swell 
of the sea  
in the distance. 
 
Taking her home 
Leaving you there 
 
 
# The dump  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 16, 2003, 6:07 AM 
 
They made an overture of silence 
staring towards our car 
as we pulled into the yard 
one tall and mained 
with scuffed cowboy boots 
the other cropped and squat 
filling an outstretched shirt 
with his blown belly. 
They eyed us at a distance 
as we lifted the boot of the car 
against the smell 
and dragged out ourlatest losses 
gifts for the burial 
glimpsing a lifetime of attachments 
unfit for charity 
too good for the dump 
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in want of adoption 
but recycling now 
towards a changed future. 
What a waste we thought 
as they lit up their fags. 
 
 
# DIY  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 17, 2003, 6:20 AM 
 
The house isn't falling down 
but it claims to be: 
the wallpaper lifting around the fire, 
the worktop spltting behind the sink, 
the paint bruised and hand marked  
beside the creaking stairs. 
All groans and grimaces 
magnified through the eyes 
of an imagined guest 
walking up the drive 
past the flourish of weeds in block paving 
past the peeling garage door 
into the unfinished porch 
and half-tiled cloakroom. 
Work to be done 
care to be taken 
time to be spent 
nag, nag, nag 
but life is too long 
and this moment too brief 
to spend it decorating 
what improvements are possible? 
 
or ... 
 
but life is so vast 
and this mement so brief 
what improvements are possible? 
 
 
# Speech  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 18, 2003, 5:42 AM 
 
One million conversations  
carried over dinner tables 
through doorways 
along the street 
within buildings 
through open windows 
in and out of cars. 
 
Words sent by air 
stirred by open throats 
shaped by lips 
and moving tongues 
into a vibration 
which posts 
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a pulse of meaning. 
 
again, and again 
the same pattern 
with different effects. 
Ears that can never 
be closed only covered 
by failed reception 
disabled by hand 
or a fixed mind 
 
But when you 
are noisely silent 
I hear everything, 
I feel it in my bones 
and shudder 
listening closely  
to a million missed moments 
for saying something. 
 
 
# Changing places [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 19, 2003, 5:36 AM 
 
We're going back in search of something 
travelling through time down dirt roads 
past waving tea cotton fields 
to a  roadside stopping 
where passing traffic presses us 
like cornered convicts 
up against a wattle fence. 
 
A proposterous bus turns 
its driver descending 
a shotgunless woman 
who conducts us into a tumbledown mansion 
with rooms that change shape 
moved by pulleys and sheet slings, 
today it is set 'all square'. 
 
Surely we're dreaming 
of something forgotten 
climbing stairs to another level 
and then struggling to locate 
the missing pieces 
hesitating among the embanked cascade 
of exotic ornaments 
thinking of  an aunt or aya 
who never knew anything like it. 
 
I pick up some oars 
and ready myself 
for the long row 
back home. 
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# Being bodies  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 20, 2003, 6:15 AM 
 
She swings at the hip, side to side 
while heading forwards, oblivious  
to the space she takes in my imagination. 
He bobs up and down like he's treading 
on water, never sure of finding breath. 
I see one flesh split in two 
all activity below the waist 
short legs racing overtime 
spine set in a flagpole freeze; 
then caught off guard by flayling arms 
I duck (as usual) and notice 
rolling, nodding, flicking heads, 
hair that moves in and out of eyes 
and people who don't seem to move at all 
getting from A to B by an act of grace 
floating over the ground silently 
going perpetually down hill. 
We have our signatures of movement 
natured or nurtured 
the stamp is upon us 
as we go about our business 
of being bodies, oscilating in the world. 
 
 
# Cornucopia  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 21, 2003, 6:43 AM 
 
A single flower and six gold circles labelled soul 
is the card I chose for you this morning 
in response to your farewell message, 
carefully writing your new address 
on the embossed yellow envelope. 
Cornucopia - the name conjures 
with the imagination, placing you at the heart 
of the past, on a ridge overflowing 
towards the future. 
 
 
# Demon lover  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 23, 2003, 5:25 AM 
 
Under the half light 
poised from the ege of sleep 
I sip a mug of hot tea 
and ponder this moment 
in silent reverie. 
 
Nearby lurks your image 
just hiddenf from view 
but sensed in my body 
a suggestion of excitement 
a button to be bruised. 
 
Alongside this feeling 
but more deeply set 
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sits another constellation 
a profound kind of sadness 
an echo of regret. 
 
What circumstances spawned you? 
what secrets do you hide? 
the power at your disposal 
builds like a volcanoe 
but is lost to my life. 
 
The shadow of an object 
caught once in bright light 
when this mind was exposed 
to a haunting fixation 
more body than clothes. 
 
Yet hiding behind this 
is a sense of an absence 
a darkness and void 
where ties are abandoned 
and fears unallloyed. 
 
Not quite free to love you 
or hate you or both 
I swing in a circle 
and pay homage by inflation 
to a false host. 
 
 
# Lost(v1)  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 24, 2003, 5:31 AM 
 
A ball over the fence 
six thousand men in  one battle 
the sun 
your face in the crowd 
a golden opportunity 
time 
my friend in day-dreaming 
two pins on the floor 
her life 
somewhere in translation 
between the sheets 
and found 
an opportunity 
all hope 
my sense of direction 
count of the falling leaves 
in anticipation 
in the maze of streets 
property 
luggage 
an important match 
all hope of ever finding 
the plot 
sheep 
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somewhere in the past 
leaving behind a gaping void 
and now we mourn 
our chance 
the burden that we carried 
the family pet 
her name when she married 
their freedom 
his ability to run 
most of my hair 
a good job 
her innocence 
in admiration 
all our certainties 
the invitation 
my sense of regret 
all their inhibitions 
what is dear to me 
the front door keys 
at sea 
despite taking precautions 
sight of the ground 
among the clouds 
without hope 
to an extreme religous cult 
up his own backside 
where we were coming from 
faith in the system (politicians)  
the feeling of pain 
your smile 
 
 
# Lostv2)  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 24, 2003, 7:45 AM 
 
A ball over the fence 
six thousand men in one battle 
your face in the crowd 
his ability to run  
all hope. 
 
Our faith in politicians 
up their own backsides 
to an extreme religious cult  
the invitation 
sheep in sleep 
 
then in a day-dream 
the count of  falling leaves 
too much of his hair is 
deep in the past, lost 
in time 
 
Charlie, the family pet 
- her name when she married 
the burden that we carried 
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my sense of regret 
her innocence 
 
A golden opportunity 
between the sheets 
two pins on the floor 
somewhere through translation 
her life 
 
A crucial match 
our one and only chance 
what is dear to me 
all of our certainties both 
the gist and the plot 
 
Their freedom and dignity 
despite taking those precautions 
the feeling of pain 
the taste for rich food 
your wry smile 
 
Now, as well, their inhibitions 
in admiration to a premonition 
property and luggage 
the keys to the cellar 
a good job 
 
My sense of direction 
in the maze of narrow streets  
where we were coming from 
the sun again behind the clouds 
souls at sea 
 
Lost  
 
and then we found 
 
a ball over the fence… 
 
 
# My IT  [Daily Journal Entry] Aug 27, 2003, 5:24 AM 
 
Just sitting - body stiff and complaining - mind dense with sleep - emerging from 
an obsessive dead end - going on for ever to achieve the security of order... 
 
Looking to defragment 
a density of mind 
I press a key 
start to scribble lists 
on endless sheets of paper 
rename files on 'my computer' 
and disappear for a day or two 
into a loft full of accumulations 
things that were once 
too good  to chuck away 
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constructing an inventory  
of unmet needs 
a reassuring sense of order 
and a long term plan 
to revise my life 
again 
in the face of unfixed bugs 
and security alerts. 
 
[after a number of days spent sorting out my computer in prep for getting on with 
my DPhil - got quite obsessive and exciting and then became tedious and 
tiresome 
 
# Riches of sorrow [Daily Journal Entry] Sep 2, 2003, 5:25 AM 
 
So in the morning I grieve 
line after line in the simplest of fashions 
lowering the drawbridge 
and penetrating the thickened walls 
through an open wound 
gashed beneath the watchtower. 
 
I look up and see nonone there 
they are lying down  
exhausted by years of vigilance, 
responding to my call 
and finally handing over keys 
 
that turn slowly 
crack after crack within the lock 
to steal into the place 
kept safe from penetration 
protected from view 
and the presence of witnesses. 
 
Each step is a word 
written to take me a fraction further 
towards the residue 
the accumulated remains that form 
the riches of sorrow. 
 
 
# Head in hands  [Daily Journal Entry] Sep 3, 2003, 5:33 AM 
 
Gone is the language of Boromir 
Gone is the language of expectation. 
 
I just sit here with head in hands 
drooped and drowning 
wondering what to do when words don't flow 
sinking back towards a dreamy oblivion. 
So be it on the edge of sleep 
trying to lower my standards enough 
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to take a walk across the page, 
my fingers doing their stuff 
everything else poised but doubtful. 
 
Kind of playing with the idea 
that from such beginnings 
something may emerge that carries 
more than this sense of randomness 
a fleeting touch, a brush with a deeper truth, 
maybe a breakthrough in human understanding 
that gives the game away 
that tells the whole truth 
the complete truth and nothing but. 
 
 
# Rendered  [Daily Journal Entry] Sep 8, 2003, 5:22 AM 
 
An hour in my life 
sixty minutes of waiting 
the incessant whisper 
of anxious voices 
only time will tell 
where this will lead. 
 
The weight of words 
heavy to the touch 
shuffles me down 
in an unmeasured  
descent 
a series of lines 
tracking closer to 
what matters 
raising the alarms 
that usher me on 
the whelming 
presence that longs 
for a living and yet 
veers in patterns 
of escape. 
 
I am rendered by a wall 
forty eight courses wide 
measured across the base 
in concentric annual rings 
made of engineering bricks 
hardened to a brittle temper. 
 
The surface is stone cold 
blunting tips of penetration 
but up above heat escape 
forming clouds that rain 
down in one eroded spot 
where a crack has split 
 
through to an unknown  
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depth.  I gauge the wall 
for movement and find 
a leaning to the right. 
 
We are digging for safety 
in the soft ground 
advised to underpin 
but only forming shallow graves 
in the running sand. 
 
Stepping back exhausted  
you hold my hand 
and lead me away 
to open land 
 
 
# Lower your standards    [Daily Journal Entry]   Sep 10, 2003, 5:46 AM 
 
Lower your standards 
let them fall 
down to the groveling 
ground 
abandon all hope 
of winning back 
in you hand  
the caress of angels 
the charmed look 
of one who knows 
open up instead 
to the grotesque 
darkness of the morning 
the sinking feeling 
guts wrenched by what is not 
a pretty picture. 
 
 
# Freezing heart  [Daily Journal Entry] Sep 10, 2003, 6:20 AM 
 
That deep cold of morning 
lying under shielding sheets 
the stiff blankets tucked under 
the metal framed bunk bed. 
A figure clicks a toggle switch 
and an element glows, a feeble 
amber in the curtained room. 
A smell of damp and singing hair. 
Then ripped back the sharp light enters 
tearing at the pitch 
scorching my eyes. 
Diving deeper into womb of sleep 
I wank desperately to keep my heart from freezing 
Stepping out at the third set of shouts 
from up the stairs 
the rug cold under my feet 
my thin vest remaining against my skin 
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as I struggle with shirt buttons and long socks. 
I carry the tie down 
to be dressed 
against the day. 
 
 
# Autumn voices  [Daily Journal Entry] Sep 11, 2003, 5:52 AM 
 
What's the point of autumn voices 
of opening up old wounds to winters penetration 
just a gabble gobble along the way 
It recedes in waves then breaks again 
against the surface of my eyes. 
I am blinded,   my sight is lost 
anger prickles with a tell tale sensitivity 
you know more than you can tell 
but do you dare to  speak? 
I am figthing tiredness, the undertow 
pulling me down into an abandoned stillness 
a place beneath words or easy formulation. 
Yes you are sensitive, raw to the touch 
burning with a host of smarting remembrances 
which you have forgotten 
against which you rise up  into detached grace 
oblivious, so you claim, to people and places 
and moods and gossip 
but don't scream - it may be too late. 
Maybe the mould is set and all you are doing 
is refiling it. Refilling not reshaping 
no time for sculpture or new creation 
just a thousan repeating copies 
perhaps a thousand and one. 
 
 
#  City of London Cemetry     [Daily Journal Entry]   Sep 12, 2003, 5:23 AM 
 
Travelling underground to Manor Park 
but arriving there on the surface 
ready to make the final pilgramage 
on foot, along the busy East London roads 
past the municipal roots of Epping Forrest 
along the boundary of the cemetry wall. 
Here the City of London is once removed 
incorporated on 81 hectacres and open 
to a quarter million visitors a year. 
merging into the statistic I am greeted  
by the striking rows of those selected to remain 
stone upon stone along avenues of trees 
broken up with flowers and signs 
pointing to the chapels and crematoria, 
new and old, an efficient business is going on 
vehicles calmly arriving at dignified speed 
mourners huddling together in groups 
that meet in sporadic conversation 
that stare at floral tributes 
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and listen to the words they only half believe. 
I pick out your flowers - to one side 
now wet and a little faded 
read the messages 
and slip away. 
wanting to be alone with my own thoughts 
not sure why I am here today 
but following the pull of something 
towards you. 
As I sit quietly, wondering and waiting, 
bemused and uncertain there is a change of pace 
a slowing of mind and a new perception 
a rising of forms, rising up into the air 
and reaching out to me, a mass exodus 
a peel of silent thunder that tears open my throat 
I am left sobbing for no reason that I know 
 
Dust to dust  the pattern never changes 
apart from the mess in the middle. 
 
 
# Survival  [Daily Journal Entry] Sep 13, 2003, 6:13 AM 
 
Tracking a descent into the long grass 
outside of the range of what it means 
to be reminded. 
Putting together sentences 
line by line in expectation 
of some deliverance. 
Still she calls me from the door, 
worried and distraught 
fiddling with her apron strings, 
staring into space 
leaving us with diminishing returns 
an inner emptiness 
What is lacking is without substance 
or definition, a parody of need, 
an incestuous reinvention, 
layer upon layer of torn fabric 
stretched to fit an inflacted form, 
a body to be admired 
offering up every desire to consumation 
penetrating the vacuum 
with the promise of survival. 
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Appendix IV 
Journal draft: Paper wings – subsequently revised into ‘Invisible man’. 
 
# Paper wings  [Daily Journal Entry] Oct 7, 2003, 6:28 AM 
 
 
 
Walking past an October night 
 
armbands glowing to avoid 
 
oncoming traffic 
 
but still 
 
drivers swerve late 
 
to avoid the invisible man 
 
I am not what I think, I think 
 
stariing out from blindness 
 
mind no longer refuelling 
 
rooted in a body 
 
but raised from the ground 
 
both feet in the air 
 
quite still 
 
like someone with paper wings 
 
and remarkable vision. 
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Appendix V 
Complete passage from Hunt & West (2006, pp. 170-171) providing a description of  
Celia Hunt’s perspective on the presentation of my uncrafted writing in supervision:  
 
Celia: It’s taken me a long time to feel comfortable with my approach and I am learning 
all the time. What seems to me now to be crucial is deep listening, of the kind that goes 
on in a therapeutic context proper, paying attention to what is said and the way it is said, 
as well as to what is not said or only implied. Here’s an example. One of my research 
students, whom I’ll call Peter, has been doing a self-exploratory project over the last 
four years, looking at his own experience of creative writing in order to understand 
better its potential developmental effects. He’s a healthcare professional and well used 
to reflecting on himself. The first couple of years of our working together involved 
discussion of Peter’s creative writing in progress, work that he was trying to craft into 
its final form and with which he often felt dissatisfied. Then he brought me a batch of 
spontaneous personal material in poetic form that he had made no attempt to craft; it 
was simply in its raw state. This felt like a very important stage in the research 
relationship. Sufficient trust must have been built up to enable Peter to allow me to see 
this deeply personal material devoid of the distance that craft provides.  
I read the work several times, noticed some recurring themes that seemed significant at 
a personal level, but wasn’t sure whether I should point them out or whether I should 
focus on the potential of the writing for further development. I found it quite difficult to 
know how I should respond and thought long and hard about it. I wrote myself some 
notes and decided to wait and see what the next meeting brought. What I remember of 
our discussion is that we talked primarily about the potential of the material for further 
development into poems. I think I said what I liked, how it made me feel, but I also 
remember clearly saying something about the themes I saw emerging, although we 
didn’t discuss these. Subsequently Peter became quite depressed. This lasted for about a 
month during which he seemed unable to proceed with the research, but then it lifted. 
When he started writing crafted poems again, something had definitely changed. There 
was more self-presence, a deep and often quite subtle focusing-in on a particular feeling 
or experience. 
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Recently, I asked Peter whether it was my mention of the themes in the material that 
had triggered the depression and, to my surprise, he said he had no recollection of my 
doing so; rather what he remembered was that I had ‘received’ the material with 
interest, and had discussed it with him from the point of view of its potential for poems. 
Clearly something of a therapeutic nature was taking place here, a kind of ‘cracking-
up’, to use Bollas’s term. Peter was able to let go of his concern with crafting his poems 
and to risk bringing something new into the open, within a research relationship that 
provided a ‘safe-enough’ container for this to happen. It reminds me of what Bollas says 
about developing a ‘self-analytic attitude’, a reflexive stance in relation to oneself, 
which helps to facilitate the ‘arrival of news from the self’ (Bollas, 1987, pp. 239-241). 
Whilst Peter was largely engaged in a self-reflective exercise, being able to bring some 
of this experience out into the open and to share it in a receptive space was beneficial 
and helped him to move on. My role in this instance was not to interpret what was 
happening, but to be a receptive audience for Peter’s own self-reflective process.  
 
 
Hunt, C., & West, L. (2006). Learning in a border country: using psychodynamic ideas 
in teaching and research. Studies in the Education of Adults, 38(2), 160-177. 
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Appendix VI 
Picture taken in April 2008 that led to the haiku ‘Snow blossoms in spring’. 
 
 
 
A net of branches 
cast against an open sky 
snow blossoms in spring 
 
 
